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PREFACE
I present the following material less as discovered 
Truth and Reality and more as a personal exploration of the 
relationships within knowledge as I have come to construct 
and experience them. Thus, this document is more of an 
invitation to the reader to explore the ways that I, at 
times quite subjectively, have attempted to construct my 
world. In this regard, I have always felt that at the heart 
of the intellectual enterprise there is net to be found a 
mature, objective adult who carefully scrutinizes the facts 
and checks each hypothesis with precison, but more likely a 
child playing with building blocks making one structure, and 
when that falls, spontaneously beginning the construction of 
another without a second thought. It is this spirit of 
"serious play" that I have attempted to cultivate during the 
construction of this document.
People are becoming increasingly aware of the degree to 
which we all construct our worlds on the basis of our 
personal experience. In some small degree, this work 
represents my own attempt to integrate my world, an attempt 
to provide answers to questions which have long troubled me. 
Only my readers can decide if my answers and the synthesis 
they provide are useful for their purposes.
This work was constructed as a complete system, each 
part or chapter builds upon the previous chapter’s 
conclusions. To aid the reader in keeping some perspective 
on this, a summary of the main points of the chapter are 
presented on the following page of each chapter in a section 
titled: "OVEBVIEW." These sections are not intended to 
summarize the content of each chapter as much as they are a 
distillation of the major points as they form a basis for 
the operation of succeeding chapters. Major conclusions are 
presented, not the evidence upon which the conclusions are 
based. For the latter, the reader is directed to the 
content of the chapter pioper.
Chapters IV through VIII relate information about 
China. This inquiry has relied, in assembling this 
material, upon secondary sources only. Therefore, these 
sections will include extensive quotations from known 
scholars in the area of Chinese studies. The use of long 
quotations, I think, is justified by the fact that I am 
limited to secondary sources and I would like to relate as 
much of the context for the specific quotation as is 
possible. To establish my case, I feel it necessary to 
examine in detail recurrent themes in Chinese knowledge.
Some readers may, at times, find these chapters a bit 
ponderous. Given these circumstances, the reader may find 
the overviews of these chapters helpful in providing 
continuity to the work as a whole.
VThis work has taken shape over a number of years. As 
its structure has evolved and changed, so has the world to 
which this work will be presented. One of these key changes 
has been toward a neutrality toward sexual roles. This 
presents certain difficulties because this work was prepared 
in a style which relied on the word "man" as its key 
referent.
Recently the American Psychological Association (1977) 
has published guidelines for "de-sexing" their professional 
publications. In the following work, I have tried to adhere 
to these guidelines as completely as possible. Since much 
of this manuscript was prepared prior to such an 
endorsement, the reader is asked to tolerate awkward 
phrasing at certain points,.
Another change that has occurred is the tendency to 
accept as valid knowledge based on personal experience which 
can be related in less formal terms. Even in science, it is 
beginning to be recognized that there is a major personal 
component in all that the scientist does. Perhaps at the 
expense of scholarly detachment and scientific objectivity, 
the use of the first person will predominate throughout this 
document. This is done less fcr convenience than as a means 
of relating a certain guality about the material itself.
In closing, I would like to acknowledge the support 
others have given me over the years,. First and foremost, I 
would like to thank Dr. Frederick b. Jervis whose 
intellectual stimulation made the conceptual structure of
this inquiry possible. I would also like to thank Dr. Peter
S. Fernaid under whose direction the present manuscript was 
prepared. It was cnly through Dr. Fernald's courage and 
support that this manuscript can now be submitted as partial 
fulfillment for this degree.
I would also like to offer my gratitude to the other 
members of my doctoral committee, Dr,. R. Valentine Dusek,
Dr. David E. Leary, Dr. Carleton P. Henge, and Dr. William 
R. Woodward, who demonstrated sustained interest in this 
project and offered constructive criticism. Dr. Hung-Min 
Chiang, while not a member of the doctoral committee, was 
gracious enough to give of his time to review a version of 
my manuscript and provided valuable suggestions for 
improvement, particularly in the sections concerning China.
The technical assistance cf Frank 0. Smith in 
proofreading this document and cf David LaBianca in 
preparing the photographic materials is most appreciated.
Last, but certainly not the least, with full Confucian 
spirit, I wish to acknowledge the support of my parents.
Hr. and Hrs. Joseph H. Hirabitc, during my entire academic 
career.
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ABSTRACT 
CHINESE AND WESTERN HAN:
A CHALLENGE TO THE ASSUMPTION OF AN INHERENT NATURE
TO HUHAN BEINGS
by
JOSEPH JOHN HIRAEITO 
University cf New Hampshire, 1979
This inguiry attempts to challenge the assumption that 
human beings have an inherent nature. Such a program would 
appear to be justified by the fact that the current 
psychological framework cf human beings appears to have 
inherent limitations in its capacity to encompass the human 
potentials of people as knowers and as the known.
A theory of frameworks is suggested which views the 
limitations or boundary conditions of a framework as the 
product of the guestions that are asked and the assumed 
context in which they are asked. From this perspective, an 
analysis is made of the current limitations of the 
traditional psychological framework. It is suggested that 
these limitations are the result of the guestions that the 
psychologist asks which are, in turn, limited by the 
assumption that human beings have an inherent nature.
xii
xiii
A survey is made of traditional methods in respect to 
their appropriateness for challenging this assumption. 
Finding these methods inappropriate, the Method of 
Alternative Assumed Contexts for Questioning is constructed 
which bases its operation on the generation of alternative 
assumed contexts, the asking cf the same question in each 
context, and examining the consequences in the alternative 
frameworks.
Alternative assumed contexts are presented for 
Traditional China and the west. The assumption of unity is 
suggested as underlying the Chinese framework, while the 
inverse assumption of divisibility is presented for the 
West. These alternative assumed contexts produce a 
different process cf questioning in each framework. These 
alternative frameworks have consequences in the way human 
beings experience and function. The traditional Chinese 
experienced and functioned within a context of unity, and 
hence tended to unify what is in the West assumed to be 
divided. Specific examples are given in each of three 
areas: experience and functioning toward Nature, toward 
others and toward the self. Finally, the areas themselves 
are shown to be unified and to be the product of a process 
of questioning based on unity.
The relation between the process of questioning and the 
consequent experience and function of people is presented as 
a challenge to the assumption cf an inherent nature to human 
beings. The results suggest that much of what we view as
"inherent” in human beings is a function of viewing them 
from a singular process of questioning. Skepticism is 
expressed about the prospects cf constructing a complete 
framework based on the assumption cf an inherent human 
nature.
The results also generate an alternative assumed 
context which views human nature as a product of the process 
of questioning through which it is viewed. This alternative 
is used as a basis for dealing with the central problem of 
encompassing human potentials. Within the alternative 
suggested, human beings, as the known, construct their own 
potentials from their process cf questioning, with these 
potentials being limited only by the fact that they must 
remain within some process of guesticning,. Likewise, the 
potentials of the human being as a knower are equally 
contained within this very same process and have the same 
limitations and potentials as the human being who is known.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Kuhn (1962) has suggested that the development of 
scientific knowledge is a discontinuous, revolutionary 
process, which involves the challenging of traditional modes 
of operation and the substitution of an entirely new 
framework.. The revolution involves the transcendence of the 
current paradigm, which has served to guide intellectual 
activity, in favor of a new paradigm which provides an 
alternative orientation.
This notion of the revolution of a paradigm as the 
central process of the development in scientific knowledge 
challenges traditional biases toward viewing the development 
of knowledge as a continuous process where knowledge is 
expanded almost in an ate sic manner, where false assertions 
about the nature cf the world are continually and additively 
replaced by true assertions. Within this view, the paradigm 
or field of discourse within which the assertions are made 
is not challenged: only the content of the paradigm, the 
assertions, are challenged.
Kuhn does make provision for non-paradigmatic change 
within his model. During non-revolutionary periods, there 
is “normal science," where the major endeavor is "puzzle 
solving." Within this period, the paradigm is assumed and
l
2the tools of the paradigm are employed to solve the problem 
presented. These problems are regarded as capable of being 
resolved given adeguate elaboration of the methodological 
orientation of the paradigm and the innovative application 
of these methods.
ALTERNATIVE DIRECTIONS FOE INQUIRY
The Kuhnian model has direct implications for any 
inguiry which has the purpose of changing knowledge. While 
change does occur within the non-revclutionary phase, the 
most significant changes occur when the paradigm itself is 
challenged and the process of revolution stimulated. The 
piecemeal changes which occur within normal science are 
important to this process, but not central.
At any one given time, the Kuhnian position reguires 
that each investigator make an evaluation of where efforts 
should be directed. If it is the investigator*s evaluation 
that the current paradigm is dominant and will be dominant 
in the future, then efforts would be best directed toward 
investigations which assume the paradigm as a given and 
define problems as puz2les which maybe resolved given 
diligent work. Alternatively, the investigator may make the 
evaluation that the current paradigm is about to be 
challenged. Efforts, given this analysis, would best be 
directed toward investigations which have the purpose of 
challenging the paradigm.
3The responsibility of the investigator within the 
Kuhnian model is considerably expanded. Problems cannot be 
merely taken as given. Some evaluation must be made as to 
the source of the problem: as a puzzle within the paradigm 
or as an indication of the limitations of the paradigm 
itself. In this manner, the investigator can be thought of 
as constructing or defining the problem rather than 
encountering a problem as.something external to one*s own 
process of evaluation.
LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT HOMAN PARADIGM
This inquiry will be concerned with challenging a 
central assumption of the current human paradigm which is 
dominant in contemporary psychology. Since I have assumed 
this direction for inquiry, it is required that I present 
some evidence which has led me to make the evaluation that 
my efforts would be best directed toward an inquiry of this 
nature.
At the core of my evaluation is the feeling that 
psychology is rapidly approaching a revolutionary phase in 
the knowledge of human beings and that the current paradigm 
will be replaced with an alternative. It follows that some 
evidence may be presented from contemporary psychology which 
would indicate that the paradigm is in jeopardy. The 
remainder of this chapter will review some of the evidence 
that has suggested to me that my efforts would be best 
directed toward an inguiry which challenges the current 
paradigm.
4Limitations in the Knowledge of Others
In our society, one of the most cherished values we 
hold about people is our belief that people have the 
potential to act in a democratic fashion. Because of the 
complete acceptance of cur belief in this potential, it 
becomes a convenient baffle tc demonstrate a problem. For 
as the framework cf the person, as currently employed by 
psychology, is expanded, a limitation is revealed: there is 
no capacity for the person’s democratic potentials. Our 
democratic image of the person becomes systematically 
excluded.
Allport (1955) recognized the limitation and the
dilemma so produced for psychology when he pointed to the
inability of cur psychological framework of the person to
extend from the laboratory-clinic setting to the ballot box.
He writes that modern psychology is in a dilemma created by
the gulf that exists between the image of the person that
the current framework presents to us and our cherished
democratic image:
Up to now the ’behavioral sciences,' including 
psychology, have net provided us with a picture of 
man capable of creating or living in a 
democracy . . . .  They have delivered into our 
hands a psychology cf an ’empty organism', pushed 
by drives and molded by environmental 
circumstance. Shat is small and partial, what is 
external and mechanical, what is early, what is 
peripheral and opportunistic have received the 
chief attention of psychological system builders.
But the theory cf democracy requires also that man 
possess a measure of rationality, a portion of 
freedom, a generic conscience, propriate ideals, 
and unigue value. He cannot defend the ballet box 
or liberal education, nor advocate free discussion 
and democratic institutions, unless man has the 
potential capacity to profit therefrom, (p. 100)
5Here we meet the limitation of our framework of the 
person directly# and the problem is given a concrete form. 
Nothing can make the problem more explicit than the 
perplexing cleavage of thought that it forces upon us. 
Allport writes of this cleavage: MNo paradox is more 
striking then that of the scientist who as a citizen makes 
one set of psychological assumptions# and in his laboratory 
and writings makes opposite assumptions respecting the 
nature of man." (p. 33) What makes this duality necessary 
is the limitation imposed by a framework which cannot 
entertain both images of the person within a unified field. 
This framework’s inability to encompass people’s potentials 
as democratic human beings reduces the very character of our 
democratic image of them.
What makes the above example of limitation of our 
framework of the person explict is that most of us endorse 
this democratic image. However# this example is a special 
case of a more general limitation. As has become 
increasingly apparent to some sections of the psychological 
community, the current framework# given its expansion# 
reduces not only the democratic potentials of people but, 
also, their human potentials. I am, of course# referring to 
the so called "third force" in psychology today# that loose 
federation of existential and humanistic psychologists.
This segment has been particularly vocal in its opinion that 
our current framework systematically reduces human 
potentials. Within this group also there is entertained the
6belief that the person is always capable of transcending any 
limitations imposed from without and can exert new 
potentials beyond the limitations the psychologist assumes 
they possess.
The movement where the general case has, perhaps, been
most explicitly stated is within humanistic psychology.
From this perspective, Severin (1965) provides us with this
definition of the limitations:
Many psychologists who ask themselves ’what is 
man?' are less than satisfied with the human image 
their science has created. It seems too 
fragmentary, too rigid, too lacking in unity and 
individuality to reflect adequately the autonomy, 
spontaneity, and creativity of the real people 
with whom they deal. (p. v)
This protest is but one of many and could easily be
duplicated a hundredfold from the writings within
contemporary psychology.
At this point, the framework as the psychologist
employs it could be defended by the argument that
psychology, as a discipline, is still a young science, our
framework is in its infancy, and as such must content itself
for the time being with what has been termed by Allport as
the "crude and simple" aspects cf human beings. It would be
suggested that, with the course of time, modifications can
be made in the framework to obviate the problem I have
presented.
Without becoming ensnared in historical issues, such an 
argument does not adequately take into account the full 
extent of the problem as it is embedded in the foundations
7of oar framework of human beings. What is being contended 
is that it is the framework itself that is the source of the 
limitation and the producer of the problem, not its present 
level of refinement. Our current framework has limitations 
inherent within itself tc deal with the person's potentials 
regardless of the sophistication of our methodology or the 
extent of our data collection with which the framework is 
supported. The problem cannot fce obviated by "discovering 
some new facts" or by "changing an assumption here or 
there." The problem as made manifest by this limitation is 
more basic.
Writing from the perspective of existential psychology.
Hay (1960) seems tc have become acutely aware of the
inherent limitations of our current framework to ever
understand a 'living' human being:
There seems tc be the following 'law' at work: 
the more accurately and comprehensively we can 
describe a given mechanism, the more we lose the 
existing person. Thg ffill ctbj=olutely and 
S2§£il£llX XI fa£J5J)ll£l ihe fo^ces~<?y drives, fog 
E2II XI III illisins ibstlS&iSSI agd ngt th§
lixiBI hgmap bejqg. For the living 
person . . .  always transcends the given 
mechanism . . . .  (p. 18, His italics)
May seems to be ruling out, in prfofopjg. the possible
extension of our current framework to ever include a
person's full existence, by suggesting a 'law* akin to
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in quantum theory, a
principle that seems to place limitations not on what we
currently know, but on the very capacity of a framework to
know.
8Limitations in the Knowledge cf Ourselves
As we extend our framework inward, we find the 
framework limits our own potentials to function and 
experience as knowers. Technically, the problem is defined 
in psychology by the problem cf reflexivity in theorizing.
On one pole, we consider ourselves to be psychologists and 
knowers, exercising a certain autonomy of action and 
responding to reason. On the ether pole, the object of our 
theorizing, the person in our framework of knowledge, is 
alternatively conceived as a creature of motivation, 
responding deterministically tc stimuli. As we turn the 
latter image of the human being back upon the former image 
in a reflexive manner, the problem of the limitations of our 
framework to encompass the potentials of the knower is 
acutely defined.
He psychologists have been understandably reluctant to 
deal with the basic problem of reflexivity in knowledge; 
the fact that the human framework must not only deal with 
others but alsc with ourselves as knowers seems to have 
almost eluded our attention. With the exception of the 
personal construct theory proposed by Kelly (1963), 
psychological theorists have net dealt with or made special 
provision for reflexivity within their theories. While the 
archives of psychology are full of theoretical formulations 
of how other men behave, there is little on how we 
psychologists function as knowers. While elaborate theories 
have been constructed tc account for the behavior of other
9people# there is little elaboration on a theory which could
account for the behavior of psychological theorists when
they generate these complex theories. Psychologists have#
it seems# failed to recognize the simple and basic fact
that, as Kelly (1963) states# "if the theory is to account
for the way in which a man turns# it should also account for
the way its author turned when he wrote it." (p. 39)
When we attempt to deal with reflexivity and extend our
current framework to the psychologist as a knower# we are
again presented with a limitation and the experience of a
problem. At the heart of this paradox is a framework which
reguires that the psychologist, metaphorically# must "speak
with a forked tongue." As Maslcw (1966) has recognized:
It was as if psychologists then lived by two 
mutually exclusive sets of rules or as if they 
spoke two different languages for different 
purposes. If they were interested in working with 
animals or with part-processes in human beings, 
they could be ’experimental and scientific 
psychologists.’ But if they were interested in 
whole persons (we may add like themselves)# these 
laws and methods were not of much help. (p. 8)
Acutely aware of these limitations# Bannister (1970)
has called psychology an "exercise in paradox." He writes:
But in our more solemn moments we seem to prefer 
the paradoxical view that psychologists are 
explainers# predictors and experimenters# whereas 
the organism# God bless him, is a very different 
kettle of fish. (p. 5)
Bannister goes on to extend our framework of human beings to
its ultimate extreme and makes the paradoxical conseguences
explicit:
If we follow the logic of non-reflexive 
psychological theories still further we arrive in 
the middle of the Skinnerian fantasy world in
10
which we can be convinced that once ill the data 
is safely gathered in then we can control and 
manipulate men in every detail. We are now faced 
with the paradox of puppets controlling puppets.
(p. 8)
The problem of reflexivity and its perplexities 
generally can be completely avoided by many psychologists 
because they work within a miciotheory within the larger 
framework. They are net concerned with the universal 
implications of their assumptions and conclusions. These 
implications may be safely relegated to the distant future 
or dismissed as superfluous flights of metaphysical 
speculation. It is only in the world of fantasy, at 
present, that the full implications of reflexivity on the 
psychologist as knewer can be examined.
One such exercise in imagination of psychology’s future 
is presented in detail by Skinner in his utopian novel, 
Wajdefl II. Walden II is the ultimate application of what 
the psychologist has learned about people to the design of a 
complete social organization. This, then, represents the 
articulation of psychology’s framework, provided one is a 
Skinnerian, on the grand scale. In Walden II, human 
behavior is controlled and manipulated from infancy. Here 
we have the ultimate application of the framework of person 
to humankind. It is in this situation also that the problem 
of the limitations of this framework and the resultant 
problems of reflexivity again manifest themselves.
11
For even in this utopian setting# Skinner finds it 
necessary to defend a non-reflexivity position# for without 
it the social framework of Walden II would dissolve into a 
paradox. To use Bannister's discription from above# this 
would be a case of " puppets controlling puppets." Skinner's 
•architect for his utopia, Frazer# freely admits that he 
could never have been a product of his own utopia. Even in 
this complete application of the framework# the constructor 
of the framework must be separated from his creation# if the 
system is to work. Skinner# through Frazer# acknowledges 
the problem through a vocal denial of any reflexivity in his 
knowledge:
Isn't it enough that I've made other men likable 
and happy and productive? Bust I posess the 
virtues which I've proved to be best suited to a 
well-ordered society? Must I exhibit the 
interests and skills and untrammeled spirit which 
I've learned how to engender in others? Must I 
wear them all like a damned manikin? After all# 
emulation isn't the only principle of 
education— all the saints to the contrary. Must 
the doctor share the health of his patient? Must 
the icthyologist swim like a fish? Must the maker 
of firecrackers pop? (Skinner# 1965, pp. 249-50)
The limitation of the framework to encompass the knower
does not dissolve in the utopian setting but becomes more
acute. In this condition# people seem to adhere very
stubbornly to the paradoxical position that the person who
knows# the person who reinforces# must be separated from and
cannot be encompassed within the same framework as are
community of people that are designed and reinforced. In
examining the utopian setting above# the point can be more
directly seen that the problem lies in the foundations of
12
our framework cf the person, not in its present level of 
articulation. The limitations demonstrated are not a 
product of our ignorance, but rather are contained in the 
manner in which we construct knowledge about ourselves.
What has been revealed is an inherent limitation in the 
capacity of our framework of the person to encompass the 
human being as a knower similar to the limitations of the 
mathematical framework presented by Godel’s proof which 
seems to set limits on the ability of the framework to know. 
As Bronowski (1968) has recognized, there is an essential 
difficulty in a human framework produced by the "self 
reference" that underlies it everywhere. Reflexivity and 
its associated problems run like a deep fissure to the very 
foundations of psychology’s framework of the person. 
Bronowski concludes that this difficulty cannot be simply 
resolved by the occasional addition of a new axiom here or 
there.
Psychology is not unigue in experiencing the 
limitations of its framework of the person. As psychology 
is related to other social sciences and shares their more 
general framework, it is possible to detect parallel 
problems in other social sciences. For example, the same 
problem of reflexivity can be revealed in sociology.
As Gouldner (1970) has recognized, the sociologist, 
like the psychologist, functions toward people with a 
certain duality of purpose, a duality that shares the common 
mark of non-reflexive theorizing in psychology: the tendency
13
for the sociologist to regard ether people as believing out 
of need and the sociologist as a knower as believing because 
of the dictates of logic and reason. Gouldner suggests that 
there must be developed a reflexive sociology which would 
view the sociologist and the person being studied within a 
methodological monism as people comprising not two distinct 
breeds but one breed of man. The work of Gouldner in 
sociology runs parallel to the theoretical orientation of 




The work c£ Kuhn was used to suggest an alternative 
direction for inquiry. It was suggested that each 
investigator must make an evaluation of where efforts would 
be best directed— toward working within the current paradigm 
or framework or challenging that paradigm or framework.
Evidence was presented which has led this investigator 
to conclude that efforts are best directed toward 
challenging psychology's framework of the person.
Limitations of this framework of the person were reviewed as 
they relate to knowledge of others and to psychologists as 
knowers.
CHAPTER II
A BASIS FOR FRAMEWORKS AND PSYCHOLOGY'S FRAMEWORK
It has become apparent to me that an orientation which 
requires the challenging of psychology's framework of the 
person, also requires a larger framework within which to 
accomplish this task. The challenge to any framework 
assumes at least seme knowledge or at least some speculation 
about how frameworks are structured and function. As a 
consequence, I have found it necessary to develop some 
opinions about the dynamics of frameworks.
A THEORY OF FRAMEWORKS 
What initiated my investigations into frameworks was 
the feeling that the current psychological framework of the 
person was limited, not by current levels of knowledge, but 
by something more fundamental within the structure and 
function of frameworks. This led me to examine the source 
of the limitations of any framework or of frameworks in 
general.
Questions as Double-edged Swords
Defining a framework is a difficult problem for it is 
not a thing, but a fundamental relation in knowledge. The 
key element in defining a framework is the means by which 
this relation becomes fixed. 'Framework' as the concept is 
being used here is not a static entity which can be given
15
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definition by enumerating its attributes by a number of 
declarative sentences. The term framework refers to 
something more elusive in quality, that is to the manner in 
which people relate to their knowledge.
Framework has a "global" impact, relating to both 
thinking and doing: what people think as well as how people 
behave. A framework is, then, a general interpretive medium 
for both experience and function. A framework would appear 
to transcend the meaning of only an axiomatic system. It 
involves not only thought, but also action. This is what is 
referred to when I use the term "functional" in describing a 
framework.
The second term I use to describe a framework is 
"relation." A framework is not an entity, but a relation 
between the framework and what is not of the framework. A 
framework, then, cannot exist fully as an isolated entity. 
For example, the Newtonian framework could not be fully 
defined as a framework independent from something beyond the 
framework. However, in contrast to the framework of 
relativity, given this relational condition, the Newtonian 
framework could be defined for what it was. This need for 
alternatives in defining frameworks will be used to 
advantage in the following chapters of this inquiry.
Since a framework is a relation, to define a framework 
one must attempt to uncover the principle by which this 
relation is fixed. Boundary conditions, by fixing this 






mechanism, I can refer to a familiar phenomenon in the 
psychology of perception, the Gestalt figure. This is more 
than a pure analogy for a framework is actually a Gestalt 
phenomenon in itself. In Figure 1, we find a familiar 
gestalt figure in which the perception can be that of a 
goblet or the faces of twins. The important point in this 
example is that the boundary conditions— what we assume to 
be the boundary between the black and white surfaces— serve 
to fix the relation between figure and ground defining the 
framework of what we see. If we consider the black surface 
to be the ground, the goblet appears. If we consider the 
white surface to be the ground, the twins appear. Essential 
to our perception, then, is the relation between figure and 
ground as revealed by what we assume to be a boundary.
In similar manner, the boundary conditions define a 
framework by fixing the relation between the framework and 
what is not the framework* These boundary conditions are a 
function of our knowlecus. For example, it,has been 
demonstrated experimentally that variables presented before 
the presentation of the stimulus in Figure 1, psychological 
sets, can affect the final product of the perception. In a 
similar fashion, the dynamics of one’s knowledge affect the 
boundary conditions for one’s framework. It is to an 
analysis of these dynamics that I now turn.
A point of departure in the search for the boundary 
conditions for frameworks of knowledge is an observation 
made by the historian and philosopher of science Stephen
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Toulmin (1961), who noted:
The intellectual frame of a man’s thought displays 
itself less in the detailed results he enunciates 
than in the questions he asks and the assumptions 
which underlie his theorizing, (pp. 94-95)
This comment is very significant in providing a direction
and point of focus. It has been a traditional bias to
regard the framework of a person’s thought as the product of
encounters between the person’s knowledge and an external,
static limit imposed by the world. According to this view,
the limits of a framework of thought, i.e., its boundary
conditions, are the result of a process of exhaustion where
the knower is the inert recipient of the discovery of these
limits.
The importance of Toulmin*s comment is that it serves 
to redirect attention to the boundary conditions as they are 
set by a dynamic process of interaction which has as its 
dual point of focus the guesticns asked and the assumptions 
entertained. It is frcm this base that the boundary 
conditions are set. There is a confrontation between a long 
standing tradition in Western knowledge which treats 
knowledge as a response by a static observer to the 
"questions posed by nature," rather than as a dynamic 
process by which the knower constructs knowledge through 
questioning. It is only within the present century, with 
the development of relativity and quantum theory that this 
dynamic process cf construction has been demonstrated, for 
in both cases the knowledge of the observer has been shown 
to have a pronounced effect on the ultimate framework that
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comes to be known. To guote the quantum physicist, Werner 
Heisenberg:
Natural science does not simply describe and 
explain nature; it is a part of the interplay 
between nature and ourselves; it describes nature 
exposed tc our method of questioning. (Heisenberg,
1958, p. 81)
It is suggested that the source of the boundary 
conditions of one’s framework of knowledge arise from this 
dynamic process of questioning. Previously, it has been our 
bias to regard the limits of a framework of knowledge as 
being the result of 1;hat which js known. The impact of this 
process of questioning in producing the result has been 
largely obscured. However, the full impact of the process 
can be best demonstrated by examining a case where a 
framework of knowledge is delimited solely by this process, 
in short, where there is nothing to be known.
Spectorsky (1955) provides us with the opportunity for 
such a demonstration in his book, Thg Exurbanites, a 
sociological study of life in the suburbs of New York City. 
He describes a "game” current among members of the community 
he studied which demonstrates my point, sometimes quite 
embarrassingly.
The format of the "game" runs somewhat like this: One 
person of the group is chosen to be "It" and is told that 
the other members of the group will, in his absence, invent 
a story, and that his task, upon returning, is to guess this 
story ny asking the grcup guestions which can be answered by 
yes or no. In the "It's" absence, the group is told that no
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story will be invented and that the group is to give yes or 
no answers only on the basis of the last letter of the last 
word of the guestion, contingent only on its being a vowel 
or consonant. Here we have a case where the "It" must 
construct a system of knowledge where nothing is to be 
known. Amazingly, the "It," under most circumstances, 
constructs a coherent tale from the virtually random 
feedback. The questions that he asks tend to converge to 
produce a guite compelling and convincing story; so 
convincing that, Spectorsky reports, it is sometimes very 
difficult to convince the "It" that there was not a story 
and that he has constructed it!
In this "game," the almost compulsive, seductive hold 
of a process of questioning is revealed for what it is, 
since there is nothing to be known to begin with and the 
knowledge comes solely from the process itself. What is 
demonstrated is an effect similar to the principle of 
closure in Gestalt psychology, the tendency for us to 
provide closure for a framework of knowledge even when this 
closure is based on nothing but the continuous feedback to 
our questioning. There is a tendency for a process of 
questioning to converge and to limit the field from which we 
choose questions, based on the guestions we have previously 
answered. It is through this latter process that the 
boundary conditions for a framework cf knowledge are 
established.
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There is a quality, then, in a process of questioning, 
in the relation of asking questions, obtaining answers, and 
asking new questions based on those previously answered, 
which tends to fix a framework and its boundary conditions. 
The implications of this relation takes us far beyond the 
limits of this work. In the future, this factor should be 
taken into account in evaluating the closure of any system 
of knowledge for this closure may be a premature one, an 
artifact of one's process of questioning itself.
Questions are truly double-edged swords. They are not 
only responsible for providing closure to knowledge, but 
also for opening new vistas for knowledge provided one asks 
the right questions. In the above, I have concentrated on 
the role of questions in setting the limits or boundary 
conditions of knowledge. The inverse relation also requires 
investigation: asking a different question is instrumental 
in setting new boundary conditions. It seems simplistic and 
trite to summarize the above argument by saying that "one 
only gets answers to the questions one asks," but this is 
largely the case. To ask different questions is to get 
different answers, answers which may have the roots of a new 
framework of knowledge, if you will, new "discoveries" 
contained within them.
The process of questioning, then, plays an important 
and quite unheralded dual role in knowledge— that of 
expanding and limiting the boundaries of that knowledge. 
Here, again, we run counter to a very forceful bias in
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Western knowledge which attributes revolutions in knowledge 
to the discovery of new information. There is, however, 
some evidence that asking different guestions has played an 
important role in revolutions in knowledge, for it is 
through such a redirection in knowledge that we become 
attuned to the need for constructing new information. The 
central role of our process of questioning in science has ' 
been largely obscured by our biases; however, this dyn.amic 
process is the very mainspring of our scientific knowledge 
as Bronowski (1973) reminds us: "The essence of science:
ask an impertinent guestion, and you are on the way to the 
pertinent answer.” (p. 153)
£ hallmark in this matter is a perceptive comment made 
by Whitehead (Price, 1954) that "the 'silly question' is the 
first intimation cf some totally novel development.”
(p. 174) In short, some "silly guestions," but not all 
silly guestions, are "silly" because they lie beyond our 
current understanding and belong, as it were, to an as yet 
undeveloped framework of knowledge which these guestions are 
about to open before us. There is a further goad presented 
by the "silly" guestion for the production of an alternative 
framework based on this "silly guestion" for as Churchman 
(1968) has observed: "once you've asked a stupid guestion,
then you have to defend your right to ask it."
(pp. viii-ix) This defense generally includes the 
formulation of a framework where the guestion is no longer 
silly or stupid, but is the most significant guestion.
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As a case in point, an examination will be made of the
role of "silly questions" in perhaps the most profound
revolution in knowledge of the universe in this century, the
change from the Newtonian universe to the relativistic
universe of Einstein- There is evidence that Einstein’s
giant leap into a new framework for physical knowledge was
as much a product of asking "silly guestions" as a product
of the discovery of new information. Indeed, much of the
information that Einstein used in constructing his theory
had been publicly available for decades. I will examine the
roots of relativity as they are grounded in the character of
the questions Einstein asked.
Wertheimer (1959), who had the opportunity to
extensively interview Einstein about the cognitive basis of
his development of relativity, has pointed to Einstein's
tendency from an early age to ask "silly guestions,"
questions which were in his later years to lead him to
alternative framework of physical thought. Wertheimer
(1959) writes:
The problem started when Einstein was sixteen 
years old, a pupil in the Gymnasium . . . .  It was 
then that the great problem really started to 
trouble him. He was intensely concerned with it 
for seven years; from the moment, however, that 
he came to guestion the customary concept of time, 
it took him only five weeks to write his paper on 
relativity . . . .  The process started in a way 
that was not clear, and is therefore difficult to 
describe— in a certain state of being puzzled.
First came such questions as: what if one were to 
run after a ray of light? What if one were riding 
on the beam? If one were to run after a ray of 
light as it travels, would its velocity thereby be 
decreased? If one were to run fast enough would 
it no longer move at all? . . .  to young Einstein 
this seemed strange, (p. 214)
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These questions that young Einstein asked were, indeed, 
"silly questions" given the Newtonian framework of his day; 
yet, it was these very guestions that guided him to a new 
framework. It is easy to see that the guestions Einstein 
was asking, while "silly questions" in the classical 
framework, were the most significant questions in his new 
relativistic framework.
Einstein, then, was a man who from his early youth had 
the capacity to use this process of questioning and the 
questions he asked to great advantage. Einstein, instead of 
using the process of questioning to generate new information 
within the classical framework, manipulated the process 
itself to open new realms of knowledge in an alternative 
framework. This was Einstein's gift, as Bronowski (1973) 
eloquently describes it: "Einstein was a man who could ask 
immensely simple questions. And what his life showed, and 
his work, is that when the answers are simple too, then you 
hear God thinking." (p. 256)
If we turn for a moment to the ether great revolution 
in modern physics, quantum theory, we can find evidence of 
other thinkers who recognized the all-powerful effects of 
one's process of questioning. Chief among the authors of 
this revolution was the physicist Niels Bohr, a man who was 
quite aware of the need to be extremely careful with one's 
questions. Bronowski (1973) relates that "He used to begin 
his lecture courses by saying to his students, 'Every 
sentence that I utter should be regarded by you not as an
FIGURE 2
THE EFFECT OF CONTEXT ON PROGRAMMING PERCEPTION 
(AFTER ORNSTEIN, 1972)
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assertion but as a question.*" (p. 334) It was this 
openness to questions* of which this is but an example* 
which served Bohr admirably in founding a new framework for 
physics.
Questions are Asked in an.Assumed Context
This work is committed to a context theory of meaning: 
that the meaning of a part does not reside in that part 
alone* but the relation cf the part to the whole. Such a 
view is not alien to psychology; this view has been 
supported by the Gestalt psychologists who have recognized 
the effect of the whole on our perception of the part. This 
conception has been particularly useful in visual 
perception. Likewise* a large body of experimental evidence 
has been amassed which demonstrates the role of set as a 
context on perceived meaning.
For example, Ornstein (1972) has pointed to context 
effects as a model for the selection process in perception. 
Ornstein presents the structure in Figure 2 to illustrate 
the point. The meaning of the central symbol is dependent 
on the context in which it is assumed to be placed. If the 
context is numeric* the symbol is perceived as a number. If 
the context is alphabetic* the symbol is perceived as a 
letter. Such context or set effects have been the object of 
experimentation for some time within psychology.
Such relations and principles* however* are not limited 
to the psychology cf set or the psychology of perception. 
Hanson (1969)* for example* extends these principles into
FIGURE 3
THE DUCK-RABBIT FIGURE 
(AFTER HANSON, 1969)
FIGURE 4
THE DUCK-RABBIT FIGURE IN THE CONTEXT OF DUCKS 





THE DUCK-RABBIT FIGURE IN THE CONTEXT OF RABBITS 
ASSUMES THE MEANING OF A RABBIT 
(AFTER HANSON, 1969)
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the philosophy of science arguing that "facts" are dependent 
upon a theoretical context for their meaning and cannot 
stand alone. "Facts," he argues, are theory laden and 
cannot be treated in isolation. He gives the example that 
even the "fact" of the sun's rising can be given alternative 
meanings dependent cn the context of knowledge. The 
thirteenth century thinker would see the "fact" in the 
context of the astronomical knowledge of the time as a 
"sunrise," while the twentieth century astronomer views the 
same "fact" as a "horizon turn."
Hanson provides us with the following concrete example 
of the effect of context on meaning. The drawing in Figure 
3 when placed in the context shewn in Figure 4 is seen as a 
rabbit and when placed in the context of Figure 5, it 
appears as a duck. While this example admittedly is 
simplistic, it demonstrates a very important, and sometimes 
unnoticed, effect of context on organization of our 
perceived meaning.
Likewise, within mathematics, Frege (1959) has 
recognized the principle of context as being of great value 
in his investigations into the concept cf number. He 
observes that it is only in the context of a proposition 
that symbols have any meaning. This principle, Frege 
states, is the key to understanding some rather puzzling 
problems in mathematics generated by taking terms out of 
context as identities. Frege sees this principle as having 
application beyond the domain of mathematics proper.
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The degree to which human beings are "context" 
processors is generally not recognized until an attempt is 
made to duplicate human processes through the use of a 
machine. Dreyfus (1972) points to the failure of the 
glowing predictions of just a decade ago that computers 
could produce readable translations to come to fruition.
The failure is largely dependent on the fact that a word is 
not just a configuration of sounds and letters, but acquires 
meaning according to its context in the sentence. It has 
become increasingly apparent tc those working in the field 
that there is great difficulty in programming a computer to 
produce such expected meanings from the context in which the 
word is contained.
Raphael (1976) provides an amusing example of the 
failure of the computer tc appreciate meaning in context.
The biblical quotation, "*The spirit is willing but the 
flesh is weak.*" was translated by computer from English to 
Russian and back again. The result was: "The vine is
agreeable, but the meat has spoiled." (p. 180) Anyone to 
whom I have ever related this story has had no problem in 
seeing that the computer was responding to the literal 
meaning of the words and not the contextual meaning.
Focusing the context principle of meaning on guestions, 
it follows that the guestions we ask do not stand in 
isolation nor do they possess self-sufficent meaning. 
Questions are not in themselves meaningful or "silly" for 
that matter; the context makes them so. It is in relation
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to this context that the meaning emerges. For example, we
noted above, in the case of Einstein and his questioning
which led to relativity, that within the context of
classical Newtonian theory, the guestions the young Einstein
asked were, indeed, "silly" questions. Yet, in the context
of relativity, these 33j0£ questions were the most meaningful
questions.. The context of physical theory, then, played a
crucial role in defining the meaning of questions about the
nature of light and observer*s place in the universe.
Central to a further analysis of the context of
questioning is the role of assumptions. ‘Assumption,* as
the term is normally used in thought, refers only to an
axiom or proposition upon which knowledge is based.. The
term as it is employed here refers tc something more basic
and global. Assumptions are not just axioms as in geometry,
but are also premises in the "geometry for living."
Assumptions refer, as do frameworks of which they are
elements, to both what we think and what we do. This term
is used to refer to the manifold which contains both our
thought aqd action. My meaning is perhaps most closely
approximated by Polanyi (1958) in his definition of
presuppositions:
When we accept a certain set cf pre-suppositions 
and use them as our interpretative framework, we 
may be said to dwell in them as we do in our own 
body. Their uncritical acceptance for the time 
being consists in a process of assimilation by 
which we identify curselves with them. They are 
not asserted and cannot be asserted, for assertion 
can be made only wj.tftitfl a framework with which we 
have identified ourselves for the time being; as 
they are themselves our ultimate framework, they 
are essentially inarticulable. (p. 60)
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It is this "in-dwelling" quality of assumptions which gives 
us an assumed context for our knowledge. Just as people 
dwell within their bodies and use them, quite unconsciously, 
as a basis for their behavior, one uses assumptions and the 
framework that arises from them as an assumed context for 
functioning.
The assumed context can be spoken of as an 
"interpretative framework." One should recognize, however, 
that the framework a person functions within as an 
individual is not unique in all aspects to themselves, but 
that the framework is itself contained within the framework 
of institutions, these in turn contained in the framework of 
nations, and, finally, they are all contained in an 
essential degree by the cosmic assumed context provided by a 
culture. Assumptions and the process by which they function 
are transpersonal in their origins, providing the assumed 
context, not only for the individual but for a culture as 
well. This dimension is one of degree cnly, for one can 
identify the same process all along the dimension from the 
individual to the culture. Just as the individuals within a 
culture have assumptions which form the interpretative 
framework for function, so does an entire culture or epoch 
have certain assumptions which lead to an interpretative 
framework.
Lovejoy (1957) has recognized the operation of a common 
assumed context from the level of the individual to the 
level of the culture. He writes: "There are, first.
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implicit or incompletely explicit a§S3ia£ii2B5* or more or 
less gnconscious m^n^al &§]&££# operating in the thought of 
an individual or a generation.11 (p. 7) Lovejoy goes on to 
give the example of the pervasiveness of the assumed context 
of "simplicity" in the age of Enlightment of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries which made them ages of qsplits 
§i2LEli§i§s.
In a similar manner, Whitehead (1925) finds that
assumptions provide the framework for philosophy and for
individual philosophers within an epoch:
When you are criticising the philosophy of an 
epoch, do not chiefly direct your attention to 
those intellectual positions which its exponents 
feel it necessary explicitly to defend. There 
will be some fundamental assumptions which 
adherents of all the variant systems within the 
epoch unconsciously presuppose. Such assumptions 
appear so obvious that people dc not know what 
they are assuming because no other way of putting 
things has ever occurred to them. With these 
assumptions a certain limited number of types of 
philosophic systems are possible, and this group 
of systems constitutes the philosophy of the 
epoch. (p. 69)
This pervasive quality of assumptions and the assumed 
context that arises from them, dispersing as it does in the 
hierarchy of levels from the cultural to the individual and 
back again, has great importance for the approach in this 
inquiry. It means at any given level, the real basis for 
the assumed context can best be defined at the most 
subsuming condition: the cultural level. It is important, 
then, in defining the global character of assumptions to 
understand the full dimensionality of this concept.
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Assumptions— as they have been defined as an assumed 
context for knowledge, an interpretative framework— so color 
the world that it is difficult, if net impossible, for one 
to recognize the assumptions that one holds. There is great 
difficulty in making an assumed context explicit when that 
assumed context lies at the basis cf one’s functioning. 
Assumptions and the assumed context to which they give rise 
must remain in the twilight of awareness, remaining "tacit" 
to use Polanyi’s term. We should note above that both 
Lovejoy (1957) and Whitehead (1925) use the term 
"unconscious" to describe the effect of assumptions on their 
holders. This is the root cf Polanyi’s pessimistic 
assessment made above that assumptions cannot be defined 
because they are the basis by which assertions are made to 
begin with.
I am reminded of the philosopher’s argument that if one 
could only perceive shades of red, one.could not recognize 
red as a color. It is only when one sees the full spectrum 
of colors that one is freed from this red-shaded world. 
Likewise, assumptions so color the world that it is 
difficult to recognize them within the world they have, 
themselves, created, until this world is transcended. 
Assumptions cannot be defined directly. Rather, the problem 
must be approached obliquely. Whitehead's advice given 
above not to "chiefly direct your attention to those 
intellectual positions which its exponents feel it necessary 
explicitly to defend," is certainly appropriate here.
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attention should be directed, alternatively, to what 
positions are not defended— that is, to places where the 
framework itself falls short.
It follows, then, that assumptions and an assumed 
context can be made most explicit when transcended. When 
the assumption or assumed context fails, and its influence 
wanes, the assumption cr assumed context can be made most 
vulnerable to detection. A gliSSlElS fif -};rai)scefldenc$ can 
thus be asserted for making assumptions explicit. It 
follows, also, that when the assumed context is transcended, 
and shown to produce a paradox, that assumed context is made 
most explicit. Prior tc this condition of transcendence, 
one is simply using the framework based on this assumption 
as a tool and does not experience its reality. In applying 
this principle for making assumptions explicit, one should 
seek the point where the assumed context generates a 
paradox.
To provide this principle with substance, an example 
can be given from psychoanalysis. Freud developed an 
elaborate theory of human beings; however, he did not and 
could not make explicit the assumed context upon which it 
was constructed. A significant part of this assumed context 
was made explicit when Malinowski (1927) attempted to apply 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory, in the field, to natives of 
the Trobriand Islands of the Pacific. It was through 
Malinowski1s experiences with the paradoxes that were 
generated, that he recognized that Freudian psychoanalytic
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theory had assumed the European nuclear family, for the 
Trobriand Islanders had a different nuclear family structure 
from the traditional European family.
This difference of assumed context for psychic dynamics 
produced major differences in the results of the theory— in 
particular, the form and direction of the Oedipus Complex, 
of which was directed toward the uncle instead of the father 
due to differences in the family structure. The important 
point in this example is that nc amount of work within 
classical psychoanlysis could have made this assumed context 
explicit; it was. only when the context was transcended, 
when Malinowski attempted to apply the assumed context to 
the family structure of the Trobriands and met with paradox, 
that the assumed context of the European family structure 
became available.
The principle of transcendence can be used to engineer 
the detection cf assumptions and assumed contexts. It is in 
this respect an indispensable tcol which this investigator 
shall make use of in the following pages. £11 that remains 
to bring this section into closure is to demonstrate that 
the assumed context, as I have defined it, gives meaning and 
significance to the guestions we ask. The relation has been 
recognized in some guarters of the philosophy of science.
Kuhn (1962), for example, recognized that the vast 
majority of time in science is spent in what he calls 
"normal science," where the major activity is "puzzle 
solving." The paradigm provides these puzzles and defines
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for the scientist which guestions are meaningful and demand 
further investigation, and which do not. Clearly, then, 
during this period, the paradigm in Kuhn’s terminology, or 
assumed context in my own terminology, gives meaning to the 
guestions the scientist asks. It is only during the short 
and chaotic periods of revolution, during which a different 
framework is born, that this encapsulating hold of the 
paradigm on guestioning is broken and different guestions 
are entertained. This condition has already been discussed 
above in terms of the guestions that Einstein asked which 
produced the revolution of relativity.
A sophisticated and concrete example to make this
relation even more defined can be taken from the history of
mathematics. Mathematicians since the time of the Greeks 
have asked the guestion "What is mathematical truth?" The 
traditional source of the assumed context in which this 
guestion has been asked derives from the geometry of the 
Greeks. Within this geometry, it was assumed that
mathematics was a representation of the physical world. The
guestion was given the meaning that that which is 
mathematically true corresponds to the way the world is.
This assumed context endured for centuries and with it an 
unchanged meaning for the guestion. In a revolution in 
mathematics in the 19th century, Euclid’s parallel postulate 
was replaced giving rise to a number of non-Euclidean 
geometries which were as consistent as the Euclidean, given 
their assumptions.
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The whole assumed context for mathematics was changed 
by changing this postulate; fcr could not other 
mathematical systems be developed which did not correspond 
directly with the world as it was apprehended? As Kline 
(1959) indicates, after 1830 mathematicians were given a new 
freedom to "devote themselves tc any ideas which attracted 
them, however wild and unrelated to the physical world they 
might appear tc be on first sight." (p. 461) This new 
assumed context produced an alternative meaning for the 
question. No longer could a proposition be evaluated for 
its truth solely on its correspondence with the physical 
world. Whereas in the cld context, the guestion was given 
the meaning that there must be a correspondence between the 
mathematical proposition and the physical world; within the 
new context, the guestion acquired the meaning that we 
should look within the propositions themselves as the source 
of truth. This context initiated the search for truth 
through consistency, the ability to derive true propositions 
from a set of axioms. It is important to note that the 
question did net change, but that its meaning did change 
within a different assumed context.
An Example of the Total Process
To this point in the discussion, the structural aspect 
of the theory of frameworks has been presented. While some 
effort has been directed toward identifying the 
relationships between the parts, the interaction of 
questions, assumptions, and boundary conditions, the
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discussion should not be left at this point. These parts,
in actual fact, comprise an integrated whole which may be
termed a process of questioning. To a large extent each
person is immersed in some process of questioning, making it
difficult to transcend the limits of the framework produced
by this process. The present discussion would not be
complete without an effort to present the total process. An
example is provided by Debono (1970), who presents in a book
on creativity the following problem:
A man worked in a tall office building. Each 
morning he got in the lift on the ground floor* 
pressed the lift button to the tenth floor, got 
out of the lift and walked up tc the fifteenth 
floor. At night he would get into the lift on the 
fifteenth floor and get out again on the ground
floor. What was the man up to? (p. 95)
Now, assuming that we have someone before us who can
answer our guestions about the problem, we would proceed to
get at the source of this strange behavior by asking
guestions. Debono suggests seme of the guestions we might
ask: "Was the man an exercise nut?"; "Did he want to talk
to someone on the tenth floor?"; "But why didn't he get
back on the elevator at the tenth floor to go to the
fifteenth?" Many such guestions and lines of guestioning
suggest themselves. Before going on to the next paragraph
where the "solution" is given, it might be appropriate to
stop for a moment and reflect on seme of the possible
guestions that might be asked.
42
How, what we have revealed before us is a concrete
example of the dynamic process cf guestioning. He have been
generating a framework of knowledge through our process of
guestioning (i-e., the guestions we have been asking) for
the purpose of solving the problem. It follows that all the
guestions we have asked, the guestions we consider
significant to ask, are conditioned by an assumed context.
These guestions are, in a real sense, convergent guestions
in respect to a particular assumption. It is through the
dynamic interrelation of these elements that a process of
guestioning has emerged placing boundary conditions on our
knowledge. What, then, is this assumption? Debono provides
us with the assumption and "solution:"
In fact the man acted in this peculiar way because 
he had no choice. He was a dwarf and could not 
reach higher than the tenth floor button. The 
natural assumption is that the man is perfectly 
normal and it is his behaviour that is abnormal. 
(Debono, 1970, p. 96)
It was this assumption— that the man was normal and the
behavior abnormal— that limited the guestions we asked and
resulted in a framework which had boundary conditions which
precluded a solution. We can see in this example the impact
of one's process of guestioning on knowledge. Likewise,
there is revealed the process of guestioning as a dynamic
process of interaction and connection, that actually does
affect the guestions that are asked and what people actually
do to solve problems.
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APPLICATION TO PSYCHOIOGY'S FBAMEWOBK 
OF THE PERSON
The theory made explicit above would suggest that the 
source of the limitations of psychology's framework of the 
person would be found in the guestions psychologists ask, as 
these guestions fix the boundary conditions of the 
framework. It would be further suggested that a central 
assumption lies at the core of this guestioning and that 
this assumption is the central delimiting factor.
The Character of Questioning in Psychology
What guestions do psychologists ask about people?
Psychology is a very diverse discipline and the guestions
that are asked are, correspondingly, guite diverse:
experimentalists ask guestions about human learning and
perception, clinicians ask guestions about their clients*
personalities, and philosophical psychologists ask guestions
bout a person's ultimate nature. The list could go on and
on. Murray (1938) provides us with the flavor and diversity
of the psychologist's guestioning:
Man is today's great problem. What can we know 
about him and how can it be said in words that 
have clear meaning? What propels him? With what 
environmental objects and institutions does he 
interact and how? What occurrences in his body 
are not influentially involved? What mutally 
dependent processes participate in his 
differentiation and development? What courses of 
events determine his pleasures and displeasures? 
and, finally, by what means can he be 
intentionally transformed? (pp. 47-48)
In this guotation, Murray summarizes the full spectrum of
the psychologist's guestioning about people. If we look
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closely, we can find a few central guestions which underlie 
such diverse areas of psychology as physiological psychology 
and personality theory.
From these fundamental guestions, we could, without 
great difficulty, proceed to see that any one researcher in 
psychology within a specific area, for example a specific 
paradigm in classical conditioning, is pffrlly asking only a 
masked version of one of these fundamental guestions, a 
guestion which it is believed, if answered, will ultimately 
lead to the solution cf one of the more fundamental 
guestions.
The theory of frameworks would suggest that at the
center of this diversity of guestioning there is a pivotal
question which gives a fixed structure to the entire process
of questioning. In short, there is a convergent point of
focus, a central guestion, for the process of questioning in
psychology. An insight into what this question may be is
provided by Boyce (1961):
Nhat is man? And how can we come to know it?
These two guestions are vital not only to any 
complete philosophy, but also to some of the most 
basic problems that the human mind confronts.
What is the true reason for our existence? Where 
did we come from? Nhy are we here? and Where are 
we going? Is there a discoverable nature of man 
as a person with rights and dignity, which can 
serve as a foundation for our cherished democratic 
concepts? What is the basis for law? of human
responsibility? Of human rights? Is the notion
of freedom compatible with the laws of nature?
Does man have a nature which includes the
spiritual, and how can this be known? In what
does man*s ultimate happiness consist? Questions 
of what man shogld do can be based only on what 
man is. (P* 3)
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In the above* Boyce is suggesting to us that all the 
questions the psychologist asks and, ultimately, the 
knowledge that is constructed about people is based on what 
a human being is- It seems, within this framework, that the 
key question that one asks is "What is a human being?'* If 
psychologists are in the laboratory or the clinic, they are 
basically asking this question and their efforts are 
directed toward providing an answer. It is also clear for 
the purposes of this inquiry that this question is given 
such paramount importance, not because of something 
intrinsic to the question itself, but as a function of the 
assumed context in which it is asked. Given the logic of 
the theory cf frameworks, there must be at the center of 
this assumed ccntext an assumption which provides 
significance to this question.
A Perspective on Questioning in Western Knowledge 
The search for the assumption at the core of 
questioning in psychology, in my opinion, must take the 
discussion beyond the confines cf psychology proper and even 
beyond the social sciences. These disciplines, being a 
product of the last century, have inherited a process of 
questioning that has been elaborated for centuries. It was 
these centuries which saw the elaboration of the 
philosophical and scientific manifold in which psychology 
and the other social sciences now function. It would seem 
to follow that to seek something as basic as the assumed 
context for questioning within psychology, one is required
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to transcend tfce U n i t s  cf psychology and the social 
sciences, and seek the roots of this context in the larger, 
prior context of Western knowledge.
While I have indicated above that the guestion "What is 
the human being?" is central tc questioning in psychology, 
what is the key guestion for the philosopher or physicist? 
Perhaps, by examining these guestions, we can more closely 
approach the assumption which underlies Western knowledge.
In respect to physics, Capek (1961) writes of the basic 
"identity of one problem" within physics, a problem 
generated and centered around the following mode of 
guestioning:
What is the nature of physical reality and to what 
extent can it be understood? All specific 
problems of physics are merely concrete and 
partial aspects of the same basic guestion; in 
truth, if we disregard its naive phrasing, the 
guestion which the pre-Socratics tried to answer:
* What is the world made of?* was not essentially 
different. (p. xvi)
As Capek points out, the source of these guestions cannot be
found in physics alone, as it cculd not be found in
psychology alone, but the sou 'ce is more deeply embedded in
the Western framework of knowledge which both have
inherited, a framework which has not lost its essential form
since the time of the Greeks. To reveal its source, we must
now turn to the parent discipline of both physics and
psychology, that is to philosophy.
What, then, is the key guestion for the philosopher?
For our answer to this, we must follow Capek*s observation
above and retreat to the dawn cf Western thought in
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pre-Socratic philosophy. Wild6 and Kimmel (1962)
characterize the questioning of the Greek philosophers in
this fashion:
When the first Greek thinkers experienced with awe 
and wonder the presence of Being in the cosmos and 
asked the guestions: What constitutes the Being of 
the things that are? • In what and from what do 
they have their being? What does it mean, to be?
By their very asking of the questions they 
revealed a forward step achieved in the 
consciousness of western man . . . .  By their 
questioning and their attempts to answer the 
questions these early Greeks set in motion the 
quest which, according to Husserl, has determined 
the destiny and character cf Western culture.
(p. 10)
Thus, we see that the process of questioning we find in 
physics and psychology is itself cast in a form produced by 
the early Greek philosophers. When the physicist asks his 
central question: "What is the nature of physical reality?" 
or the psychologist asks his central question: "What is the 
nature of human beings?", they are both only echoing a 
tradition of questioning begun at the very beginnings of 
Western thought when the pre-Socratic philosophers asked the 
paramount question: "what is the Being of things?" The
Western tradition of knowledge, within this perspective, 
reveals itself as a unified process of questioning.
The guestion still remains, however, as to the 
assumption that underlies this similarity in questioning.
If the analysis of both processes of questioning and the 
theory of frameworks is appropriate, one should be able to 
uncover an assumption which underlies this process of 
questioning providing significance to these questions.
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Guthrie (1950) gives us an insight into vhat this assumed
context was for the pre-Socratics when he writes of them:
They looked for something permanent, persisting 
through the chaos cf apparent change; and, they 
thought that they could find it by asking the 
question: ’What is the world made of?* The world
as our senses perceive it seems restless and 
unstable . . . .  Philosophy started in the faith 
that beneath this apparent chaos there exists a 
hidden permanence and unity, discernible, if not 
by sense, then by mind. (p. 23)
It seems then the centrality of the question: "What is
the world made of?" derives from the prior assumption that 
there is §n jnh^r^qt na£u£e £o ££§ universe, beyond the 
world of chaotic change, which can be known. It is this 
assumption that provides the assumed context for Western 
thought; all further work was to be only an elaboration of 
this basic assumed context. This assumed context so 
permeates Western thought that it is difficult tc conceive 
of an alterntive. As with any assumption, it was only with 
the partial transcendence of this context, with the 
development of organic, process knowledge in the West that 
the full impact of this assumption on knowledge begins to be 
recognized.
It is apparent, for example, within the process
formulations of Whitehead (1925):
One such ^sumption underlies the whole philosophy 
of nature during the modern period. It is 
embodied in the concept which is supposed to 
express the most concrete aspect of nature. The 
Ionian philosophers asked. What is nature made of?
The answer is couched in terms of stuff or matter., 
or material . . . .  (p. 69)
We can see within Whitehead’s astute comment the full
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interrelation which I am seeking to illustrate: the 
assumption of an inherent nature to the universe, leading to 
a process of guestioning to discover this nature, and 
finally resulting, as a conseguence, in a system of 
knowledge that focuses on fired entities or material stuff. 
This process of guestioning, established as it was in the 
infancy of Western knowledge, has a pronounced effect on the 
derived knowledge in physics and psychology.
This assumed context provided by the pre-Socratic 
philosophers has undergone a significant revision in modern 
times. With the rise of science, recognizing the inhibitory 
effects of searching for the inherent nature of things in 
terms of essences in an Aristotelean sense, the modern 
investigator has transformed the assumed context. One no 
longer searches for essences in things for "the nature of 
things, in themselves," but is content tc work with 
appearances, with discovering functional relationships among 
phenomena. Still, however, the spirit of the assumed 
context maintains itself through this transformation. The 
Western investigator still serves the assumption of an 
inherent nature of things, but this search becomes 
redirected toward discovering something fixed in the 
appearance of the universe without the unnecessary 
metaphysics involved with a search for essence.
This transformation of the assumed context in modern 
times has produced certain manifest changes in the process 
of guestioning itself. However, these changes are only
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manifest, for at root the guestioning is in unity with that 
of the pre-Socratics. Harcuse (1964) has recognized this 
redirection in theoretical emphasis and its corresponding 
redirection of the process of guestioning from the 
"metaphysical 'What is.........?' . . .  to the functional
' H o v . ( p .  151) Thus, the scientist who would 
scoff at searching for the essences of things still does 
equal service the assumption cf an inherent nature by 
searching for something functionally fixed in the phenomena 
studied, considered in an empirical, operational sense.
Both the search for essences carried out before the 
modern era and the search for fixed relations carried out in 
modern science are motivated by the imagination of the 
pre-Socratics, with their assumption that there is something 
to be known that is permanent beyond the chaos of the 
universe as immediately experienced. Thus, this modern 
transformation is not a major alteration in the most basic 
sense, but serves only to increase the acceptability of the 
original assumed context in an era where metaphysics is not 
greatly valued.
The Assumption of an Inherent Nature to Human Beings
In dealing with the general case of Nestern knowledge,
I have already considered psychology as a special case. 
However, within this special case, we can see the assumption 
that human beings have an inherent nature to be known is at 
the root of the central meaning and significance given to 
the question "What is a human being?" One interpretation
51
would be that: th§ sssissi sjjssiiasisa iiial siisis is
psychology is that hjjm§s £j§ia.S§ assumed £2 h§vg an
inhgssQt Minze ££ar £he jsyghslsaisj; gan gomg £o kngw.
Given the perspective generated above, this conclusion is
hardly an unexpected one.
The profound influence of this assumed context has been
recognized for some time by existential psychologists; Hay
(1960) takes a parallel course in criticizing the character
of contemporary psychology:
In endeavoring to separate reality into its 
discrete parts and to formulate abstract laws for 
these parts. Western science has by and large been 
e^en-friflj-j-st in character; mathematics is the 
ultimate, pure form of this essentialist approach.
In psychology, the endeavor is to see human beings 
in terms of forces, conditioned reflexes, and so 
on, illustrate the approach via essences. (p. 16)
Psychology’s fixation on one dimension of guestioning
centering around "What is the human being?" is only
symptomatic of a more basic commitment to the assumption
that the human being has an inherent nature to be known.
While few psychologists today would consider themselves
essentialist in the classical meaning of the term, the
search for functional, empirical relationships is egually in
the service of the assumption of an inherent nature. As in
Western knowledge in general, there has been a manifest
transformation of the process of guestioning. The
contemporary psychologist nc longer looks for the essence of
the human being in the Aristotelian sense. Nonetheless, as
in the case of the physicist, the psychologist still seeks
fixed empirical relationships within human nature. Again,
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it would be suggested that for these empirical relationships 
to be coherent over time and space there must be an 
underlying structure or inherent nature. Thus, the 
contemporary psychologist is as committed to the assumption 
of an inherent nature as is the modern physicist to an 
inherent nature to the physical universe.
It was through physics that psychology originally 
obtained its assumed context for knowledge. Thus, we find 
one of the founders of American psychology, William James 
(1952), readily quoting the physicist Helmholtz to the 
effect that " «the ultimate goal of theoretical physics is to 
find the last unchanging causes of the processes in 
Nature."1 (p. 883) It is not difficult to infer that James 
is likewise supporting a position that the ultimate goal of 
theoretical psychology is to find the last unchanging causes 
of the processes of human beings.
This relationship between physics and psychology is no 
less true today. Where the physicists have reduced their 
goals from discovering the underlying structure of matter to 
discovering functional relationships within a matrix of 
empirical data, psychologists have followed the same course 
and no longer search directly for the substance of human 
beings, but only for functional relationships within 
empirical data. In a practical sense, in each area, the 
effect of the assumption of an inherent nature to the object 
of study and the guestions that arise from this assumed 
context are still most influential.
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While the contemporary psychologist may cringe from 
asking the traditional, metaphysical guestion "What is a 
human being?" the psychologist, given his logico-empirical 
Zeitgeist, still asks the functional guestion "How does a 
human being do this?" Both questions are equally indicative 
of a process of questioning influenced by the assumption of 
an inherent nature to the person. The latter is just a more 
conservative version of the former.
The remainder cf this inquiry will be directed toward 
expanding the boundary conditions of psychology*s framework 
of the person by changing the above process of questioning. 
To accomplish this, the assumption that human beings have an 
inherent nature which is at the core of this process of 
questioning will be challenged.
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CVEBVIEW
A theory of frameworks was suggested which viewed the 
boundary conditions of frameworks as a function of the 
questions asked. The guestions that are asked, were, in 
turn, related to the assumptions or assumed context of the 
questioner.
This theory was applied to psychology’s framework of 
the person. The central question the psychologist asks is 
"What is the human being?" This central guestion for 
psychology was given perspective by examining this as a 
special case of the general tendency to ask "What is the 
world made of?" The latter guestion was given paramount 
importance because it was assumed that the world had an 
inherent nature that could be known.
This insight was applied tc psychology where the 
assumption of an inherent nature to human beings was 
identified as central to psychology’s process of 
questioning. It was concluded that this inquiry should be 
directed toward challenging this assumption.
CHAPTER III
METHOD
In the present context, the sole criterion for method 
is its ability to challenge the assumption of an inherent 
nature to human beings. This criterion should be kept 
clearly in mind during the following discussion.
SURVEY OP TRADITIONAL HETHODS
There are any number of "methods" that people 
use: intuition, religion, tradition. The current survey 
will be concerned exclusively with two large categories of 
formal methods, experimental and analytic. These two 
classes of methods may be most clearly distinguished on the 
basis of the activities cf these who employ them. In short, 
when one uses one method as opposed to another, one 
functions in a different manner.
By experimental methods, I refer to methods where the 
user concentrates on the analysis of data and observation 
from which the data is derived, with the criterion of 
validity ascribed to the correspondence between one*s 
propositions and the data. By analytic methods, I refer to 
methods which center around activities such as logical or 
semantic analysis with the criterion of validity being 
linked to the internal consistency of propositions.. This 
classification is to be taken only as one of convenience and
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not as suggesting a complete epistemology,.
Experimental Hethcds
He begin with experimental methods because they are so 
central to psychology. The purpose for which experimental 
methods are used in psychology is to discover the inherent 
nature of the human being, net to guestion if this nature 
exists. They do not evaluate if the human being has an 
inherent nature, only if the answer given by the 
psychologist is valid cr not. This commitment to the 
assumption of an inherent nature makes experimental methods 
inappropriate for challenging psychology’s framework of the 
person.
This can be guite simply illustrated by challenging any 
experimentalist to construct an experiment or an entire 
program of research which would produce evidence that the 
human being does net have an inherent nature. Such a 
request would undercut the basis of experimentation within 
psychology. Such a request would negate the very purpose 
for doing an experiment to begin with: io discover tfr^  
inherent 3§£J3£§ si huaag frejpg. Contrary to being a 
suitable method for challenging psychology’s framework, 
experimental methods are the mechanism through which the 
framework is maintained and refined.
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Analytic Hethods
He now turn to the seemingly mere promising area of
analytic methods. I have considered analytic methods after
experimental methods for a purpose. As I have attempted to
establish above, experimental methods are inappropriate for
the purpose of this inquiry. The total effect of analytic
methods within psychology’s framework of the person has been
to focus knowledge toward experimental methods. Thus,
analytic methods, in this ancillary capacity, are themselves
inappropriately contingent on the inappropriateness of
experimental methods. Tc understand the ancillary function
of analytic methods, it would be best to investigate the
historical setting of their introduction within psychology.
Stevens (1939) wrote what has come to be a classic
article on the application cf analytic methods to the
problems of psychology. In this article, he wrote cf a
common spirit which has developed in which the conception of
science was that cf fitting a formal system of symbols to
empirical observations. He described the confluence of
operationism, logical positivism, and logical empiricism
within psychclcgy toward this ccmmcn goal. The purpose of
this was a division of labor by which analytic methods as
used by the philosopher could be brought into the service of
experimental methods by making the latter more efficient:
The philosopher complements the scientist by 
probing the nature and the rules of this symbolic 
language. Statements about the empirical domain 
are called object-sentences; statements about 
language-forms are syntactical sentences. In any 
special science, such as psychology, both types of 
sentences frequently occur, because the
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psychologist must tell us not only about his 
facts, but also how he intends to use his words 
and symbols . . . .  The philosopher, on the other 
hand, can point out the logical implication of the 
psychologists language and help him guard against 
the vicious combination of these two types of 
sentences which lead to pseudo-propositions.
(p. 237)
From this quotation, one begins to appreciate the 
perceived utility of analytic methods within psychology.
This particular paper, coming as it did early in the 
introduction of philosophical sophistication into psychology 
and the social sciences, reflects the context in which the 
social scientist approached analytic methods. The climate 
was one in which analytic methods were to aid the more 
efficient functioning of experimental methods, a role 
Marcuse (1964) describes as therapeutic. Such movements 
within psychology such as operationism and logical 
positivism were to have the function of doing therapy on the 
psychologist’s knowledge, such that the psychologist could 
function as a "better" experimentalist and clearly relate 
experimental results tc others. In this manner, analytic 
methods became infused with the assumptions and purpose for 
inquiry of experimental methods.
The mechanism by which analytic methods serve 
experimental methods deserves closer scrutiny, for it is a 
case study in the truncation of a process of questioning. 
Analytic methods, as used traditionally within psychology, 
tend to legislate what questions can be meaningfully asked, 
having the effect of focusing the process of guestioning 
toward experimentation and the discovery of an inherent
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nature, not toward challenging this assumption.. The nature 
of this therapeutic function is that it attempts to "cure 
from illusion, deception, obscurities, unsolvable riddles, 
unansweyfrbjg guestjcq^. from ghosts and spectres," to quote 
Marcuse (1964, p. 183, My italics).
I take particular note that analytic methods attempt to 
remove from attention "unanswerable guestions." Chapter II 
has demonstrated the danger of artifically eliminating 
certain guestions from the realm of legitimate guestions.
It was noted above, in respect to questions and boundary 
conditions of knowledge, that it is just these seemingly 
"unanswerable guestions" or "silly guestions" as I have 
called them, that are often the key to challenging 
assumptions and expanding the boundary conditions for 
knowledge.
The Attempted Flight Beyond Method
Some psychologists have recognized the limitations of 
the current psychological framework and have also recognized 
the emptiness of the formal methods outlined above. Their 
reaction has been to deny advocacy of any method or position 
about the inherent nature of human beings in the hope that 
such an uncommitted position will free them from service to 
the assumption of an inherent nature. The result is often 
quite the opposite.
One of the major problems in advocating a position of 
non-commitment is that it is purely The only
method that remains from this point of .view is a negative
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one: a rejection of an inherent nature to human beings or,
more accurately, a rejection of the possibility of knowing
this inherent nature. This negativism is at best
••halfhearted" for it attempts tc make a positive assertion
about human beings within a negative context.
A paradox arises frcm the fact that even in complete
negation, something positive about human beings is being
asserted. For example, we can take the statement of Jourard
(1968) as representive of this situation. He writes:
After having tried cut psychoanalytic, trait 
theory, self-theory, and other kinds of 
theoretical models of man, I have opted for a 
model that is no model, or is a meta-model. It is 
one implicit in the philosophical tradition of 
existential phenomenology (Luijpen). According to 
this perspective, man is the being such that in 
his being, his being is in question,. (p. 114)
In Jourard’s statement, we find an example of the negative
reaction which current psychological framework fosters among
some. Jourard*s answer, like that of many other
psychologists, is to reject the framework. But does the
traditional framework allow such luxuries? Is Jourard
really rejecting all models? Is this in fact a complete
negation of the assumption of an inherent nature to human
beings? Does anyone have the option of "opting for no
model?" To answer these questions and uncover the fallacy of
such negative approaches, I will recall the discussion in
Chapter II concerning the nature of knowledge, specifically
the discussion of the role of assumptions in knowledge.
Within this perspective, I defined assumptions as a
container for knowledge, concluding that
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"assumptions cannot be avoided in constructing knowledge."
This principle is egually applicable to the knowledge
of human beings. We do not have the option of having no
assumed context for knowledge,. While on the surface it may
seem plausible tc subscribe to a position of non-commitment,
some assumed context is indispensable for the knowledge of
the human being. As Van Kaam (1965) has recognized:
There is no escape from assumptions in psychology.
The psychologist of every school always makes 
ultimate and absolute judgements about what is 
called the nature of man and about the way in
which man can be understood. (p. 177)
Even a position of open-ended empiricism is not tenable,
for, as Van Kaam points cut, even this level of research
requires some ultimate assumptions about human nature.
Thus, the psychologist cannot adhere to a complete
negativistic position in respect to human nature. Any
framework abhors a vaccuum guickly converting the negative
position to a positive assertion about people.
Paradoxically, even the most vehement rejection of an
inherent nature to people converts to an affirmation of an
inherent nature. Paul Tillich (1961), for example, has
recognized that any existentialist position ultimately rests
upon an essentialist position. He argues that even Sartre's
radical departure from essentialism with his famous
statement that a person's essence is his existence, in final
analysis rests upon an essentialist position. It becomes an
affirmation of a human being's §SS§alial freedom to
transform himself. Even in such an extreme position one
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cannot escape reinforcing the assumption of an inherent 
nature. For even Sartre, in his extreme existentialism and 
rejection of the traditional framework of the person is 
affirming a process which is assumed to be inherent in human 
beings!
THE HETHOD OF ALTERNATIVE ASSUHEE CONTEXTS 
In the search for method, as I examined the 
inappropriateness of current formal methods, it appeared 
that the key to developing an appropriate methodology rested 
with an application of the theory of frameworks made 
explicit in the previous chapter.
Hy evaluation was that traditional methods are 
inappropriate because, tsed for the purpose that I would 
like, the methods are required to work against the dynamics 
of the process of questioning. These methods have been 
constructed to expand a framework based on an assumption 
that human beings have an inherent nature, It is extremely 
difficult to see how these methods may be used to challenge 
this very same assumption and framework. It was with this 
thought in mind that I began to consider the construction of 
a method that used to advantage the structure cf frameworks 
and the closure imposed by a process of questioning.
Alternative Frameworks and the Criticism of Knowledge
It is not difficult to establish the importance of 
alternative systems in the criticism of an assumed context. 
In the viewing of an alternative system, the seemingly
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unrelenting and monopolistic held of a framework of 
knowledge can be brcken. alternative systems provide a 
point of reference from which the system can be criticized. 
Just as it is difficult to make assumptions explicit from 
within a framework, it is egually difficult to criticize a 
framework from within the framework. In attempting to do 
the latter, we are involved in what has been called by 
Pirsig (1974) a "platform problem." Since we use a framework 
as the "platform" for action including the action of 
criticism, one cannot use this same "platform" for the 
purpose of critically examining the platform. This is the 
great advantage of the alternative system as a solution to 
the problem; given an alternative, one has two or more 
"platforms" upon which to stand. From this vantage point, 
one is free to pull at the flocr boards of either platform.
As an example of the profitable use of alternative 
systems, I can point to the work of the anthropolcpist 
Heyerdahl (1950). In his bock Kon-T^ki* he explains that 
the Pacific area had been divided into two specializations: 
Polynesian and American anthropology. He recognized, 
however, that the problems of the Pacific could not be 
solved from within one of these areas independently. The 
entire Pacific area had to be considered in its unity, for 
it is only through viewing the alternative areas together 
that the full relations can be exposed within the entire 
area. He writes that tc pursue the elaboration of one 
anthropological area exclusively would be "like doing a
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puzzle and only using the pieces of one color." (p. 32)
Here he is pointing to the obvious point of leverage 
that alternative systems provide; for in viewing the 
alternatives, questions are generated not only about the 
systems themselves, but also about the relations between the 
alternatives. The total effect of viewing alternatives is 
to expand the power exerted over knowledge, a power that can 
never be equalled by refining cr focusing of a singular 
system. In Heyerdahl’s case, it is highly unlikely that an 
anthropologist working within the specialization of either 
Polynesian or American data could have developed the 
hypothesis that people sailed across the Pacific from one 
cultural area to another; but, given Hyerdahl’s subsuming 
vantage point of the alternatives viewed together such an 
idea is mere likely to be generated.
Within more systematic realms, this principle of the 
need for alternative systems for evaluation may be 
illustrated in both analytic atd experimental areas. Within 
the former, Godel’s work as described by Nagel and Newman 
(1958) has provided a proof that seems to indicate that, 
within axiomatic systems at least as complicated as 
elementary arithmetic, the consistency of the system cannot 
be established from within the system itself. To establish 
consistency, it is necessarj to appeal to rules beyond the 
system, to a larger system. Gcdel’s proof seems to 
demonstrate that we cannot have a consistent system and a 
complete system at the same time. To demonstrate the
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consistency of such an axiomatic system, one must appeal to 
transformation rules which lie beycnd the system.
I can find a parallel development in experimental 
methods. It is possible to discern an evolution in physical 
thinking from the view that experimental methods simply test 
the theory against the facts to the view that we are always 
testing our knowledge within competing, alternative systems. 
Duhem*s argument against the refutability of an isolated 
hypothesis is certainly an important step in this evolution 
(Duhem, 1954), as is Popper’s recognition that we must 
decide between at least two systems in evaluating our 
knowledge (Popper, 1965).
The full fruition of this development occurs in 
Feyerabend’s thesis that a plurality of theories is 
necessary for the complete evaluation of any empirical 
system (Feyerabend, 1963). It is net sufficient, he argues, 
merely to compare cne theory with the ’facts,* but 
factuality can be asserted only when the theory has been 
confronted with alternatives, (p. 7) Feyerabend gives the 
scientist responsibility not only to produce information 
within a theory, but actively tc seek alternatives as part 
of his research program, because it is only within such a 
confrontation that the factuality of one’s information can 
be established. It is clear, then, that the use of 
alternative systems for the criticism of knowledge is not an 
alien process, but central to the development of 




In the design of a method, two factors should be 
integrated in my opinion. The method should use to 
advantage the process cf convergence that is typical of 
questioning within any framework. Also, the method should 
use to advantage the powerful leverage provided by viewing 
alternative systems or frameworks. These were the criteria 
which guided me in the construction of a method. The method 
that was the result of this process I have called "The 
Method of Alternative Assumed Contexts for Questioning." In 
the remainder of this document this method will be referred 
to by the acronym AACQ.
The logic of the method is quite simple: to avoid the 
closure imposed by a singular process of questioning, two or 
more alternative processes of questioning are constructed.
In the juxtaposition of one framework of questioning to an 
alternative, a significant leverage is generated. Likewise, 
the closure of each process of questioning augments this 
relief by helping to define clearly the ether framework{s). 
The execution of the method may be segmented into three 
discrete steps:
1- Ilabsiiiion of &ltejn§tiv§ fl^ g med CQfltgx-fcs
An alternative assumed context for questioning is 
produced by making explicit the assumptions underlying the 
context under consideration and the derived principles which 
develop from these assumptions. In making assumptions
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explicit, I use to advantage the principle of transcendence 
described above.
2. The EX£2S13I§ &£ hltSiSSii-SS Sicqqsseq £f fljissiisaifia
In this step, the alternative processes of questioning 
are exposed as a dynamic process. In each alternative 
assumed context, the §am  ^ question is asked and a different 
meaning generated in each context. This same question, 
given alternative meanings, becomes the focus for a process 
of questioning in each framework. In this way, the process 
of questioning is brought under some control and carefully 
evaluated in each framework.
3. Consequences for FufiSiiSliia £2£S£i§£££
The purpose of this step is to complete the alternative 
systems by demonstrating that the alternative processes of 
questioning generate alternative consequences. In short, 
the processes of questioning have certain implications for 
function and experience: "they make a difference." By 
defining the relation between the process of questioning and 
the effects of this process on what is experienced and how 
one functions, the full impact of the process can be 
evaluated. This step is accomplished by placing examples of 
experience and function within the alternative assumed 
contexts.
Following these three steps, the method has been 
executed and alternative systems of knowledge are displayed, 
each in relief of the other. An evaluation of each assumed 
context can be undertaken using the results of the method as
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a basis.
Linking The Method to Traditional Knowledge
While this may be the first formal statement of the
method of AACQ, aspects of the method are net completely
alien to traditional modes of thought. For example, many
different cultures as well as cur own have recognized that
asking the same question in different contexts produces
different information, and that such an awareness of how
questioning functions can be the source of enlightenment.
Here is an example taken from fables of Sufism, a
system of Moslem mysticism of the Near East:
A Sufi master was visited by a perplexed 
Seeker-after-Truth, who said to him:
'I have crly one question to ask. Why is 
it that, wherever I go, I always seem to 
get different pieces of advice from Sufis?'
The master answered:
'Come with me for a walk through this 
town, and we shall see what we can discover 
about this mystery. '
They went into the market-place.
Sufi asked a greengrocer:
'Tell me, what time cf prayer is it?
The Greengrocer said:
'The time for the morning prayer.'
They continued their walk. After some 
time the Sufi asked a tailor:
'What prayer time is it?'
The tailor answered:
'It is the time of the midday prayer.'
After spending more time in conversation 
and companionship with the Seeker, the Sufi 
approached another man, this time a bookbinder.
'What time of prayer is it?'
The man replied:
♦It is now the time of the afternoon prayer.*
'Do you want to continue the experiment, 
or are you now satisfied that virtually the same 
question can elicit almost totally different 
answers, all of them corresponding to the 
current truth?' (Shah, 1971, pp. 6-7)
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Along more formal methodological lines, a close 
parallel to the method is the "thought experiment" used in 
physics. The "thought experiment," as used by 
physicists— primarily Einstein and Bohr— presents a 
contrived situation which brings together essential features 
of physical thought to reveal conflicts and internal 
contradictions leading to a fuller understanding of the 
framework. Unlike an ordinary experiment, the situations in 
a thought experiment are often impossible or extremely 
unlikely; for example, in the case of Einstein’s masterful 
use of the thought experiment to demonstrate aspects of 
relativity theory, one is asked to envision elevators 
falling through space or trains traveling at the speed of 
light.
The important point is not the material possiblity of 
the situations, but rather their heuristic value, the 
insights they provide. Within Einstein's thought 
experiments, for example, it is not at guestion if a train 
can be made to travel at the speed of light, but rather what 
the implications of this situation are for physical theory. 
It will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter II 
concerning Einstein's construction of relativity that he 
used such thought experiments and the guestions they 
generated to direct his theorizing. Within the thought 
experiment, then, the content is only of value in terms of 
the more general process of criticizing knowledge, of 
demonstrating contradictions in the framework of thought and
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of entertaining new frameworks.
Even the positivistic philosopher of science# Ernst
Hach# a few years before Einstein's use of the thought
experiment in physics# recognized the important role of
thought experiments in knowledge. Writing in 1897# he
traced the development of the thought experiment from the
time of Aristotle. He found a direct continuity with the
principles of physical experimentation:
It can be seen that the basic method of the thought 
experiment is just like that of a physical experiment# 
namely# the method of variation. By varying the 
circumstances (continously# if possible) the range of 
validity of an idea (expectation) related to these 
circumstances is increased. Through modification and 
specialization of the circumstances the idea is 
modified and specialized . . . .  (Mach, 1973# p. 453)
In the method of AACQ, the model of the thought
experiment is appropriate. For as with the thought
experiment# one systematically uses the method of variation
to place the same guestion in alternative contexts and find
the range of validity of the meaning so generated. At this
point at least# the method proposed here and the method of
the thought experiment are guite similar..
APPLICATION OF THE METHCD TO THE PROBLEH 
The method of AACQ requires for its operation an 
alternative to Western knowledge. Finding such an 
alternative is an increasingly difficult task within Western 
knowledge; with its superiority in the ability to 
manipulate the physical world# Western knowledge has tended 
to overwhelm most alternative cultural systems, reducing
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them to merely sources cf anthropological data. In 
addition, the alternative selected should be a viable 
alternative to Western civilization. One should find within 
the alternative a majority cf criteria one would associate 
with the term "civilization." It was with these requirements 
that I began a search for an alternative,.
Traditional China as an Alternative
In my search for an alternative, I was directed toward 
finding a pocket of humanity that was isolated from the 
mainstream of Western thought, to the extent that an 
alternative framework cf thought could develop and serve as 
the nucleus for an alternative "civilization." As a final 
test, I would expect that normal Western categories of 
thought would fail when confronted by this alternative.
With these intentions firmly in mind, I surveyed world 
history and came upon traditional China as most closely 
meeting the above criteria.
As Latourette (1964) has observed, Chinese civilization 
has been isolated from the rest of humankind more completely 
and remotely than any other civilization,. This isolation 
can be largely attributed to geographical factors.
Latourette writes: "Cut off from the rest of mankind by
oceans, deserts, and mountains, although receiving varied 
contributions from abroad, they (the Chinese] created a 
distinct civilization." (p. ix)
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The effects of this isolation and the alternative
character of Chinese knowledge can be discerned at a very
early level of development. For example, while the
neolithic culture of China was quite similar even in detail
with the neolithic culture in the rest of the world, the
elegant civilization of China which flowered from this base
was quite unlike any other civilization that developed from
this common base in the rest of the world (Luard, 1965). As
Creel (1929) has speculated:
If one wishes to make an extreme statement, he 
might even contend that ancient India, the 
Mesopotamian world, the Mediterranean world, and 
Europe shared one system cf human thought, while 
Ancient China presents us with another . . .  many 
ideas which have been.thought ♦universal' and been 
referred to the 'psychological unity of mankind' 
must abdicate this position when the Chinese 
touchstone is applied. (pp. 2-3)
My intention is to take full advantage of this fractionation
of the "psychological unity of mankind" when exposed to the
counterexample of the "Chinese touchstone" in a systematic
fashion.
However, two problems arise in the use of traditional 
Chinese civilization as an alternative to the West: 
defining what is meant by "traditional Chinese 
civilization," and the contamination and subsequent 
alteration of this civilization through interaction with the 
West.
In respect to defining "traditional Chinese 
civilization," this concept, like "Western civilization," 
covers a wide diversity cf different elements within its
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boundaries. Yet within this diversity, over the centuries, 
there has been a common stream of thought, an identity of 
purpose, that identifies Western civilization as a unified 
concept. In Chapter II, I suggested what one dimension of 
this identity is, to some degree, by presenting a common 
process of questioning from the time of the pre-Socratic 
Greeks to contemporary physics and psychology. Likewise, I 
would suggest that a similar identity can be found in the 
knowledge of traditional China as a common stream running 
through Chinese thought.
Fried (1973) has enumerated some of the difficulties 
implicit in defining traditional China. He argues that such 
a concept is too simplistic and must rest upon huge 
generalizations, while overlooking such major variables as 
time, location and social class. He points to the 
difficulties in choosing a particular system of knowledge, 
such as Confucianism, or a particular period of time as a 
model for traditional China. Fried*s arguments and 
reservations are valid given the purposes of traditional 
scholarship in this area. Such over-generalized concepts 
seem to inhibit traditional scholarship where the purpose is 
to make more and more clear distinctions,.
Within this perspective, "traditional China" as a 
concept is too simplistic. Yet, it is essential that this 
inquiry and method not share the limitations of traditional 
inquiries; furthermore, I shall argue below that the 
purposes of this inguiry are not the same as those of the
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Chinese scholar- In using the concept of traditional China 
within the context of the method, I am only stating that an 
alternative framework of human beings can be constructed 
from the information that traditional China offers; no 
other assertions are being made- I am definitely not 
asserting that "traditional China" as I am representing it 
existed as an entity, nor am I stating this concept as a 
model for all of Chinese thought. Hy wish is that the 
reader will bear in mind that the method has the much more
modest and severely delimited purpose of challenging the
assumption of an inherent nature to human beings. This 
purpose places a certain distance between this approach and 
that of traditional Chinese scholarship.
The second problem is, perhaps, more threatening for it 
would compromise the very alternative character cf 
traditional Chinese knowledge in respect to the West,. To
begin with, I will make every effort to limit my
consideration of traditional China to China prior to 1500, 
the time when the impact of Western civilization began to 
alter China in a pronounced manner- I am not suggesting 
that there was no interaction prior to this date, even as 
early as prehistoric times- However, I am suggesting that 
such interactions with the West never produced a major 
impact on Chinese thought.
Until the sixteenth century, what contacts there were 
never altered the basic fabric of Chinese civiliation. 
Needham (1954) ccmes to basicly the same conclusion:
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• ,. . there was mere intercourse and reaction 
between the Chinese and their Western and southern 
neighbours than has often been supposed, but 
nevertheless . . .  the essential style of Chinese 
thought and culture patterns maintained a 
remarkable and perennial autonomy. This is the 
real meaning of the •isolation1 of China; 
contacts there were, but never abundant enough to 
affect the characteristic style of the 
civilization . . ..-(p. 157)
As a validation of the alternative character, one would 
expect that Western categories cf thought would have 
difficulty dealing with "things Chinese." The East, in 
particular China, has always enjoyed a certain mystical 
quality for Western eyes, summarized most acutely by the 
adjective ’inscrutable* which has often been applied in this 
regard. This tends to underline the fact that Western 
categories of thought do not easily encompass Chinese 
categories, and guite to the ccntrarj, usually stand in 
opposition to them. As one scholar in the area has aptly 
noted (Moore, 1976), undoubtedly from much personal 
experience and frustration in applying Western categories to 
China; "a lesson long since learned by China specialists is 
that, in their application to things Chinese, Western 
concepts often strain, crack, and break under a host of 
cultural burdens." (p. 234)
This is not to say that attempts have not been made to 
subsume Chinese thought within Western categories for these 
attempts have and are being made. Such attempts, in their 
very character, tend, through unnecessary complexities, to 
demonstrate the very opposite of what they are attempting to 
accomplish; the alternative character of Chinese categories
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becomes underscored, one can, for example, attempt to
demonstrate a Taoistlc logic, but the result is something
less than satisfactory— so unsatisfactory that one observer
(Hu, 1971), has labeled such attempts as a fallacy, similar
to ordering a hamburger in a Chinese restaurant. It can be
done, but the result is cot too appealing.
Viewing Chinese thought as a component of western
thought or, perhaps, a primitive precursor to Western
categories, fails to appreciate the degree to which Chinese
thought is a complete and viable alternative to the West.
As such, it is most difficult, in fact seemingly impossible,
to assume the western framework without destroying the
essential characteristics of the Chinese framework which one
is examining. Along this line, Wright (1967) argues:
To attempt to fit Chinese thought into Western 
philosophic categories tends to do violence both 
to the nature and to the hierarchy cf problems 
with which Chinese thinkers have been concerned.
For example, epistemoiogy is a major focus of 
interest for Western philosophers; it is 
subordinate or irrelevant for most Chinese 
thinkers. (pp. l-” )^
We could, for example, deal with the thought of Confucius
within the category of the "epistemoiogy of Confucian
thought" but this tends to violate the purposes contained
within this thought to begin with by replacing them with
Western priorities. Such attempts to violate the
alternative character of Chinese thought tend to reveal the
purposes and character cf Western knowledge more than they
shed light on Chinese thought.
77
The alternative character cf traditional China has also 
been demonstrated by the failure of Western expectations to 
hold themselves against the Chinese example. As an 
instance, Fairbank (1957) gives the case of the failure of 
some Western assumptions about the social order to encompass 
Chinese society, by pointing to the example of Hax Weber's 
investigation of bureaucracy. Weber was able to encompass 
Western social systems within a unitary concept of 
bureaucratic order based on law, but when he was confronted 
with Chinese social order, according to Fairbank, Weber 
"naturally had to begin with the absence in China of any 
•systematic, substantive, and thorough rationalization of 
law.'*' (p. 4) Weber was reguired to construct an alternative 
category of bureaucratic order, demonstrating the unique, 
alternative character of traditional Chinese social order.
The Spirit of this Inquiry into China
The method of AACQ places certain limitations on the 
purposes this inquiry may pursue, purposes for which inquiry 
is not generally undertaken in Chinese scholarship. 
Consequently, it is necessary to make explicit the different 
approach to China that will be required in the following 
chapters. I do not see this methodology as being in 
conflict with traditional scholarship. Each has its own 
purposes and may serve tc coaplement the other. Indeed, the 
material that will be presented in the following chapters is 
the fruit of traditional scholars of China. However, my 
major concern is net with evaluating this material in
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detail, but in attempting to construct new relationships 
within the material itself through the operation of the 
method of AACQ.
From the beginning cf this inguiry in Chapter I, I 
defined this approach as challenging frameworks, not adding 
incrementally to them. Conseguently, this approach demands 
a high degree of generalization which is the intention and 
spirit of the present inguiry. It is only through the 
principle of generalization that frameworks can be operated 
upon. Likewise, the method that has been constructed in 
this chapter was designed with this latter purpose in mind 
and has a high degree of tolerance to generalization. The 
method of AACQ demands a certain license for generalization, 
a generalization that will lead to the confrontation of the 
alternatives, the mainspring of the operation of the method. 
This purpose clearly differentiates the method from that of 
traditional scholarship which has as its purpose the 
elaboration of a singular assumed context where 
specialization and an eye to detail become paramount.
Specialization has certain inherent limitations in 
dealing with Eastern and Western knowledge. Northrop (1946) 
recognized this limitation in his classic investigation. The 
Si where he made a point of
distinguishing his own approach to the East from that of the 
specialist. In the introductory pages of this volume, 
Northrop argues that traditional scholarship has certain 
inherent limitations, because of its specialization, in
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defining problems which transcend local areas of concern and 
affect the total framewoik.
Some problems can be defined only within the total 
gestalt of the field. According to Northrop, traditional 
scholarship, based as it is on meticulous specialization, 
cannot define certain problems which lie in the relationship 
between the local parts subjected to specialized study. 
Making his purpose the identification of the underlying 
basis of conflict in the world, Northrop feels that a new 
type of scholarship is reguired, a scholarship that is based 
on the general, with the courage to "venture into local 
domains without all the detailed information of the experts 
in these domains." (p, 10)
It is only with this license that the whole can be 
visualized and its problems defined. As Northrop 
recognized, this new form of scholarship does not have to be 
antithetical and in conflict with traditional scholarship.
It is, rather, a complement of the latter. For as the 
latter provides specific focus, the former provides a much 
needed wide-angle view. The method used here reguires that 
one work within the paradigm of the new scholarship. As 
Northrop suggests, it is only within the interrelations 
between specialized knowledge that the problem addressed 
here can be defined and it is cnly by venturing through 
these diverse areas that the problem can be operated upon.
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Another way cf locking at the spirit of this inquiry is 
to see the parallels between the present approach to 
traditional approaches in physics and the social sciences. 
The closest parallel to the method of AACQ within 
traditional scholarship is the thought experiment. 
Specifically# then# the application of the method to the 
problem of challenging the assumption of an inherent nature 
to human beings can be conceived of as a "thought 
experiment" in human nature. I am proposing the use. of the 
"method of variation" by examining conceptions of human 
behavior in the West and in traditional China to discover 
the "range of validity" of the idea cf an inherent nature to 
human beings.
Following Einstein’s use cf the thought experiment in 
physics, my intention in this inguiry is to expose certain 
contradictions in our framework of human beings. I will 
construct the material conditions for this thought 
experiment. However, as in the case of the thought 
experiment in physics# it is not the context of these 
material conditions that is of utmost importance nor the 
exhaustiveness of the scholarly detail; it is rather# the 
ability to unearth contradictions in the framework. Again, 
the content# the material presented about traditional China# 
is subservient to the process in which I am engaged, 
unearthing basic relations and contraditions in the 
framework of human beings. Just as a train or elevator was 
used by Einstein as the material setting to investigate the
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implications of physical theory* traditional China can serve 
as the material setting for the investigation of the 
implications of thoughts held about what is inherent in 
human beings.
Still another way of looking at the following 
discussion of traditional China is to regard the latter 
concept as an "ideal type" in the sense in which it was used 
by flax Weber. The concept of ideal type frees the 
investigator from having to deal with concepts which are 
only representations of empirical instances and allows the 
investigator "to illuminate what is peculiar to a given 
cultural phenomenon." (Idwards, 1967, p. 283)
Thus, within this conceptualization, traditional China 
as a concept would not be reguired to represent all the 
phenomena of Chinese civilization at any one given point in 
time. Yet, during all periods, with the phenomena that each 
presents, one can still construct an ideal type which can 
never be given a complete instance, but yet is still 
representive of the global cultural phenomena of China.
This ideal type is still useful in ordering relationships, 
even though there is no case where all cf the phenomena at 
any one time could be said to coexist as one whole.
Such an argument from ideal types has been of use in 
the physical and social sciences. The physicist speaks of 
the idea of the "perfect vacuum." Sociologists speak of 
"pure rational bureaucracy" as do economists of the 
"perfectly competitive market." (Papineau, 1976, p. 137)
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In each case, the ideal type helps tc integrate and organize 
existing ideas and to serve as a model for constructing new 
relationships in future studies.
Finally, the way I look at my approach involves the 
distinction between knowledge for and knowledge ab<?u;t. The 
traditional scholar's approach to China has the purpose of 
constructing knowledge about China as an end in itself. The 
method of AACQ is constructing knowledge of China for a 
certain purpose beyond the knowledge itself. In particular, 
the construction will have the purpose of generating 
information to challenge the assumption defined by the 
problem. This distinction is helpful to me in keeping a 
focus on the ultimate aim of the inquiry and to some degree 
preventing me from becoming lost in the detail.
I can think cf no better way to close this chapter than 
by quoting the propitious words of Chancellar in the 
introductory pages of his translation of Wei-Ping's book on 
Chinese acupuncture. He says cf Chinese thought that it is 
•'the result of an indigenous cultural and philosophical 
idiom, self-developed and isolated from the rest of the 
world by high mountains and deep oceans. Here is a world of 
thought unto itself. Tc penetrate this world, tolerance and 
intellectual humility are needed." (Wei-Ping, 1962, p. 5)
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OVERVIEW
The two classes o£ formal methods, experimental and 
analytic methods, were evaluated as to their appropriateness 
for the task of challenging the assumption of an inherent 
nature to human beings. Both methods were found to be 
inappropriate for this purpose.
The method of AACQ was constructed which attempts to 
use to advantage the structure cf processes of questioning 
in providing closure for frameworks and the point of 
leverage provided by alternative frameworks. The basis of 
the method is to ask the same guestion in alternative 
assumed contexts and relating this to the consequences in 
each framework.
In applying the method to the problem, traditional 
China was suggested as an alternative to the West. The 
geographical and intellectual isolation of China from the 
West was a key factor in producing this condition. The 
method requires a different approach to the knowledge of 
traditional China from the approach of traditional 
scholarship in this area.
CHAPTER IV
ALTERNATIVE ASSUMED CONTEXTS FOR QUESTIONING 
IN CHINA AND THE WEST
In order to make the method functional, I began to 
examine traditional Chinese knowledge and western knowledge 
with an eye to containing them within the economy of 
parallel and alternative assumed contexts. The key element 
I was seeking was a single assumption central to the 
structure of Western knowledge and a complementary 
assumption central to the structure of knowledge in 
traditional China.
ASSUMED CONTEXT FOR KNCWIEDGE IN THE WEST 
The method I employed in attempting to search for the 
assumed context for Western knowledge was to examine the key 
traditions of the West. In this context, perhaps structural 
similarities could be found frcm which an approach could be 
made to the assumed context itself.
The Assumption of Divisibility in Western Knowledge
The characteristic feature of consciousness in the
Western thinker is revealed most directly by the guestions
with which Western tradition was begun at the time of the
pre-Socratic philosophers. Wilde and Kimmel (1962) have
characterized this questioning in this manner:
By their very asking of the questions (questions 
relating to Being) they revealed a forward step
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achieved in the consciousness of Western man— his 
emergence from the naive immediacy of beings in 
the midst of Being. (p. 10)
The consciousness cf Western thinkers commenced, then,
to achieve maturity when they began to s^p^rate themselves
as knowing and guestioning beings from the Being of the
universe that was to be known. This direction is suggested
by the dominant guesticns they asked, questions of the
order: "What is the world made of?" In the background of
this scenario in the birth cf Western knowledge is the
assumption of divisibility, a separation between the knower
and known. This assumption was elevated to a point of
necessity for the functioning of Western knowledge.
In the following centuries, the assumption was given
increasingly central importance, with the final result that
all of Western knowledge was to hinge on this assumption.
With Parmenides and his Eleatic school of philosophy, the
assumption of divisibility became formalized and triumphant
over other systems not endorsing divisibility, such as the
philosophy of change advocated by Heraclitus. By the fifth
century B.C., the assumption of divisibility became firmly
embedded in Western knowledge. In Chapter IX, I will
examine this crucial period in greater detail.
From this source in early Greek times, the influence of
the assumption has penetrated all of Western knowledge. All
of our current divisions have their source in the assumption
of divisibility. Capra (1975) writes of this development:
The split cf this unity began with the Eleatic 
school, which assumed a Divine Principle standing 
above all gods and men. This principle was first
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identified with the unity of the universe, but was 
later seen as an intelligent and personal God who 
stands above the world and directs it. Thus began 
a trend of thought which led, ultimately, to the 
separation of spirit and matter and to a dualism 
which became characteristic of Western philosophy.
(p. 20)
I can see in this trend a common process: the original 
division gave rise to fcrther divisions and these to further 
still, until the totality of Western knowledge became 
saturated with division.
At the beginnings cf the modern era, we find the 
philosopher Descartes formalizing divisibility for the 
modern thinker. Indeed, much cf the importance of his work 
lies in the fact that he addressed himself to the major 
problems of division. I find, upon examination of his 
works, a general endorsement of divisibility, specifically 
the division between mind and matter. The elegance of his 
philosophy lies in his ability to maintain these divisions 
and yet unify them.
From the time of Descartes to the present, there is not 
much to be said in respect to divisibility. The synthesis 
provided by Descartes is still very much with us, especially 
in the social sciences. Divisibility has permeated our 
cultural tradition in the West, to the degree that we are 
hardly aware cf it as a necessary, functional basis for 
activity.
To illustrate this, I can point to the privileged 
status of divisibility within the major traditions of the 
West: religion and science. Defined on the most general
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level, these traditions have served as the container for 
Western thought over the centuries. As religion lost its 
influence at the end of the middle ages, science guickly 
rose to fill the vacuum at the dawn of the modern era.
While many experience these traditions as separate and 
different, on one level they both are equally committed to 
the assumption of divisibility and hold the assumption 
central to their operation.
Within Western religion, the primal assumption of 
divisibility reveals itself in the division between God and 
man. This division is the basis for most Western religions. 
Even the scholarship of a man like Buber can only unify man 
with God within an "I-Thcu" relation which maintains an 
essential divisibility.
A major activity within most religions is prayer.
Again, the assumption of division is necessary for its 
operation. To pray, one must assume a division between God 
and the human world; to do otherwise is to destroy i^s 
meaning. As Phillips (1965) remarks, "a conviction that one 
is talking to oneself is the death cf prayer." (p. 41) This 
recalls the story of the man who, when asked for a 
justification for believing that he was God, related that 
one day he was praying and found that he was talking to 
himself! Clearly, such unifications of the central division 
of religion reduces this institution to the absurd. The 
division between Gcd and humankind must be assumed for 
religion to function.
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A parallel development can be made explicit in the 
other major tradition of the West: science. Science rests 
firmly on the division between knower and known, observer 
and observed. Again, the central operation— the experiment 
rests upon this division. If this division is unified as it 
is to some extent in modern guantum physics, the experiment 
becomes problematical. The very purpose of the experiment 
is to make an independent observation of phenomena. If 
these phenomena are not independent of the observer, the 
entire meaning of the experiment is called into guestion.
In this condition, science relinguishes seme of its 
validity.
Making the Assumption of Divisibility Explicit
The assumption of divisibility is so rooted in the 
beginnings of knowledge in the West that it is difficult to 
perceive the assumption as an assumption at all. Bather, 
the tendency is to regard the assumption as indispensible to 
all knowledge. So for us to challenge this assumption or 
for us to hold it as only an arbitrary proposition is, in 
one stroke, to challenge the very foundations of knowledge. 
The encapsulating effect of the assumption then is more far 
reaching than any ether assumption that the Western thinker 
holds.
For most of us, divisibility is hardly an assumption at 
all, but a discovery of "truth and reality." Pirsig (1974) 
speaks of this sacredness of divisibility and the resistance 
to regarding it as only an assumption:
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What is essential to understand at this point [the 
time of early Greek philosophy] is that until now 
there was no such thing as mind and matter# 
subject and object# form and substance. Those 
divisions are just dialectical inventions that 
came later. The modern mind sometimes tends to 
balk at the thought of these dichotomies being 
inventions and says# 'Well# the divisions were 
theye for the Greeks to discover,' and you have to 
say# 'where were they? Point to them! and the 
modern mind gets a little confused and wonders 
what this is all about anyway# and still believes 
the divisions were there. (p. 367)
Questioning the assumption of divisibility on its own
ground# then# is almost an impossible task. As was noted in
Chapter II# the task of making an assumption explicit within
the framework cf which tie assumption is a part is very
difficult. With the assumption of divisibility in the West,
this situation is further compounded# for the assumption has
permeated the entire framework cf knowledge from its
infancy.
Chapter II was dedicated tc the evaluation of the 
function of assumptions within frameworks. In this context# 
I noted the powerful "encapsulating" hold assumptions have 
on one's knowledge. It is this latter characteristic that 
has prompted seme to argue that assumptions cannot be made 
explicit and must forever remain "tacit." However# it is my 
conviction that assumptions can be made explicit and I 
proceeded to delimit a principle by which this goal could be 
accomplished. The. " principle cf transcendence" was 
introduced whereby an assumption can be made explicit within 
a framework when the assumption is transcended.
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Here my purpose is to apply this principle tc making 
the assumption of divisibility explicit in Western 
knowledge, and, in the next section, to making explict an 
alternative assumption in the knowledge of traditional 
China. In applying this principle, I shall assert that 
divisibility is a necessary condition for the smooth 
functioning of Western knowledge, and that when the 
assumption is threatened, Western knowledge generates a 
paradox.
There is a tendency to dismiss some of the paradoxes 
that I am about to present as trivial or nonsensical. 
However, it must be recalled the significant advantage that 
paradoxes provide in the understanding of knowledge. 
Paradoxes, because they are paradoxical to us, have a 
special status, for they have the valuable position of 
sitting on the fence at the boundaries of one's knowledge. 
Paradoxes cannot then be dismissed lightly, simply because 
they come to us in humble dress. Kasner and Newman (1956) ' 
warn:
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the 
logical paradoxes are not idle or foolish 
tricks . . ... The paradoxes are like the fables 
of La Fontaine which were dressed up to look like 
innocent stories about a fox and grapes, pebbles 
and frogs. For just as all ethical and moral 
concepts were skillfully woven into their fabric, 
so all of logic and mathematics, of philosophy and 
speculative thought, is interwoven with the fate 
of these little jokes. (p. 1952)
The paradoxes that are presented to us reveal something most
basic about knowledge, and it is hoped that in this manner
they will demonstrate the way in which knowledge is based on
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the assumption of divisibility.. For as I will demonstrate, 
when this assumption of divisibility is violated within 
Western knowledge, a paradox arises.
Our first demonstration is from the field of logic.
Both very simple and very ancient, the example dates from 
the time of the early Greeks in the Uth century B.C., when 
it was recognized that the simple statement of three words, 
"I am lying," produces a profound and penetrating paradox.
If we accept the statement as true, then the statement 
refutes itself. If we accept the statement as false, the 
statement also refutes itself.
In this example, I feel there is a model for all of the 
examples that are to follow. The basic condition that 
produces the paradox is the unification cf a divisibility; 
in this case, the divisibility between the speaker and that 
which is spoken of is collapsed. The result is a failure of 
knowledge to function further. This particular example has 
demonstrated its cogency through its longevity, first 
fascinating the Greeks, then the Schclastic philosophers, 
only to be revived again by logicians and mathematicians in 
the last century. This cne example, then, gives rise to an 
entire family cf paradoxes which have developed guite 
independently in widely different areas of Western 
knowledge.
For example, a similar case obtains in the area of 
language. Language clearly depends for its force upon a 
divisibility for it is a "system which can talk about
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something outside of itself." Its purpose is to operate 
within this divisibility, to describe the world. This
division is essential to the operation cf language for when
this division is challenged paradox results. Kilmister 
(1967) provides a simple example:
***************************************************
* *
* The sentence in a box on this page is false. *
* * 
***************************************************
This example places us in an analogous bind to that in the 
case of the "liar" above. There is an identity between the 
language and that which is being described resulting in a 
paradox.
The general semanticist Korzybski (1958) reminds us 
that "a word is net the object it represents." (p. 58) and 
cannot be lest we be propelled into a world of paradoxical 
self-reflection. Our language must be only a "map" of the 
"territory" as general semanticists would put it. This 
division must be maintained as the basis of our linguistic 
convention lest a paradox of infinite regression develop in 
which the map must "include, in a reduced scale, the map of 
the map; the map of the map; and so on, 
endlessly * . .." (p. 58) The assumption of divisibility, 
then, must be maintained for Hestern languages to function 
adequately.
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If we turn tc the next bulwark of Western knowledge,
logic, I find a parallel dependence of logic on the
assumption of divisibility. Its history is replete with
contradictions which arise from the unification of that
which has been assumed tc be divided. Huch of the effort of
logicians, particularly in scholastic times, was directed
toward systematically removing these contradictions from the
basis of logic. The effort was directed toward the
discovery of a principle by which such paradoxes could be
avoided and the formulation of the fallacy of reason
contained within them.
Perhaps the most famous of these logical paradoxes is
that of a certain barber in a village described by Kasner
and Newman (1956):
The village barber shaves everyone in the village 
who does not shave himself. (But this principle 
soon involves him in a dialectical plight . . ..)
Shall he shave himself? If he does, then he is 
shaving someone who shaves himself and breaks his 
own rule. If he does not, besides remaining 
unshaven, he also breaks his rule by failing to 
shave a person in the village who does not shave 
himself. (p. 1950)
One can see in the last example the paradigm of other
examples treated above— the unification of a division. In
this case the barber is unified with his own principle;
with other men the principle can be logically applied
without contradiction. Such logical contradictions were
known to exist at the basis of logic since antiquity.
Scholastic philosophers attempted to formulate principles by
which such contradictions could be resolved.
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After this tine, however, interest in such 
contradictions diminished until the middle of.the nineteenth 
century, when analogous contradictions began to emerge at 
the very basis of mathematics. The mathematician Cantor, 
the founder of modern set theory, generated analogous 
paradoxes concerning infinite classes. Since set theory is 
used as a basis for many processes central to mathematics, 
these paradoxes— or antimonies, as they became known 
technically— could not be passed over lightly as an 
interesting oddity in the otherwise consistent pattern of 
knowledge.
Conseguently, in response to this difficulty, and
others in which mathematics found itself at the turn of the
century, Whitehead and Bussell (1957) attempted, in their
monumental work, P i i a s i E i §  .f l i l£hemajiga, to place mathematics
on a firm logical basis. Correspondingly, they found it
necessary to deal directly with the confluence of logical
and mathematical paradoxes and tc provide a principle
whereby they could be systematically removed from
mathematical logic. It was in this context that they
presented several antimonies of which the following is a
principle example:
Let w be the class cf all those classes which are 
not members of themselves. Then, whatever class x 
may be, *x is a w* is equivalent to *x is not an 
x.* Hence, giving to x the value w, *w is a w* is 
equivalent to *w is not a jg. ' (Whitehead and 
Bussell, 1957, p. 60)
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It is with such paradoxes that the ordinary rules of 
logical inference seem to fail. Whitehead and Bussell 
suggested the "theory cf logical types and degrees" whereby 
these contradictions can be systematically removed from the 
basis of mathematical lcgic. The basis of this theory was 
that propositions could be divided by type and degree.
These antimonies could then be attributed to irregular use 
of different types of propositions within a single argument. 
The major thrust of this theory was to insure a divisibility 
which had been viclated in producing such 
self-contradictions.
Whitehead and Bussell attributed the origin of these 
antimonies to "a vicious circle fallacy." "The vicious 
circles in question arise from supposing that a collection 
of objects contains members which can only be defined by 
means of the collection as a whole." (p. 37) What in effect 
Whitehead and Bussell were suggesting, in my terminology, 
was that a certain divisibility must be maintained at the 
basis of mathematical logic tc avoid contradiction, and they 
suggested their theory cf types as a means of legislating 
such a division of propositions.
In any respect, these paradoxes should be viewed as 
something more than pure speculation or games, for as 
Chihara (1977) notes, it was through a consideration of 
these paradoxes that a fruitful exploration of the 
foundations of mathematics was pursued in the first half of 
this century. He writes, "It is hard to imagine what form
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logic and set theory would have today had the paradoxes not
been discovered and taJssu SSSlSJlSlJ-11 (P- 369* His italics)
In the 1930*s, the mathematician Godel dealt a telling
blow to any attempt to place mathematics on a
non-contradictory basis. I have presented aspects of his
famous proof above in defense of the assertion that
alternative systems are needed for the full evaluation of a
system of knowledge. However, this proof also demonstrates
that at the basis of any logical system as complex as
elementary arithmetic a necessary contradiction arises. Any
one mathematical system cannot demonstrate its own
consistency; there will always remain certain undecided
propositions. We have in this a classic example of the
bracketing of a division where the system attempts to
demonstrate something about itself. The result of the
attempt to turn the system back upon itself is
self-contradiction. In short, Gcdel*s proof, in its
broadest implications, established that:
It is not possible to demonstrate the 
non-contradictoriness of a rational system by 
using only the means offered by the system itself. 
(Carruccic, 1964, p. 361)
Godel recognized in presenting his argument the 
similarity between his proof and the paradoxes I have 
already considered above, particularly the paradox of the 
"liar." In terms of my purposes, it appears that a certain 
divisibility between the system and itself must be 
maintained to insure the full function of axiomatic systems.
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In the above discussion of the assumption of
divisibility I have focused on the areas of logic and
language# areas in which there is an attempt to use precise
definition. I concluded that at the basis of the validity
of both there is the assumption of divisibility. However#
the assumption is a more general precondition for the
Western tradition of knowing. Parallel demonstrations can
be found in the major traditions of Western knowledge.
For example, from the area of religion# the
cyberneticist, Wiener (1964) provides us with a
demonstration of the need for a basic assumed divisibility
at the center of religion which demands that God be divided
from the universe he created. He recounts an age-old
question that has troubled many who believe and assert the
omnipotence of God:
Can God make a stone so heavy that he cannot lift 
it? If He cannot# there is a limit to His power, 
or at least their appears to be; and if He can# 
this seems to constitute a limitation to His 
powers too. (p. 6)
This example and the double-bind it produces in our thought
can be clearly seen to fit within the paradigm noted above
in the case of the liar. In this case# the unification of a
basic division in religion between God and the universe
results in a paradox.
In the other major tradition of Western knowledge,
science# I can illustrate a similar dependence on the
assumption of divisibility, is was noted above# the
tradition of science is committed to a basic division
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between observer and observed. For science to function in 
its classical manner# this division must not only be assumed 
but maintained. This need can be demonstrated by examining 
the paradoxes generated in scientific thought when this 
division was challenged in the micrccosmic world of quantum 
physics.
It was in the 1920's that the classical division 
between the observer and observed was bracketed by 
experimental results, results that seemed to demonstrate 
that the observer could not be totally isolated from the 
thing being observed. This unification of the classical 
division produced such paradoxes in thought as Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle whereby two variables could not be 
known simultaneously— for example# both the position and 
velocity of an electron. Again# in the example of quantum 
theory# we find the same paradigmatic development# the 
unification of a division resulting in a paradox.
In the above discussion# I have endeavored to make 
explicit the assumption of divisibility in many different 
areas of Western knowledge. I have attempted to demonstrate 
in each case that as this assumption is challenged# the 
system fails to function and results in paradox. Without 
the assumption of division# the powerful and central 
bulwarks of Western thought are reduced to 
self-contradiction. On this basis, I conclude that the 
assumption of divisibility is a general requirement for the 
function of Western knowledge.
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Bridgman (1959) has recognized the interconnection of 
the examples I have presented and the general character of 
Western knowledge’s need to assume a division between 
systems.
The essence of the situation presented by Godel’s 
theorem seems to be that we are here concerned 
with a system dealing with itself— mathematics 
attempting to prove something about mathematics,. 
Similar situations present themselves frequently 
in logic, as when we have the class of all 
classes, including itself, or contemplate the 
barber ordered to shave all those who do not shave 
themselves, including himself, or the map that 
must contain a map cf the map. In all these 
situations we have systems dealing with 
themselves, and in all these cases we have paradox 
or, at best, infinite regression, and therefore 
difficulty. It is tempting to generalize Godel’s 
theorem to read that whenever we have a system 
dealing with itself, we may expect to encounter 
maladjustments and infelcities, if not downright 
paradox. (p. 7)
In this statement, Bridgman draws all of the examples
presented together to reveal the general case of the
generation of a paradox within Western knowledge: when
previously divided systems are united into one system
paradox results.
Nowhere is this principle given more substance than in
the case of the theoretical problems surrounding General
Systems Theory. The problems arise because the purpose of
this theory is to generate the most general system and in
the process all of the normal divisions between systems are
eliminated. As would be expected, this structural condition
produces paradoxes surrounding how systems will be
integrated and differentiated. Sadovsky (1974) has made
explicit no less than six paradoxes that these issues
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generate for systems theory.
ASSUMED CONTEXT EOS KNOWLEDGE 
IN TBADITICNAI CHINA
A fruitful way to deal with the assumed context of 
traditional China is simply to treat it as the inverse of 
the Western assumed context. Where the assumed context of 
the West is dominated by the assumption of division, using 
this logic one would expect the Chinese framework to be 
permeated by unity. This is the hypothesis that largely 
directed my efforts in this area.
One could speculate about the possible source of this 
inverse relation. I could speculate that in some manner 
unity is "logically" prior to divisibility. While Western 
thought moved from unity to increasing divisibility, in 
traditional China we dc not find divisibility at the core of 
the consciousness of the Chinese thinker. Guenon (1972) has 
suggested that "a man ’Westernizes* himself, whatever may be 
his race cr country, to that extent he ceases to be an 
Oriental spiritually and intellectually." (p. 16)
From this perspective, the unity implicit in the 
knowledge of China is net an sxcepticnal case to be 
accounted for, but it is that Western thinkers have 
progressively divided themselves from this primal unity. 
According t o  Guenon, this is ere of the great values of 
oriental civilization for the Westerner, for the former is 
the only major cultural system that has retained what the 
Westerner has leng since abandoned.
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In contrast tc the development of knowledge in the 
West, the Chinese retained and elaborated knowledge based on 
an assumption of unity. The knowledge that developed has an 
"organic" quality, a term often used by scholars in this 
area, viewing China as they do from the grounds cf Western 
divisibility. This is really the closest approximation the 
Western terminology permits given its inherent assumption of 
divisibility.
On another level, the assumption of unity, viewed 
through Western eyes, appears to reveal an emphasis away 
from abstraction and toward immediate experience. Again, 
Western categories of thought seem to fail. For example, 
the contrast reveals itself most clearly in Northrop«s 
distinction between "theoretic" and "aesthetic" components 
(Northrop, 19h6). Using this classification, Northrop 
argues that the West is characterized by the theoretic 
component where Western thinkers attempt to abstract 
themselves from that which is being known. In firm 
contrast, the knowledge of the East tends toward the 
aesthetic ccmpcnent based on an essential intimacy between 
the knower and that which is known.
In short, the major thesis being presented is that 
while the Western thinker found it necessary to articulate 
knowledge on essentially two planes— characterized by a 
large number of dualisms such as mind-body, subjective- 
objective, and so forth— the Chinese, from the earliest 
time, built their knowledge monistically, based on an
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essential unity. Like tie divisibility of the West# this
unity revealed itself very early in the development of the
system of knowledge.
Wilhelm (1960) gives an excellent example of this
divergence in knowledge in his examination of the I plying.
the Book of changes, an ancient Chinese text concerning
order and change in the universe. He notes that even at
this early stage of development (500 B.C.), there was a
clear distinction between the concepts of change in China as
compared to Greek thought of the same period. Again, the
dimension is one cf divisibility and unity. Change and the
laws of change were conceived by the Greeks to be separate,
such that the laws of change were abstracted from the actual
movement of things in the universe. Such an abstraction, of
course, bases its authority on the assumption of
divisibility prevalent in the Greek philosophy of the time.
While for the Chinese, given their assumption of unity,
these two elements were viewed within the same unity.
Wilhelm notes:
But to the Chinese, as we shall see, the two 
principles, mcvement and the unchanging law 
governing it, are one; they knew neither kernel 
nor husk . . .  heart and mind function together 
undivided. (p. 13)
As Wilhelm suggests, this one division, like most 
divisions made by Western thinkers, is not valid for the 
Chinese. As Pirsig (1974) has recognized, the basic 
divisions were the result of the dialectical process of the 
Greeks, resulting, in turn, in an entire series of
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dichotomies within Western knowledge. Such a dialectical 
process did not occur among the Chinese of this period and, 
consequently, their knowing process retained and perpetuated 
an essential unity.
The assumption of Unity in Chinese Knowledge
The problem in defining the assumption of unity within 
the traditions of China is that we must approach this 
alternative framework from the Western framework which has 
the contradictory assumption of divisibility embedded in it. 
Most directly, the Western framework produces in us certain 
expectations that must be produced for definition, while the 
Chinese framework tends to function along quite different 
lines. For example, within the Western framework, the more 
central a concept is, the more important it is to the 
framework, the more analytically it becomes defined. Thus, 
the layman's definition cf energy is less precise and 
explicit than that of the physicist, who discriminates among 
different types of energy. This flow of knowledge derives 
from the assumption of divisibility. Within the domain of 
this assumption, the definition of a concept is related to 
its clear discrimination from other concepts.
In Chinese thought, the customary criteria used in the 
West for the definition cf concepts do not apply. Indeed, 
the reverse relation seems to exist, as a concept becomes 
more central within the Chinese framework, it becomes both 
less definable and more obscure. This flow of knowledge is 
a product of the underlying assumption of unity, which
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continues to submerge the concept within the ever greater 
unity of which it is a part. Consequently, the present 
discussion with the purpose of defining unity within the 
major traditions of China must, of necessity, fall short of 
Western expectations for definition.
The nearest that the Chinese approximate labeling the 
fundamental unity of their framework is in the concept of 
the Tao which is one of the most ancient, profound, obscure 
and central concepts within Chinese knowledge. To even 
attempt to define it by Western standards of definition is 
like attempting to hit the moon with an arrow; one is told 
by the sages of the East that one is destined to fail.
The concept of the Tao antedates both of the major 
traditions of China, Confucianism and Taoism, with the locus 
cjassj.cqs. according to Needham (1956), to be found in the 
ancient classic, the I Ch^ng. where it is recorded: "'One
Ying and One Yang; that is the Tao! (p. 274). 
Consequently, both Confucius and Lao Tse, the founder of 
Taoism, inherited a framework based on the unity of the Tao.
The fullest definition (if one can call it this) of the 
relation between the Tao and the assumption of unity appears 
in the great, but obscure classic of Taoism, the T^p Te 
Ching. generally translated as the "The Way and its Power." 
The work, however, far from making the nature of the Tao 
more explicit, tends to further obscure it. This little 
volume, of but a few characters, has undergone tens, if not 
hundreds, of translations due tc its basic obscurity. We
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read in the beginning cf the vclume that the "True Tao"
cannot be spoken of:
The tao (way) that can be told of is not the 
eternal T 3 0 :
The name that can be named is net the eternal 
name. (Chan# 1963# p. 139)
Here# we are confronted directly with the problem alluded to
at the beginning of this section: to name this unity or Tao
is not to define it, by its very definition.
The point of this discussion is that the Tfao cannot be
approached by the traditional Western process of knowing;
to attempt to do so is to miss the mark completely. The
response of the Master Nan Ch'uan to the guestion, "What is
the Tao?" is here more than appropriate:
•The Tao#* said the master# ’belongs neither to 
knowing ncr tc net knowing. Knowing is false 
understanding; net knowing is blind ignorance..
If you really understand the Tac beyond doubt# 
it's like the empty sky. Why drag in right and 
wrong?' (Watts, 1975, p. 38)
It is here more correct to identify the problem not so much
with the T30 as with the Western process of knowing which is
antithetical tc the very character of that which we are
seeking to know.
at this pcint, almost in frustration, one could ask:
"What can be said of tie unity cf the lao?" If I must "shoot
an arrow at the moon," I can provide an approximation by
saying that the T§o represents to the Chinese the way of the
universe, the unity of the universe. The universe, for the
traditional Chinese, was a unified whole functioning in
harmony like a giant organism, each part having its 3& 0 ,
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harmonizing completely into the 3aS °f the entire universe.
This is such a difficult concept to relate because
order and change in the universe, to Western eyes, stand as
principles, divided frcm the wcrld. For the Chinese,
everything was unified into the whole of the Tao,. Needham
(1956) writes:
The key word in Chinese thought is order and above 
all pa-t;-frern (and, if I may whisper it for the 
first”time, Org^nj.sm). The symbolic correlations 
or correspondences all formed part of one colossal 
pattern. Things behaved in particular ways not 
necessarily because of prior actions or impulsions 
of other things, but because their position in the 
ever-moving cyclical universe was such that they 
were endowed with intrinsic natures which made 
that behaviour inevitable for them. If they did 
not behave in those particular ways they would 
lose their relational positions in the whole 
(which made them what they were), and turn into 
something ether than themselves. (p. 281)
The representation for this pattern or order was the T§o.
Both Confucianism and Taoism share this tradition of
the unity of the Tao. with a different emphasis. The
Confucians had as their primary concern the pattern and
order of society and were, consequently, interested in the
"Tao of Man." Alternatively, the Tacists were concerned
with order and pattern in Nature and consequently concerned
themselves with the "2§o of Nature." Even as these two
traditions conflicted on many issues, they still shared the
communality of the unity of the £ao.
In the Taoist classic, the T§o we find the
following passage in which Lao Tse relates the to the
unity of the universe:
There was something undifferentiated and yet 
complete,.
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Which existed before heaven and earth.
Soundless and formless, it depends on nothing
and does not change.
It operates everywhere and is free from danger.
It may be considered the mother of the universe.
I do not know its name; I call it Tao.
(Chan, 1963, p. 152)
Again from the same classic. Lac Tse relates how the 
universe arises fom the unity of the Tao:
Tao produced the Cne.
The One produced the two.
The two produced the three.
And the three produced the ten thousand things.
The ten thousand things carry the yin and em­
brace the yang and through the blending of
the material force <ch*i) they achieve harmony.
(Chan, 1963, p. 160)
Two elements must be stressed from this passage. First, 
that for the Chinese and the Tacists in particular, there is 
always a unity below the diversity of things. Secondly, 
this progression that Lao Tse relates must not be read from 
the Western assumption of divisibility,. The differentiation 
referred to here was not simply division as it occurred in 
the West, but rather a very special form of differentiation, 
if this word is appropriate at all, which maintained the 
essential unity of the system.*
♦Scholars in both China and the West have traditionally 
distinguished between Tac-Chia cr Estoteric Taoism and 
Tao-Chj.as or Popular Tacist Religion. The former is the 
Taoism of the great mystics celebrated in the y^o 3s Ching. 
while the latter is the corrupt version of the common
peasant which is given to superstition and necromancy. This
inquiry will freely draw from both traditions as the 
situation warrants. It is my feeling that there is an 
underlying communality which could be called Philosophical 
Taoism which is at the center of both traditions and has 
provided a particular orientation to Chinese culture. I 
would agree with the assessment of Smith (1958) that:
"Esoteric Taoism has vanished; Popular Taoism is corrupt;
but Philosophical Taoism continues to shape Chinese 
character in the direction of serenity and grace." (p. 181)
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In Confucianism, we find the same dedication to the 
unity of the T a o . In one of the most profound points in the 
classic of Confucianism, The Analects, Confucius is asked 
about his doctrines by a disciple. Confucius replies, 
according to the translation by Legge (1970) , "The Master 
said, 'Shan, my doctrine is that of an all-pervading 
unity.'" (p. 169) For Confucius, this unity must begin with 
the individual human being where heart and mind are one. In 
this manner, one can conduct one's life in accordance with 
the Tao of Man.
As I have suggested above, the assumption of 
divisibility in the West affects the function of people 
within the Western framework. In both religion and science, 
I found Western thinkers attempting to function within this 
assumed divisibility (namely, prayer in religion and 
experiment in science). Similarly, in traditional China, I 
would anticipate that people would attempt to function 
within the context of unity within their major traditions.
Without preempting the discussions that are to follow,
I can in this context say that in both Confucianism and 
Taoism, people are attempting to work within the assumed 
unity by acting to promote the unity of the Tao and adjust 
themselves to the natural contours of its nature. The 
purpose for knowledge within the domain of unity is to act 
in accordance with the T a o . This is essentially why 
Confucius places such great emphasis on the correct behavior 
in the smallest matters. Likewise, in Taoism, contrasting
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sharply with Western people's concern with experimenting and
controlling Nature, people attempt to unify themselves with
the Tao of Nature.
Examples of unification with the T 30 abound in Taoist
literature, perhaps the mcst famous is the story of the
butcher of King Hui of Liang related by Needham (1956):
Ting, the butcher of King Hui, was cutting up a 
bullock. Every blow of his hand, every heave of 
his shoulder, every thread of his foot, every 
thrust of his knee, every sound of the rending 
flesh, and every note of the movement of the 
chopper, were in perfect harmony— rhythmical like 
the Mulberry Grove dance, harmonious like the 
chords of the C h^qq Shgu music. 'Admirable,' said 
the prince. 'Yours is skill indeed!' 'Sir,' said 
the cook, laying down his chopper, 'What your 
servant loves is the Tao, which is higher than 
mere skill. When I first began to cut up oxen, I 
saw before me the entire carcasses. After three 
years' practice, I saw no more whole animals. Now 
I work with my mind and not my eyes, my spirit 
having no need of control of the senses.
Following the natural structure, my chopper slips 
through the deep crevices, slides through the 
great cavities, taking advantage of what is 
already there. My art avoids the tendinous 
ligatures, and much more so the great bones. A 
good cook changes his chopper once a year, because 
he cuts. An ordinary cook needs a new chopper 
once a month because he hacks. But I have had 
this chopper for nineteen years, and although I 
have cut up many thousands of bullocks, its edge 
is as if fresh from the wetstone. (pp. 45-6)
Commenting on this passage, Needham remarks that the nature
of the T$o reveals itself as something not vague and obscure
to the Chinese, but as being the "naturalness, the very
structure, of particular and individual types of things."
(P- 45)
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Making the Assumption cf Unity Explicit
To find the assumption cf unity in the major traditions 
of China is net tc make this assumption explicit in a 
technical sense. Again, the principle of transcendence 
suggested itself to me for this task. The thought that 
first occurred to me was to attempt to make the assumption 
explicit by employing the same stratagem as was done for the 
Western framework: engineering the unification of a 
division. The expected failure of this stratagem would have 
the benefit of reaffirming that traditional China is in fact 
an alternative framework to the West.
In the assumption cf divisibility in the assumed 
context of the West, it was pointed out that the unification 
of a division resulted in a failure cf Western knowledge to 
function. It is logical that in an assumed context 
dominated by unity, such a condition of unification of a 
division should net prove a weakness but rather a strength 
for the system. It would be expected that such a condition 
would not inhibit the functioning of the assumption of 
unity, but actually would reinforce this assumption.
To illustrate this point, I turn to the writings of 
Chang-Tze, who is surpassed only by the founder of Taoism, 
Lao Tze, in his knowledge of the Tao and its unity. In his 
writings, Chang-Tze provides the following example of the 
unification of divisions as reinforcing the unity of the 
Tao:
If you hide away a boat in the ravine of a hill, 
and hide away the hill in a lake, you will say 
that (the boat) is secure; but at midnight there
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shall come a strong man and carry it off on his 
back, while ycu in the dark knew nothing about it.
You may hide away anything, whether small or 
great, in the most suitable place, and yet it 
shall disappear from it. Eut if you could hide 
the world in the world, so that there was nowhere 
to which it could be removed, this would be the 
great reality of the ever-during Thing (the Tao). 
(Legge, 1927, pp.. 242-43)
In the last sentence, I find the classic example of the
unification of a divisicn, as Chang-Tze asks us to "hide the
world in the world." Unlike Western knowledge where .this
condition produces a negation of the system, given the
Chinese framework, there is an affirmation of the system.
To operate upon the assumption cf unity in the
framework of traditional China, a different stratagem would
be best employed. We cannot simply unify what is divided
resulting in paradox and perplexity as has been done with
Western knowledge. Given the assumption cf unity, such
unifications do not present a problem, and, consequently,
cannot be used to advantage. For example, consider the oft
quoted story of the man who confused the distinction between
waking and dreaming:
Formerly, I, Kwang Kau, dreamt that I was a 
butterfly, a butterfly flying about, feeling that 
it was enjoying itself. I did net know that it 
was Kau. Suddenly, I awoke, and was myself again, 
the veritable Kau. I did not know whether it had 
formerly been Kau dreaming that he was a 
butterfly, or it was now a butterfly dreaming that 
it was Kau. (Legge, 1927, p. 197)
This story appears in the writing of the Taoist, Chang 
Tze in a section of his writings titled the "The Adjustment 
of Controversies" which has as its purpose to demonstrate 
that the unity of the 2 §o underlies all conflicting
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divisions. Thus, in this context of unity, Kwang Kau's 
confusion of the division between dreaming and waking 
presents no major perplexities cr paradoxes.
Compare this to the fate cf the same unification in the 
Western framework. The confusion of waking and dreaming 
presents a central philosophical problem. This issue is 
best revealed in the philosophy of Descartes where the 
confusion of dreaming and waking is one of Descrates* key 
doubts and its resolution becomes central to his 
epistemology. He finds it necesssary to make as clear as 
possible a distinction between the two states, while our 
Chinese philosopher merely entertains the possibilities of 
relation between the two.
This example is representive of the differences in the 
two frameworks. A different approach must be taken from 
that taken with the assumption of divisibility. To advance 
beyond this point, I shall employ the same general process, 
the principle cf transcendence, to the problem of making the 
assumption of unity explicit. Since a framework based on 
the assumption of unity presents to us a continous whole, I 
could not find a clear point of leverage from within the 
framework. In this case, an effective principle of 
criticism suggests that I should seek an alternative system 
with which to confront the unified system of the Chinese, in 
the manner of an external probe. In this manner, the 
dominant unity of the framework can be transcended.
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As noted above, China has retained a privileged 
position insulated from the impact of alien influence. It 
is this very isolaticn that has given China its alternative 
framework. Traditionally, the Chinese have been dominant in 
their cultural area and regarded themselves as the “center 
of the world." Their characteristic reaction to foreign 
contacts has been to submerge these foreign elements, in a 
non-violent manner., within the Chinese whole. In this way, 
innumerable barbarous hordes of Central Asia became 
"sinicized" and assimilated. When the power of the alien 
was beyond the capacity cf this assimilation process, the 
characteristic response, even to the present time (e.g., the 
behavior of Haoist China in the 20th century), was to 
withdraw into isolation.
There is cne major exception to this general course of 
events in the history of China providing an interesting 
point of leverage. At the beginning of the Christian era 
(circa, 65 A.D.), a foreign element. Buddhism, began to 
appear in China. Unlike the prior ccurse of events, the 
Chinese addressed themselves directly to this foreign 
doctrine and attempted tc deal with the problems generated 
by its introduction within their assumed context. In 
Buddhism, we have a condition cf transcendence where the 
overpowering unity of the Chinese was breached.
It will be recalled frcm the discussion above that the 
Chinese scholar Creel (1929) was guoted as saying that if we 
viewed the world in the most comprehensive terms, one could
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divide it into two alternatives with India, the Middle East,
and Europe on one extreme, and China and her cultural area
on the other. On this basis, India and her knowledge system
could be conceived as being Western. An indication of this
can be taken from historical linguistics where it has been
recognized that there is a direct linkage between the
language of Ancient India, Sanskrit, and the roots in
European languages.
Consequently, the linguist groups them together under
the label, Indo-European languages. In China, we find a
radically different language structure which has little or
no relation to Indo-European languages. If there is such a
gap between India and China on something as basic as
language structure, we would expect that this gap would be
reflected in many different areas. Hright (1959) describes
the differences:
No languages are mere different than these of 
China and India. Chinese is uninflected, 
logographic, and (in its written form) largely 
monosyllabic; Indian languages are highly 
inflected, alphabetic, polysyllabic. Chinese has 
no systematized grammar; Indian languages, 
particularly Sanskrit, have a formal and highly 
elaborated grammatical system. (p. 33)
Naturally, of course, these differences tend to permeate
through the entire system. Wright goes on:
When we turn to literary modes, we find that the 
Chinese preference is for terseness, for metaphors 
from familiar nature, for the concrete image, 
whereas, Indian literature tends to be discursive, 
hyperbolic in its metaphors, and full of 
abstractions. (p. 33)
Here, in this comparison of languages and the immediate
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ramifications in literary style, we can appreciate the fact 
that we are confronted with two basically different systems.
When we turn specifically to Buddhism, we find that as 
a system it emerged from the Indian cultural matrix being 
very much committed to this assumed context. The important 
point is that Buddhism, arising as it does from Indian 
knowledge, is essentially a part of the Western framework 
and, consequently, has inherited the assumption of 
divisibility which permeates the Western framework. Before 
proceeding further, I shall attempt to illustrate the 
essential association cf Buddhism with the Western framework 
of divisibility.
Daye (1975) points out that the Buddhists were very 
careful in their definition of concepts such as "emptiness" 
to insure that reflexsive problems would not arise. In the 
case of emptiness, a strict divisibility was maintained 
which viewed "emptiness" only as a construct in language, 
not as an ontological entity. In this way, the turning of 
emptiness back upon itself, and consequently, the problems 
and confusion inherent in this unification of a division, 
could be avoided.
In Buddhism, the principle that a unification of 
something normally divided leads to a paradox seems to be 
very much operative. Daye writes that in Buddhist thought, 
there is a "persistent confusion surrounding the 
propositions that there is perception but no perceiver, 
thought but no independent ontological thinker." (p. 99)
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As I have noted and suggested above these confusions vhich 
Western thinkers and the Buddhists share arise from the 
common assumption within the Western framework of a 
separation between the knower and kncwn. It would seem that 
Buddhist knowledge shares the same limitations in respect to 
division as does Western knowledge.
In the following discussion, I will assume that with 
Buddhist knowledge we have an alternative to the Chinese 
assumption of unity. Tc make use of this transcending 
condition, I will examine in detail the problem that the 
Chinese experienced in attempting to understand Buddhist 
knowledge. If the analysis is correct, the Chinese thinker 
should experience problems with the divisibilities imposed 
by the Buddhists. In short, the problems and paradoxes will 
be due to the fact that the Buddhists were assuming certain 
divisions which the Chinese traditionally had unified.*
At the time of the Buddhist introduction, human beings 
in traditional China existed in a fundamental unity on a 
number of levels. On the level cf knowledge, the thinker 
was unified with knowledge and the world, resulting in a 
concrete and pragmatic form of knowledge. Within the social 
level, human beings were unified with other human beings in
♦To display the full impact of this discussion, it will be 
necessary to anticipate the discussion that will be 
undertaken in the next chapters. However, at this point, in 
order to present the contrast, it will be reguired to make 
some rather bread generalizations about the unity of human 
beings in traditional China without spending the time to 
support each assertion. The reader must keep in mind that 
these assertions will be documented at length in the 
following pages.
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the whole of the family and always functioned and
interpreted their world from the context of family
relationships. The family, for the Confucian, revolved
around the central axis of the father-scn relation and
placed great importance on virtue in the relation of filial
piety. It was through this relation of continued obedience
of the son to the father that the whole of the family was
perpetuated through time.
On the level cf the individual, we find a similar
unity. Human beings were considered to be a harmonious
whole >f mind and body. In general, the image that this
brief and sketchy portrayal of human beings in traditional
China is intended to convey is a human being unified with
the "here and now," as immediately reacting to the world in
concrete terms and functioning in a pragmatic manner.
This central assumption of unity really becomes
explicit when we examine the problems generated by the
introduction of Buddhist divisibilities. It is difficult, I
think, to appreciate the impact of this confrontation on the
Chinese. From their perspective, the confrontation was
traumatic, generating numerous "absurdities." Chen (1973)
attempts to relate something of this:
The Chinese were also told that the phenomenal 
world is illusory, like a mirage or shadow, that 
life is suffering and transitory, that sensual 
pleasures are undesirable and therefore ought to 
be suppressed or eradicated, that the ideal 
pattern of life was withdrawal frcm society and 
family to life of celibacy and mendicancy. The 
Chinese also learned that because of rebirth, 
their ancestors could very well be reborn as 
animals and hence it wculd be wise to follow a 
vegetarian diet. (p. 3)
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It can be seen frcm Chen's brief statement that one could
not imagine a system of thought that vas more antithetical
to the Chinese system.
At the root cf all cf these perplexities was the simple
fact that Buddhist notions of Beality were based on the
assumption of divisibility and the Chinese on unity:
Nirvana, the sole Buddhist Beality, lay outside 
the Chinese order of reality altogether. The 
empirical world and its inner principle, which the 
Chinese assumed to be all of Beality, was, 
according to Indian Buddhism, sheer illusion.
(Nather, 1955, p. 26)
To open this point cf entry further, the major problem
for the Chinese was the proclivity cf the Buddhists for a
high level of abstraction in knowledge. As I noted, the
Chinese were unified with the world and their knowledge was
immediate, concrete and pragmatic. The Chinese revealed
their wholeness in reacting to this abstraction: they
attempted to reduce the abstractions of the Buddhists to
visual diagrams and, thus, attempted to make these esoteric
doctrines immediately available (Nakamura, 1964). However,
such attempts were of little effect for there was a basic
difference in assumptions and language structures.
The Buddhists were being guite Western with their
divisibilities and were seeking a "reality" beyond the world
as it is immediately experienced. This doctrine comes into
direct confrontation with the Chinese assumption of unity
which required the world be experienced immediately as a
whole. Needham (1956) writes cf this conflict:
Another doctrine introduced by Euddhism which was 
basically antagonistic tc the indigenous
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philosophies was that of the illusory nature of 
the visible world (J&ya), and its corresponding 
theoretical form cf subjective idealism. (p. 410)
Such differences resulted in different purposes for
knowledge.
Buddhism was not interested in co-ordinating and 
interpreting experience, or finding reality in the 
fullest and most harmonious statement of the facts 
of experience, but in seeking some kind of 
•reality* behind the phenomenal world, and then 
brushing the latter away as a useless curtain.
(Needham, 1956, p. 417)
Dumoulin (1963) notes, along these same lines, that there
was a basic difference in values. The Chinese wished to
live in harmony and unity with Nature and other human
beings, while the Indian Buddhists were committed to fleeing
the world in an act of division.
If we turn to the social level, we find analogous
problems centered around division and unity between human
beings. The Buddhists regarded human beings as individuals,
who were seeking their own salvation in the manner of the
Buddha himself. Consequently, the religion advocated the
monastic life independent of the everyday, profane world.
Given the Chinese experience of the unity of people, the
conflict in social values was readily joined.
As Chen (1973) records, the Chinese attacked the
Buddhists for being ,,unfilial,, and destroying the unity of
the family and society in favor of individual gratification
of monastiic celebacy. Again, we find the same paradigmatic
problem, the Buddhists were making a division of human
beings from the rest of humankind, while the Chinese held a
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unity of all humankind as represented by the whole of the 
family.
On the level of the individual, we find, again, the
same type of problem. The Chinese had not shown any
inclination to divide human beings into mind and body or to
divide and analyze the personality of human beings. For the
Chinese, the human being was a unified whole (Wright, 1959).
The Buddhists, on the ether hand, had an elaborate system of
psychological analysis. Again, a confrontation was at hand:
the Buddhists suggested a suppression of the passions in
which the mind controlled the body. Consequently, the
Buddhists advocated rules and methods for expunging of these
passions. Chen (1964) records one such case in particular.
The Buddhists suggested that in order to extirpate lust, one
was to go to the cemetery and meditate on a corpse in
various states of decay. The Chinese were deeply offended
by such rules for the passions and viewed them as an affront
to the natural and spontaneous movement of the T§o.
By way of summary, all of these issues speak with one
voice in suggesting the strength of the assumption of unity
in the Chinese framework and the threat with which the
introduction of Buddhism was perceived:
Though particular criticisms arcse over many 
separate issues, the underlying complaint was 
invariably the same: the adherence of Buddhist 
monks and nuns to an cther-wordly ideal, which 
caused them to repudiate the actual world with its 
obligations and tc practice principles contrary to 
nature, was a dangerous threat not only to society 
and the state, but to the harmcny of the universe 
as well. (flather, 1955, p. 26)
The luxury of dividing oneself from the rest of society and
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from the world, that the Buddhists merely assumed, could not 
be so assumed in the Chinese framework based on the 
assumption of unity.
ALTERNATIVE PROCESSES OF QUESTIONING 
It is hoped that the above discussion of alternative 
assumed contexts is not just an academic exercise. To go 
beyond this, the method requires that the alternative 
assumed contexts be related to the questions that are asked. 
In short, the respective assumptions of unity and 
divisibility should be shewn to affect the nature of 
questioning in each framework. As a contingent further 
step, to use this material within the method, these 
alternative processes cf questioning must be focused upon 
the problem and shown tc make a difference in terms of the 
consequences in each system.
Alternative Assumptions and Alternative Questioning 
Given alternative assumed contexts, it would be 
expected that different questions would be thought to be 
"significant” questions in China and the West. In short, 
the questions that Western thinkers ask are not the same 
questions that thinkers in traditional China asked.
These different piocesses of questioning derive from 
the alternative assumptions. The Western thinker works with 
divisions, the major division being the separation between 
the knower and the known. Consequently, significant 
questions are questions which lead tc the construction of
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information about the known. The purpose for knowledge is 
to understand.
In traditional China, the assumption of unity requires 
a different purpose and structure for constructing 
information. Since the thinker is unified into one system 
with everything, within the Tag, significant questions are 
questions which provide information about relationships 
within this whole. The purpose for knowledge becomes to 
act, to produce these relationships to the harmony of 
humankind in Confucianism and the harmony of Nature in 
Taoism. The result of these different purposes and 
assumptions is a radically different process of questioning 
in each framework:
A comparison of the discussions of knowing in 
pre-twentieth-century Western and in Chinese 
philosophy reveals that the topics cf most concern 
to the Westerners are rarely significant in the 
Chinese discussions. For example, the question of 
certainty and doubt is important to Westerners:
Are there truths that cannot be doubted? What are 
the grounds for the knowledge we supposedly have 
when we grasp such truths? What is the relation 
between knowing something and the reasons we can 
give to claim knowledge? What is the relation 
between knowledge and belief? Hew do we weight 
the competing arguments in favor of intuition, 
sense experience, and awareness of the laws of 
logic in answering these questions? Another set 
of questions important to Western philosophy 
concerns the relation between our sense 
experiences and objects supposedly external to our 
minds: Do objects themselves resemble our 
perceptions of them? Do objects exist outside of 
and independently cf our minds and experience? 
Certainly, the Chinese philosophers were not 
unaware of seme of these guestions, but they were 
primarily concerned with two quite different 
questions. First, what can we learn through 
studying things that will tell us both how things 
are naturally structured to act and how they 
should act? That is what we can learn about moral 
rules and also about objects— acorns, streams.
123
planets, cr people— that will help us evaluate 
whether or not they are acting properly. The 
other question is what happens to a knower as a 
result of his efforts to know, that enables him to 
behave properly when alcne or toward other people 
and things? Does he learn things about himself in 
the process cf trying to know the natures of other 
things; and does that knowledge help him to 
behave more consistently with Ccnfucian norms?
Does he acquire feelings toward objects he knows 
that he should seek to duplicate in his 
noncognitive dealings with them in the future? In 
short, these who are interested in knowing are 
interested in making the right evaluations and in 
guides tc action. (flunro, 1977, pp. 27-28)
This lengthy quotation seems justified by the fact that
Nunro is one of the few scholars in this area to make
explicit the relation between purposes, questions, and the
resultant differences between Chinese and Western knowledge.
These alternative processes of questioning diverge from
different central ox core guestions. As was noted in an
earlier discussion of the dynamics of questioning, guestions
asked in any framework are really rephrasings and specific
elaborations of a key question which is considered the most
significant question. The same relation pertains here. The
Western thinker asks questions about substance and the
Chinese thinker about relation and action. At the basis of
this questioning are two key guestions. Needham (1956)
writes;
At any rate, Chinese thought, always concerned 
with relation, preferred tc avoid the problems and 
pseudo-problems of substance, and thus 
persistently eluded all metaphysics. Where 
Western minds asked 'wjjaj; essentially is it ?*
Chinese minds asked 1 how is it related in its 
beginnings, functions, and endings with everything 
else, and how ought we to react to it? 1 (p. 200)
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Focusing the Alternative Processes on Human Beings
To use these alternative processes in the following 
chapters, the process should be focused upon human beings 
and the guesticns that are asked about human beings. I can 
build upon the earlier discussion cf the process of 
questioning in psychology as that process converged to the 
key question: "What is a human being?" If all of the effort 
so far directed is of any use it should be possible to give 
this key guestion an alternative meaning in opposition to 
the singular meaning of the Western framework,.
Within the assumed context of divisibility prevalent in 
the West, the question acquires an all toe familar 
meaning: a human being is an isolated entity existing within 
a divided world. As the questioning progresses from this 
central meaning, questions centering around human beings as 
separate entities beccme of paramount importance until we 
come to the extreme levels of derivation such as "What 
traits are in this person*s personality?" We can easily find 
in this interdependence of guesticns the entire framework of 
human beings in the West.
Everywhere I look within the West, I find the results 
of the Western meaning cf the guesticn. As I found 
divisions at the center cf the major traditions of the West, 
I must also find that human beings who function within these 
traditions are a product of this same division. The 
conception of the human being that arises is that of a 
person divided: the personality is composed of traits, the
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person is divided into mind and body, people are experienced 
as separate from ether people, and humankind is divided from 
Nature.
Within the assumed context of unity in traditional 
China, "What is the human being?" acquires quite another 
meaning and we are propelled into another process of 
questioning in respect to people. In this context, the 
question is given the meaning that a person is a unity 
contained within ever larger unities, ft cursory reading of 
the Chinese classics reveals ancther world from that of the 
West, a world where harmony and unity are the rule and not 
the exception.
This level of abstraction still lacks the focus 
necessary to serve as the basis for the operation of the 
method. One way of further refining this is to ask: "What 
are the key relationships which transect human experience 
and function?" I believe there are three major dimensions 
of interrelation: humankind’s relation to Nature, human 
beings relation to other human beings, and a person's 
relation to himself. The next three chapters will examine, 
in turn, each of these dimensions in an effort to delimit 
the conseguences of these alternative frameworks on the 
function and experience of human beings.
The structure of these chapters will be the sane. The 
first section will ask the question in each assumed context 
to produce alternative meanings. The remainder of the 
chapter will examine the consequences of these alternative
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meanings. The conseguences will be examined first as they 
relate to how a human being experiences along this 
dimension* and the final section will examine how this 
experience leads tc a difference in what people do in 
traditional China as opposed to the Nest.
Before this material is presented, something must be 
said about the emphasis cn China in the following chapters. 
No effort will be made to present a completely balanced view 
of both systems. I am assuming a Western reader and will 
concentrate my efforts cn making the traditional Chinese 
alternative explicit. Documentation abcut the Western 
framework will be presented at points tc make the Chinese 
alternative more of an alternative in this contrast. The 
reader will find a full development cf Chinese material, but 




Alternative assumed contexts for questioning were 
constructed for traditional China and the West,. The 
assumption of divisibility was found to be functional in the 
major traditions of the Nest, religion and science. The 
assumption was made explicit by producing cases where this 
divisibility could not be assumed with a corresponding 
failure of Western knowledge to resolve the paradoxes so 
generated.
In traditional China, the assumption of unity as 
reflected by the concept of the |ac in Confucianism and 
Taoism was made explicit by viewing the paradoxes 
surrounding the introduction of Buddhism, a system which did 
not share this assumption, into China. Problems centered 
around conflicts in the Buddhist view of the human being as 
divided from the world and humankind, and the Chinese view 
which regarded the human being as unified along these 
dimensions.
These alternative assumed contexts produce different 
processes of questioning and different purposes for 
knowledge in each system. These alternatives can be focused 
upon the knowledge of human beings by viewing the 
alternative meanings given to the key question: "What is a 
human being?"
CHAPTER V
CONSEQUENCES IN HUHANKIND'S GELATION 
TC NATUEE
Given the process of questioning in traditional China, 
it would be expected that human beings would be unified with 
Nature and concern themselves with relationships within this 
whole. This chapter will be concerned first with the 
experience of this unity and will consider how function 
develops from this experience. In the case of both 
experience and function, a single practical area will be 
identified— art for experience and architecture for 
function. These areas will serve as a point of focus from 
which one can begin to appreciate an alternative relation to 
Nature from that cf the West.
EXPEBIINCING NATUBE 
In searching for a pcint cf entry into the experience 
of Nature in traditional China, I was immediately drawn to 
the "eye" of the artist. Artistic vision is an extremely 
sensitive barometer of a culture*s perception of its world.
The Chinese Artist's Experience of Nature
The immediate point of entry into Chinese art is 
unusual from a Western standpoint: the approach will be 
through the written language. This pcint of entry appears 
to be unusual because Western languages are basically
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alphabetic in form while the Chinese written language is 
idiographic in structure. Contrary to Western words which 
are only a combination of a limited array of letters, 
Chinese characters are graphic representations of objects.
For example, as Needham (1971) indicates, one of the 
earliest characters for "bridge" was simply:
being a "drawing of a plank crossing a stream." (p. 147) As 
the language developed from this primitive insight, phonetic 
elements were, of course, added to this representational 
base, but the basic insight of having the character be a 
graphic portrayal of the object it represented remained the 
basic format for the written language.
Calligraphy. Because calligraphy represents a fundamental 
relation of the artist to the world, calligraphy becomes the 
basic art form in China from which all of the other art 
forms derive. For example, the transition from calligraphy 
to painting is at once a direct and continuous one. Both 
calligraphy and painting involve the modulation of brush 
strokes. Thus, the student begins with calligraphy by 
learning to use the brush and then develops quite naturally 
to painting. Painting and calligraphy form a unified whole 
to the degree that it is common for a Chinese painter to say 




This influence of calligraphy extends far beyond the 
scope of the mere similarity cf the brush in hand in 
painting to the even more functional art form of 
architecture. Unlikely as it may seem to the Westerner, 
writes Lin Yutang (1935) , the fcrms cf Chinese architecture 
are related directly tc the forms of characters in 
calligraphy. He notes that, like a character, the Chinese 
house is built upon a framework with the lines of the 
structure visible like the lines of a character. He 
attributes the major characteristic cf the Chinese building, 
the curved roof, tc the curved strokes composing a 
character.
In Chinese architecture, there can be found a material
representation of the original insights of the world
codified first within calligraphy.
So fundamental is the place of calligraphy in 
Chinese art §§ i Si iSIJSS as* ikYi&S in t&£
abstract that we may say it has provided the 
Chinese people with a basic esthetics, and it is 
through calligraphy that the Chinese have learned 
their basic notions of line and form. It is 
therefore impossible to talk about Chinese art 
without understanding Chinese calligraphy and its 
artistic inspiration. There is, fcr instance, not 
one type of Chinese architecture, whether it be 
the p&ilas# the pavilion, or the temple, whose 
harmony and form is not directly derived from 
certain types of calligraphy. (Lin Yutang, 1935,
P. 291)
If it is the purpose tc illustrate the fundamental 
experience of the unity of the human world with the world of 
Nature in Chinese art, attention would be best directed to 
the artistic vision cf calligraphy.
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The fundamental inspiration for Chinese calligraphy was
Nature and unity with her. The origins of calligraphy are,
of course, shrouded in the past. However, Lai (1973) notes
that one legend has it that MTs*ana Chieh observed the
patterns and movements of the celestial bodies and earthly
creatures before creating the earliest writing system.*'
(p. xi) He goes on to note that the now extinct scripts of
old have the names of natural objects which relate to their
origin, for example: the "tadpole script," "the bird
script," and the "the tiger script."
Through the avenue of calligraphy the entire artistic
tradition of China became infused with a unity with Nature.
The fundamental inspiration of calligraphy as of 
all arts of China is Nature. . . . our love of 
Nature is characterized by a desire to identify 
our minds with her and so enjoy her as she is. In 
calligraphy we are drawn tc Nature in the same 
irresistable way: every stroke, every dot suggests 
the form cf a natural object. And, in turn, 
natural objects become in many instances 
prototypes of calligraphic style. Hany expressive 
names drawn from Nature have been coined by great 
writers in the past to describe different kinds of 
strokes: 'falling stone,' 'sheep's leg,' 'the 
ruggedness of a plum branch,* 'decayed trunk of an 
old tree,' 'the muscles, bcnes and sinews of an 
animal's limbs,' are examples. (Chiang, 1973,
p. 111)
In the case of calligraphy, I find the gem of the Chinese 
artistic spirit: an experienced intimacy and unity of human 
art with Nature.
The calligrapher becomes the model for Chinese artists 
as they call upon Nature for their inspiration. Within the 
experienced unity of human art form and Nature there is a 
full exchange. Lin Yutang (1935) writes that a famous
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calligrapher practiced for years, but still could not
perfect his style until one day while wandering through the
mountains he chanced upon two fighting snakes and from this
inspiration developed his classic style called "the
fighting-’-snakes." Such an incorporation of nature into the
calligraphy of the scholar is quite common as he notes:
If a scholar sees a certain beauty in a dry vine 
with its careless grace and elastic strength, the 
tip of the end curling upward and a few leaves 
still hanging on it haphazardly and yet most 
appropriately, he tries to incorporate that into 
his writing. If another scholar sees a pine tree 
that twists its trunk and bends its branches 
downward instead cf upward, which shows a 
wonderful tenacity and force, he also tries to 
incorporate that into his style of writing. We 
have therefore the * dry-vine* style and the 
1pine-branch' style writing. (Lin Yutang ,1935, 
p. 293) .
The transition from calligraphy to painting proper is 
hardly a change in the area of discourse at all. As noted 
above, the materials and techniques are essentially the same 
and are readily transferable from one to the other. Indeed, 
most paintings have calligraphy appended to them as a matter 
of course. It would be expected that the dominant 
inspiration of Nature in calligraphy would apply to Chinese 
painting.
iaa<|§£a£e Eaiatiss. Calligraphy and poetry, antedating 
painting as such, reflect at a very early stage cf 
development the interest of the Chinese in Nature as a 
source of artistic inspiration, Munsterberg (1955) presents 
several examples of poetry dating frcm prior to 1000 
B.C. which exalt the loveliness of Nature and the human
Figure 6
A Typical Chinese Landscape Painting Illustrating 
the Integration of Human Beings with Nature 
(Courtesy Museum of Fine Arts, Boston)
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being's intimate relation with her. Painting, especially 
landscape painting, is a graphic representation of trends 
which have existed since the dim past of China.
This experienced unity makes itself available to us in 
its full fruition in the Chinese landscape painting. In 
Figure 6 , we have what Munsterberg (1955) has called an 
example of the supreme expression of the spirit of Chinese 
landscape painting. This painting by a Sung artist reflects 
his interest in Nature, particularly an emphasis on her 
major features: mountains, water, and, secondarily, sky. It 
must be remembered that the Chinese name for a landscape is 
Shan Sjji, translated as "mountains and water." (Sowerby,
1940)
In the idiom of mountains and water, Chinese artists 
relate their experience of Nature: the yin-yang in the Tao 
of Nature. The water represents change and flow in contrast 
to the solidity of the rock of the mountains, yet both are 
unified within the Tag of the painting itself. £s one 
author aptly notes, "peaks and torrents seem to fill these 
painters with a kind of intoxication, as if their spirit 
were buoyed on the stream of universal life pervading all 
things . . .." (Fry, 1935, p. 13)
In this context, it would not be suprising to us that 
one of the most striking things about Chinese painting is 
the early period in which landscapes appeared as independent 
themes (Binyon, 1927). This is in striking contrast to 
Western art where the landscape as an independent theme is a
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quite recent development.
Binyon (1927) observes a further contrasts the
mother-child theme is as predominant in Western art as
Nature is in Chinese art. Even where human themes are
presented in Chinese paintings, he asserts, they are
presented in such a manner as to suggest the full beauties
of Nature, not of the human subjects. In Western art, the
relation is inverted. The landscape as such was used as a
background for human action and was, generally, selected to
enhance the human form.
At the heart of all that has been said about the
Chinese landscape, there is the intimate, experienced unity
of the artist and Nature as the subject. By way of summary,
Binyon (1936) writes:
The Chinese wcrd for 'landscape' means 
'mountain-water picture,' and suggests at once 
something more elemental. It is concerned with 
that which is solid and that which is fluid. The 
mountains are thought of as the flesh, and the 
streams as the blood, of a living organism. It is 
not the life of nature conceived of as something 
separate from the life of man, but the whole 
created universe through which one spirit streams.
(p. 83)
A further insight can be obtained by examining how the 
artist paints human beings in a landscape. It follows from 
what has been said that when humans are pictured in the 
landscape, they are pictured as part of the whole of Nature 
got unlike other natural objects such as trees or rocks. 
Again in reference to the example in Figure 6 , at first it 
is difficult to discern humans in the painting where the 
characteristics of Nature predominate. It is only through
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close inspection that we find seme people in a boat on the
great expanse of water, and then, upcn closer inspection, we
find some human beings waiting on the shcre overshadowed by
the tree that lies behind them. On this point, Sowerby
(1940) writes:
Often will be found a diminutive human figure or 
two accompanied by seme beast of burden; but 
always the dominant theme will be the mountains, 
the water, and the mists. Human figures are 
always given their rightful place by the Chinese 
artist in the grand scheme of nature. Never do 
they assume proportions that would suggest that 
man is considered the most important thing in the 
universe; for Chinese philosophy is above all 
rational and maintains a fine sense of relative 
values. (p. 153)
This placing of human beings as an integral element in
the whole of Nature by the Chinese artist takes on added
importance when we compare this with the place of human
beings in Western art. In Western art, human beings tend to
be portrayed as dominant, with Nature serving only as a
backdrop for their action and the object of their ccnguest.
Throughout Chinese poetry and painting we find 
this same awareness cf the beauty and mystery of 
Nature— always, however, a Nature in which man 
holds an integral but not assertive place. Never, 
on the one hand, are the mountains, rivers, and
forests of the great Chinese landscape painters
mere decorative backdrops for man and his 
activities, as so often in prercmantic Western 
art; equally never, on the other hand, do they 
consist simply of empty and seemingly uninhabited 
wildernesses. Always they are peopled by human 
figures, tiny yet distinct: a fisherman in his 
boat, a woodcutter, a cowherder, a recluse sitting 
in contemplation on a rock. (Bodde, 1957, p. 32)
The false impression should not be given from the above
that the Chinese conception of the unity of human beings and
Nature is somehow the reverse of the Western, where Nature
Figure 7
The Beciprocal Gelation between the Characteristics 
of the Human Being and the Natural Setting 
(Courtesy Museum of Fine Arts, Boston)
miill
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dominates the human being. The relation is a reciprocal and
complete one for the Chinese artist where the human being
relates to Nature and Nature relates to the human being.
In Figure 7, we have another characteristic setting
from a Chinese painting, a recluse scholar in a natural
scene of again '•mountains and water." It is significant to
note that the artist is attempting tc relate to us something
about the scholar from the natural setting in which he is
placed. Priest (1954), in discussing such paintings, makes
explicit this relation:
Often in these landscapes there is a scholar (or 
sometimes two scholars), very tiny in comparison 
to the scene he sits in. He are informed that we 
can gauge the profundity of the scholar's mind by 
the loftiness of the mountains in the distance.
He are further told that when gnarled, ancient 
trees appear they are the symbols of the scholar's 
years, that when hung with vines, the vines 
symbolize the chains of habit impeding the growth
of the tree . . .. (p. 15)
The artist, then, is working with the whole of Nature and
attempts to use this reciprocal relation to relate to us
something about the characteristics of the human subject.
In respect to Figure 7, Boyd (1962) provides these very
appropriate comments:
Hence that constantly recurring figure in Chinese 
literature and painting, the scholar recluse in 
his retreat, living alone or perhaps with a single 
attendant, in a thatched hut surrounded by the 
immense precipices, the torrents and mists of the 
mountain landscape, having risen above the 
ambitions and desires of the world and being freed 
from the rapacities and intrigues of the official 
career. (pp. 111- 112)
Not only is the human being unified with Nature, but so must
the good artist be part of this same whole.
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Tfre Tfto of the artist. The key to becoming a good artist
in traditional China was an ability to involve oneself with
Nature completely. Northrop (1946) has delineated the basic
differences in approach between the Western and Eastern
artist. The Western artist superimposes a theoretical
dimension on the subject, while the Eastern artist
approaches the subject directly within a purely aesthetic
dimension without the need for abstraction. Northrop feels
that the first thing a Chinese painter must acquire is the
capacity to grasp the immediately apprehended aesthetic
factors in the immediately experienced. There is little
attempt to approach art via abstraction, as Westerners do,
with perspective and the science of optics playing an
unimportant role.
The comparison that Northrop draws between the approach
of the Eastern and Western artist to art is quite striking:
while Western artists content themselves with the careful
study of the geometric form and perspective, Chinese artists
immerse themselves in their subjects, usually the majesty of
Nature's mountains and rivers, to obtain an immediate grasp:
Before taking up brush and pigments, they [Chinese 
artists] went out into nature, and immersed and 
lost themselves, becoming one with the 
all-embracing continuum which is nature in its 
aesthetic immediacy. Approaching nature in this 
way, in their paintings, they pcrtray the 
aesthetic manifold primarily, and the external 
three-dimensicnal objects, which Westerners tend 
to seek for in these paintings only incidentally, 
if at all . . . .  (Ncrthrop, 1946, p. 330)
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Along these lines, Lin Yutang (1935) comments in a
rather critical vain:
The Chinese artist does not learn painting by 
going into a room and stripping a woman naked in 
order to study her anatomy, nor does he make 
copies of plaster figures cf Ancient Greece and 
Home, as some backward art schocls in the West 
still do. The Chinese artist travels and visits 
the famous mountains like Huangshan in Anhui or 
the Omei mountains in Szechuen. (p. 288)
If we can free ourselves from Lin lutang's obvious
moralizing, we can distinguish the two approaches of the
artist to the subject.
This merging of the artist with the subject, however,
can be carried to an extreme. To illustrate this point,
Prodan (1958) relates the story of the master painter, Li
Lung-Mien who possessed the gift of identifying himself so
completely with his subject that "his friends used to
dissuade him from depicting horses, for fear lest he might
become a horse himself!11 (p. 159)
It would be an errcr tc leave the area of Chinese art
without relating the unities that have been unearthed to a
more general process within the framework. The unity of
human beings and Nature in Chinese art is derived from the
assumption of the unity cf the Tao.
By the single daring assumption of the cosmic 
principle cf the the Chinese fccused on the
notion of one power permeating the whole universe, 
instead of emphasizing the Western dualism of 
spirit and matter, creator and created, animate 
and inanimate, and human and nonhuman. This 
concept of the was the touchstone of Chinese 
painting which affected the creative imagination, 
the subject matter and the interpretation.
(Rowley, 1959, p. 5).
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Along the same lines, Munsterberg (1955) writes of the 
artist and the £§o: ". . . the artist was taught that he 
must first of all identify himself with the landscape and 
become one with the Jjc which pervades all of Nature, for 
only then could he begin tc dc justice to his theme." (p. 8)
The Human World as Unified with Nature
There is in Chinese landscape art an anthropomorphic 
projection of human characteristics cnto the organism of 
Nature. Sullivan (1962) writes of such an attitude toward 
Nature as it contributed to the development of landscape 
painting:
In popular belief the mountain is the body of the 
cosmic being, the recks its bones, the water the 
blood that gushes through its veins, the trees and 
grasses its hair, clcuds and mists the vapor of 
its breath . . . .  (p. 1)
In this contest, Chinese artists locked out upon Nature 
and found an analogue of themselves since to them they were 
unified within the same T3 0 . They did not experience a 
representation of life in a primitive sense or in a Western 
animistic sense, hut rather they experienced the same order 
and relations within themselves as they experienced in the 
cosmos. As we move from the experienced unity of human 
beings and Nature in Chinese art to a more general system, 
we will find this correspondence assuming more specific and 
literal dimensions.
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Macrocosm-microcosm Chinese art is only a
special case of the general tendency in Chinese knowledge to 
experience human beings as a microcosm of the macrocosm of 
Nature. At the root of the microcosm-macrocosm dimension, 
were two analogies: " . . . one postulated point-for-point 
correspondences between the bod? of man and the universe or 
cosmos as a whole, the other imagined similar 
correspondences between the human body and the society of 
the State.” (Needham, 1956, p. 294) Needham refers to the 
former as the universe analogy and the latter as the state 
analogy.
Before examining these analogies in a detailed manner 
within a specific area, something must be said of the 
general nature of the unity expressed by the doctrine of 
macrocosm and microcosm. I feel that the key concepts in 
Needham's description are whole and correspondence. This 
doctrine is always relating elements from one whole to 
corresponding elements in another whole.
It is helpful to imagine three planes, each placed a 
distance above the other such that an object on the first 
plane becomes projected onto the second plane, and, further, 
projected upon the third plane. Now if a circle is drawn on 
the bottom-most plane with points within it, this circle and 
its related points will be projected to the next higher 
plane, and from this plane to the third plane. The 
important point is that the circle on each plane will be in 
correspondence to the circles of the other planes. In a
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like manner, the.relation of points on the first plane will 
correspond to the relations of the points on the other 
planes.
This ordering of a hierarchy of wholes is a dominant 
feature of traditional Chinese knowledge. With this notion 
of correspondence between wholes, I can turn to a practical 
illustration in traditional Chinese medicine. The two 
analogies which compose the doctrine of macrocosm and 
microcosm can be examined at the extremes of the spectrum 
where there is a correspondence between the microcosm of the 
human body on one hand and the macrocosm of Nature on the 
other.
In Chinese medicine, the whole cf the human body was
related in detail to the corresponding aspects of the larger
whole of Nature. This gives rise in Chinese medicine to
what Palos (1974) labels a philosophical anatomy in which
parts of the body become experienced as being related to the
phenomena of Nature.
By virtue of the universe analogy, the parts of the
human body are related to corresponding parts in Nature.
The universe with its dual forces (the Yin and 
Yang) is a macrocosm. Nan is a microcosm, a 
little universe. Thus, we read that as heaven is 
round and the earth sguare, so a man’s head is 
round and the feet sguare. As heaven has its sun 
and moon, its order of stars, rain and wind, 
thunder and lightning, so man has two eyes, a set 
of teeth, joy and anger, voice and sound. The 
earth with its mountains and valleys, rocks and 
stones, trees and shrubs, weeds and grasses, has 
its parallel on the human body in the shoulders
and armpits; nodes and tuberosities; tendons and
muscles; hairs and down. The four limbs 
correspond to the four seasons, the twelve joints 
to the twelve months . . . .  The pulse is of
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twelve kinds to agree with the twelve rivers. The 
heart contains seven holes because the ursa major 
is composed of seven stars, and the human skeleton 
has 360 bones for the simple reason that there are 
the same number of degrees in a circle. (Hong and 
Lien-te, 1936, p. 21)
This correspondence was not just a loosely held belief.
but was actually a part cf practical medical knowledge.
Hume (1975) remarks that an often heard phrase among Chinese
doctors is that the human being is a miniature heaven and 
earth. For this close relation of the human body and 
nature, there is nc lesser classical authority than Lao Tse 
who said: *'0ne may know the world without going out of
doors." (Chan, 1963, p. 162) The implication of this is 
that all the knowledge of the universe is contained within 
the sage himself.
If we turn to the state analogy, there was within
traditional Chinese medicine an equally detailed relation of
the microcosm cf the human body to the macrocosm of the
state. Again, as in the universe analogy, we find a
detailed correspondence cf the parts of the human body with
the parts of the state.
Thus the body cf a man is the image of a State.
The thorax and abdomen correspond to the palaces 
and offices. The four limbs correspond to the 
frontiers and boundaries. The divisions of the 
bones and sinews correspond to the functional 
distinctions of the hundred officials. The pores 
of the flesh correspond to the four throughfares.
The spirit corresponds to the prince. The blood 
corresponds tc the ministers, and the Cfrftj to the 
people. Thus we see that he who can govern his 
body can control a kingdom. Loving his people, he 
will bring peace to the country; nourishing his 
ghh^. he will preserve his body. If the people 
are alienated the country is lost; if the Chh4 is 




At this point, it may be possible to give more 
substance to the image of the hierarchy of wholes. I can 
imagine that on the first plane there is the whole of the 
human body. This microcosm is related directly to the 
macrocosm of the second plane of human social structure or 
the state. Finally, this micrccosm becomes related, on the 
third plane, to the whole of Nature herself. One could 
almost draw a line connecting the wholes within the planes 
such that corresponding elements are connected in each 
whole. For example, on the first plane, we have the four 
limbs of the body. This corresponds, on the second plane, 
to the four frontiers and boundaries of the state. Finally, 
on the third plane, of the macicccsm of' the universe, the 
four limbs of the human body are projected to become the 
four seasons.
This hierarchy of wholes that I have just considered 
are experienced as being unified such that changes in one 
whole are reflected in changes in another whole. For 
example, changes in the whole cf the human world are 
reciprocally reflected in corresponding changes in the whole 
of Nature. It is an attractive idea to consider these 
changes as occurring within a causal framework. I think 
this is a reading of the Western framework into these 
relationships. I do not feel that these are causal 
connections, but rather, more cf a sympathetic resonance 
where changes in the miciocosmic human world are reflected 
in resonant changes in the macrocosmic whole of Nature.
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This connection, in ay opinion, cannot be reduced by 
analytic methods tc a sisple mechanistic interaction of, for 
example, one billiard ball hitting another. It will be 
recalled from the above discussion that Needham (1956) 
expressed the opinion that objects to the Chinese behaved 
not because of mechanistic impulsions but from the general 
pattern of things, such that "if they did not behave in 
those particular ways they would lose their relational 
positions in the whole." (p. 281) This is one way of 
conceiving of a framework where correspondences between 
wholes are not mechanistically determined, but are 
relational, determined by the pattern of the whole. This 
discussion, if developed, would take us far beyond the 
modest purposes of this wcrk tc dealing with the major 
interface between metaphysical frameworks in traditional 
China and the West.*
Reciprocal relations. In the following discussion of 
corresponding relationships, I will talk of the 
corresponding changes of the human bcdy and Nature as if
♦It should be noted that there have been several attempts on 
the part of Western thinkers to construct a relational 
framework similiar to the one I am talking about in 
traditional China. Jung (1973) with his principle of 
synchronicity and the principle of seriality suggested 
somewhat earlier by the Austrian zoologist, Paul Krammerer, 
reported by Koestler (1971), suggest an acausal ordering 
principle. Progoff (1S73) presents an interesting 
interpretation of the relation of synchronicity and Jung’s 
depth psychology as they are supported by Liebnizian notions 
of macrocosm/microcosm. These positions are an attempt to 
approximate the acausal crder cf the Chinese world by 
extending the Western framework. At least in the case of 
Jung, there is a decided Chinese influence, in particular 
from the J qhiflg.
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they were causal relationships. To the traditional Chinese,
they did not have this coloring. This should not be
misconstrued as indicating that the Chinese did not
experience these relationships; they simply did not make
the inferences that a Western mind does when confronted with
the correspondence. I am definitely net asserting that
changes in one whole are producing changes in another whole
in a causal sense.
From the direction cf Mature to the human body, I find
a smooth, continuous flow. For example, the experienced
unity is such, as Meedham (1971) notes, that one flows
smoothly from the hydraulic tc the sociological within the
context of the same discussion. In the following discourse,
the Duke of Huan is being given counsel by Kung Chung
(presumably, an engineer) on the best site for his capitol:
It is the nature of water to flew, but when it 
reaches a bend (in its channel) it is retarded, 
and when the bend is full (the water) behind 
pushes forward that which is ahead. Where the 
land slopes downward it flews along smoothly, but 
where it rises (the water) is impeded. (In some 
places) where the bank curves (the water) becomes 
agitated and leaps up,. When it leaps up it runs 
to one side, on running to one side it forms 
whirlpools. After forming whirlpools it returns 
to its central course. On returning to its 
central course (and slowing) it leads to a change 
of course. Changes of course bring fresh stopage.
Thus, impeded, (the water) runs wild. Sunning 
wild, it injures men. When it injures men, there 
araises great distress among them. In great 
distress they treat the laws lightly. Laws being 
treated lightly, it is difficult to maintain good 
order. Good order lapsing, filial piety 
disappears. And when people have lost filial 
piety, they are no longer 
submissive . . . .  (Meedham, 1971, p. 223)
It is interesting to find in the above discourse the ease
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with which Kung Chung passes £rcm the physical consequences
to the social consequences of hydraulics. One could
speculate that to him the smooth flow of water in its river
bed is the same process as the smooth flow of human behavior
within the channels of filial piety.
In a similar fashion, we can examine the alternative
direction: the relation from the human world to that of
Nature. Bodde (1S57) writes:
The close interrelationship of the human and 
natural worlds means that disturbances in the one 
result in corresponding disturbances in the other. 
Floods, droughts, plagues, and innumerable other 
abnormal phenomena are, thus, positive evidence of 
irregularities in human society. (p. 38)
He continues with some concrete examples:
The school of changes and reversions says that the 
eating of grain by insects is caused by officials 
of the various departments. Out of covetousness 
they make encroachments, and this results in the 
insects eating the grain. When these latter have 
black bodies and red heads, it is said to be the 
military officials (who are the blame), whereas 
when they have black heads and red bodies, then it 
is said to be the civil officials. When 
punishment is brought to those officials whom the 
insects resemble, these insects thereupon 
disappear and are no longer seen. (p. 38)
It follows from this reciprocal relation with Nature that
human beings must be extremely careful in their behavior
lest they destroy Nature’s order.
The full ramifications of all that has been discussed
is that human beings are inextricably linked with Nature
within the Chinese experience, in what Needham (1956) has
aptly labeled an ethical solidarity. In the West, a human
being’s ethical behavior is experienced as having
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implications for the function of society. Within the 
traditional Chinese framework, the human beingfs ethical 
behavior was experienced as having cosmic implications far 
beyond the limits of the immediate society.
In the this framework, a breach of moral conduct on the 
part of a single person was not experienced as an individual 
problem or even a social problem, but as an indication of a 
potential or actual disorder in Nature. Needham (1956) 
writes that because of this experienced ethical solidarity, 
there was a "basic disguiet arcused in the Chinese mind by 
crimes, or even disputes, because they were felt to be 
disturbances in the Order of Nature." (p. 526).
FUNCTIONING TOWAND NATUBE 
It would be expected that the experience of the unity 
of the human world and the world of Nature would affect the 
actions of people in traditional China. Again, it is best 
to begin with a practical area cf study and expand this 
point of entry to a more general statement. I will begin 
with the functional component cf art in the practical area 
of architecture.
Nature in Chinese Architecture
As in the case of calligraphy, approaching Chinese 
architecture from the perspective of the garden may appear 
to be unusual by Western standards. Yet it is a clear 
example of the differences in Chinese and Western values in 
the placing of human structures in a natural setting. Just
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as with the discussion of calligraphy and its relation to 
traditional Chinese art, the garden can provide a valuable 
insight into the infusion of Nature into Chinese thought.
The Chinese Garden. The study of the Chinese garden and
its relation tc the European garden is a vast area of
scholarship in its own right. Here, I can only give a
passing account of the Chinese garden as it reflects the
unity of human beings and Nature and, consequently, affects
the function of the architect in building design. &s in the
case of landscape painting where the majesty of Nature
predominates (the ruggedness cf mountains, the movement of a
rushing stream) Nature and her ruggedness predominate, in a
similar manner, in the Chinese garden.
This point is best illustrated by a comparison with the
pre-romantic European garden. In the latter, geometric form
dominates; Nature is bent to the will of the garden
designer through the use of the ruler and compass. Nothing
could be more antithetical to the Chinese garden than the
gardens of Versailles where everywhere there is the evidence
of the human hand forming Nature to the abstract patterns of
the human mind.
In contrast, the traditional Chinese garden designer
seems to be inspired by the spontaneity of the free forms of
Nature. Needham (1956) writes from his own experience:
In my youth I greatly admired the gardens and park 
of Versailles, but when many years later I visited 
it again after having become acquainted in the 
interval with the Summer Palace (I Ho Tuan) at 
Peking, it was with a feeling of desolation that 
one surveyed its geometrical arrangement.
153
imprisoning and constraining Nature rather than 
flowing along with it. (p. 361)
He goes on to note that the movement away from the geometric
pattern in the European garden which occurred in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can be attributed, in
some degree, to a Chinese .influence.
These differences relate to differing assumptions for
knowledge in each framework. In the Chinese framework, the
human being is to be inspired by Nature with the result that
the Chinese garden was designed to continually engage the
visitor with differing vistas. The visitor in the Western
garden, on the other hand, is confronted with geometric
formalism which restricts the perceiver to fixed channels of
observation. Tuan (1968) summarizes these differences
precisely:
To the question, what is a fundamental difference 
between the European and the Chinese attitude 
towards nature, mcst people with any opinion at 
all will probably make some such reply: that the 
European sees nature as subordinate to him whereas 
the Chinese sees himself as a part of nature.
Taken as a broad generalization with a grain of 
salt there is much truth in this distinction; a 
truth illustrated with diagrammatic force when one 
compares the formal European garden of the 
seventeenth century with the Chinese naturalistic 
garden. The geometric contrast reflects 
fundamental differences in environmental 
evaluation. The formal European garden in the 
style of the Le Notre was designed tc produce a 
limited number of imposing prospects. It can be 
appreciated tc the full only at a limited number 
of favoured spots where tie onlooker is invited by 
the garden’s design to gaze at distant vistas.
Or, seen in another way, the European garden is a 
grandiose setting for man; in deference to him, 
nature is straitjacketed in court dress. The 
Chinese garden, on the other hand, is designed to 
produce almost constantly shifting scenes: there 
are no set prospects. The nature of the garden 
requires the perceiver to move along a winding
154
path and to be more than visually involved with 
the landscape. It is not nature that is required 
to put on court dress in deference to man; rather 
it is man who must lay aside his formalistic 
pretensions in order to enter nature.
(pp. 176-177)
This experienced unity of the human world and Nature in 
the garden has implications for the function of the Chinese 
architects, as they approach their work less from abstract 
design, and more frcm the ruggedness of Nature herself. The 
purpose is to integrate the human structure, in the spirit 
of the landscape painter, integrating human artifacts into 
Nature as an unobtrusive part of her total pattern, less as 
something of human origin and mere as a feature of Nature 
herself. Boyd (19 62) speaks of the Chinese garden in this 
way;
And yet man was to be present in this natural 
landscape, just as in the wildest of landscape 
paintings there was almost always some human 
figure, some hut, path or bridge. There was to be 
no dichotomy or separation between architecture 
and Nature. There were in fact more buildings and 
other architectural elements in the Chinese garden 
than in that of Europe; and this integration of 
the two things was cne of the achievements of the 
Chinese tradition. (p. 112)
It seems that the position of the architect in
traditional China was guite different frcm that of the
Western counterpart. The life and work cf these great
architect-gardeners have been carefully preserved by the
Chinese (Needham, 1971).. The relation of the human
structure and Nature was always an important aspect of
design. Boyd (1962) writes:
The Chinese architects never extended the 
formality of the building pattern into the 
surrounding landscape, forcing nature to be
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architectural, as we in Europe have done from time 
to time. True to their philosophy of the place of 
man in the World, the relation cf two things, 
architecture and nature, was rather the ether way 
around. As Siren has pointed out, the garden was 
not conceived as a setting for the house; rather 
the house was a setting fcr the garden. (p. 112)
Turning to the actual structure of the buildings
themselves, the architect did not just design a house, but
worked with the relation of the house with its surroundings.
Thus, the "house-garden complex" and the "house-courtyard
complex" became dominant features of Chinese structures. In
this manner, aspects of nature, gardens and open spaces,
were functionally planned as part of the house itself. As
Needham (1971) indicates; "In domestic buildings, the
courtyard system . . .  has the great merit that yards and
gardens are made a part cf the building, and not something
additional and separate." (p. 62)
Structures £o bjend a£th Thus, the architect,
like the Chinese artist, is working within the unity of the
T^o. The Chinese artist constructs a painting from the
context of a whole such that where a brush stroke is not
placed is as important as where one is placed. In a similar
fashion, the relational nature cf architectural structures
in traditional China produces a meaning for "empty" space,
which surrounds the physical structures. Wu (1963)
admonishes his readers that the significance of the
courtyard lies in its "emptiness";
Both clearly demonstrate the significance of the 
courtyard, which as negative space plays a 
prominent role in forming the 1house-yard* 
complex. The student of Chinese architecture will
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miss the point if he does not fccus his attention 
on the space and the impalpable relationships 
between members of the complex* but* rather* fixes 
his eyes on the solids of the buildings alone.
(p. 32)
The total effect of the relational system of 
architecture is to integrate the human world* the world of 
the house* with the larger world of Nature beyond. The 
courtyard system does this guite effectively* for the 
courtyard has the effect of bringing Nature into the human 
structure and still providing a measure of privacy. Hu 
(1963) writes: " . . .  horizontally the yard is separated 
from the street by the vail ox by the surrounding buildings* 
but it shares both the sky and the elements of the weather 
with other houses and yards." (p. 32)
This courtyard system makes the inhabitant of the house 
always aware of the space that surrounds and the 
corresponding conditions of Nature which surround the house. 
Needham (1971) comments by way cf summary: "the spaces
between the low houses supply abundant air* and all the 
windows look out internally onto plants and trees in the 
garden courtyards. Thq§ man i§ not jspla-fced fypm qture ."
(p. 62-63, My italics)
As we move inward from the courtyard and the garden to 
the house itself, the architect* through the design of the 
structural features of the house* insured an intimate 
contact between the place of habitation and Nature. In the 
earlier discussion concerning the relation of calligraphy 
and architecture, it was suggested that the curved roof of
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the house Has thought to be related to the curved strokes of
the Chinese character. In a similar vein, the complete
structure of the Chinese house is designed much like a
character. A character is written on a framework with the
strokes placed on this structure. In a similar manner, the
architect begins with a timber framework for the house and
hangs the walls from it.
The walls serve no support function in the typical
Chinese house. The walls of Chinese buildings are always
curtain walls and are not bearing walls which support the
structure (Needham, 1971). This provides a certain
flexibility in design that is ECt possible in load bearing
walls of Western structures:
Every architect is familiar with the logic— and 
the aesthetic— of separating the elements of 
support from those of enclosure, the column from 
the screen, and the advantages of a frame system 
of structure, providing wide spans, supports of 
small plan area, a freedom in planning, and a 
flexibility in use, since walls and partitions are 
'moveable* and need not even be there at all, and 
the plan can thus be completely opened up in any 
or all directions. The Chinese were quite 
conscious of these advantages and they fully were 
used in the Chinese tradition. (Boyd, 1962, 
p. 24)
Within this construction tradition, the screen walls or 
curtain walls could be easily moved and removed without 
disturbing the framework of the house itself. Many times 
the walls were not even carried up to the full height of the 
framework (Boyd, 1962).
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In general, this form cf construction promoted still
further the purpose of integrating Nature into the home
first made possible by the courtyard and garden,. The total
effect of the house-courtyard complex and the method of
non-supporting walls was to allow the full unity of the
human world and Nature such that the human being could
always be aware of Nature within the house. Again, Needham
(1971) draws upon his own personal experience:
One of my most dominant impressions for sometime 
after first returning to Europe from China was the 
sense of loss of intimate contact with the 
weather. The wooden lattice windows cowered with 
paper (often tern), the thin plaster walls, the 
open verandahs outside every room, the sound of 
rain-water dripping in the courtyards and small 
patios, warmth made individual by fur-lined gowns 
and charcoal fires— everything gave a 
consciousness cf Nature*s moods, of rain, snow, 
wind and sunshine, from which one is utterly 
isolated in European housing,. (p. 63)
This is quite an acknowledgement of the ability of the
Chinese architect to put into action the experienced unity
that is so central to the Chinese mind.
In the above discussion, I have concentrated on
individual, domestic housing as it was constructed to allow
the full relation with Nature. This same blending is
equally true for architectural structures on a grander
scale. In general, the Chinese did not attempt tc impose
their architectural forms on Nature, but rather attempted an
organic union cf the buildings with the natural setting.
Even in the case of large and numerous structures, the
Chinese chose a predominantly horizontal mode of
construction which allowed the buildings to conform to the
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Figure 8
The Integration of Architectual Structures with 
the Horizontal Lines of Nature 
(Courtesy Museum of Fine Arts, Boston)
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natural contours of the terrain, rather than obtrude from 
the natural setting- In Figure 8, we have an example of a 
complex of larger structures as they are made to blend 
horizontally with the lines of Nature.
It is interesting to compare this to the Western 
tendency toward vertical lines in structural design.
Needham (1971) remembers musing on this very point with a 
Chinese friendwhile viewing a great cathedral of Europe. 
Needham likened the vertical lines of the medieval cathedral 
or the modern skyscraper to the general tendency of the 
westerner to attempt to transcend the material world in 
theology. While the Chinese with their horizontal lines, 
tend to be very this-worldly in their theology. We can 
recall in this context the extreme problems that the Chinese 
were confronted with in attempting to understand the Nirvana 
of the Buddhists.
In this charateristic horizontal architecture, I find a 
material manifestation of a basic tendency at the heart of 
the Chinese mind: the tendency to prefer the concrete to the 
abstract, the immediate tc the derived, and the this-worldly 
to the other-worldly. Ihis earth-bound trait not only 
reveals itself in architecture, but in many other aspects of 
functioning.
The Tai C£i master hi Huang (1973) makes the 
interesting comparison between T^ jL (a more complete 
discussion of this traditional Chinese dance form will be 
presented in Chapter VII) and the Western dance form of
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ballet- In la i chi. he says, there is a constant awareness 
of a connection between the dancer and the earth, while in 
ballet the dancer attempts to touch the earth as little as 
possible to produce an ethereal effect. Again, the nature 
of the dance is as earthbound as architecture. Hany other 
examples can be produced from other areas which demonstrate 
this proclivity amcng the Chinese.
Chjfleige Ggomjns^. In the exploration of unity in 
traditional Chinese architecture. I have progressed from the 
unity of the microcosm of the Chinese garden to an 
examination of this same expression in domestic housing, and 
finally to the unity of relatively large structures. I 
would now like to examine the macroccsmic implications of 
this unity by examining how all human structures were 
harmonized into one whole and how this whole was harmonized 
with the whole of the cosmos. The system by which this was 
accomplished was a method of gecmancy called Feng Shui, the 
science of 'winds and waters.' (Needham, 1962)
The basis of this system was the correspondence between 
the microcosm of the human body and the macrocosm of the 
earth as suggested above, such that the earth was compared 
to the human body having veins and vessels corresponding to 
those of the human body. It fellows that the placing of 
human structures must be carefully planned lest they cut 
these veins and vessels and, thus, disturb the harmony of 
Nature. The sethed of Fgjjc] Sfryj was a method of divination 
whereby these natural lines of the earth could be determined
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and prescriptions made for the placement of human 
structures. Needham (1962), following Chatley, defines Feng 
Shui as " ’the art cf adapting the residences of the living 
and tombs of the dead so as to cooperate and harmonise with 
the local currents of cosmic breath.*" (p. 239)
Even though this chapter has concentrated on displaying 
the unity of the human world and Nature in China, it is 
still extremely difficult to appreciate fgqg Shui which is 
based on this unity because our own Western experience is so 
different. Freedman (1966) speaks of his own efforts to 
understand:
It is difficult for somebody brought up in a 
tradition which distinguishes sharply between man 
and nature to grasp at once the basic premise of 
fena-shgi and yet (if I may generalize from my own 
experience in trying to understand what Chinese 
geomancy means to people who believe in it) the 
significance of the premise becomes apparent as 
soon as the outsider begins to examine a landscape 
through Chinese categories. One may stand by the 
side of a Chinese friend and admire the 
view . . .  the combination of hills and sea 
produces splended vistas. One’s own pleasure is 
aesthetic and in a sense ’objective': the 
landscape is cut there and one enjoys it. One’s 
friend is reacting differently. His appreciation 
is cosmological. For him the viewer and the 
viewed are interacting, both being part of some 
greater system. The Cosmos, is Heaven, Earth, and 
Man. Man is in it and of it. So that while my 
characteristic reaction to a landscape may be to 
say that I find it beautiful, my friend's may well 
be to remark that he feels content or 
comfortable . . . .  Man is in Nature. The 
landscape affects him directly, in the ideal case 
making him feel relaxed and confident.
(pp. 121-122)
It is this experienced unity of the human observer and 
Nature that is at the heart of Feng Shui. Without this 
insight the system becomes unintelligible, a mere primitive
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superstition, instead of an attempt by the Chinese thinker 
to deal with Nature from his context quite as much as 
science is the Western thinker's attempt.
Whenever any human structure was contemplated, a 
geomancer was called to position this structure according to 
the lines of divination on the earth. Not only the 
structures of the living, but mcst importantly, the tombs of
the dead were not constructed without the principles of Feqg
Slijji being applied by a geomancer. In this manner, human 
structures became related to the whole of the natural world. 
In a real sense, the unity of the human world and Nature 
were connected in the sagely experience of the geomancer. 
This is reflected in the education of the novitiate to Feng
Education of the eye and the sentiments,
familiarization with the local terrain, and at the
same time an initiation, this discipline is an
indication of the primary place of immediate 
experience in geomancy. In the last instance, all 
that counts is how a site feels, the quality of 
blend of psyche and landscape; if one can feel 
life breath directly, all else is superflous.
(Narch, 1968, p. 259)
Feflg Shqj was not only a descriptive system, but a
remedial system as well, not only indicating where
structures were to be placed, but also how the unfavorable
sites could be more beneficially prepared.
Every place had its special topographical features 
which modified the local influence of various qhfr4 
of Nature. The forms of hills and the directions 
of watercourses, being the outcome cf the moulding 
influences of winds and waters, were the most 
important, but, in addition, the heights and forms 
of buildings, and the directions of roads and 
bridges, were potent factors. The force and 
nature of the invisible currents would be from
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hour to hour modified by the position of the 
heavenly bodies so that their aspects as seen from 
the locality in question had to be considered.
While the choosing cf sites was of prime 
importance, bad siting was not irremediable, as 
ditches and tunnels could be dug, or other 
measures taken, to alter the f^ng shqi situation. 
(Needham, 1956, p,. 359)
]?§£S Shiji not only demanded that human structures be 
harmonized with each other, but that all structures 
harmonize with the whole and, ultimately, with the entire 
universe including astronomical phenomena. There is a 
certain uniformity of application of the principles of Feqg 
Shui such that the largest whole becomes involved directly 
with the smallest whole.
For example, in determining the site, for the grave of a 
parent, a geomancer would be called in and, using the method 
of Shui. he would position the tomb with the
characteristics of other human structures on the site, with 
the structures of Nature herself, such as mountains and 
rivers, and, finally, with the characteristics of the cosmos 
itself. In this manner, £§23 Shuj. provided a unified 
function for the traditional Chinese in all of their 
architectural projects.
This order was not the result of the dictates of some 
master plan. It was rather that Feng Shuj.. uniformly 
applied at each site, produced an ordered whole with a 
spontaneity beyond that possible by the calculation of a 
master planner. Instead of looking to a master plan, in 
each specific case, one looked to the immediate 
relationships around tfce site itself. For example, "within
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a village the height and position of a new house are watched
with close attention lest it damage the fortune of other
houses; and caution must be exercised in modifying an old
house (by piercing a wall to make a window, for example)
lest a deleterious effect be produced on the Feqg~Shui of
nearby houses." (Freedman, 1966, p. 139)
Through the consistent application of the principles of
Feng Shui in each specific case, the cumulative effect was
that all of the human structures were unified into an
harmonious whole and this whole itself unified with the
whole of nature. Using this grassroots ordering principle,
the traditional Chinese became the first successful urban
planners (Breuer 1970).
One of the most dcxinant features of the Chinese city
is its integrated, harmonious crder. The Chinese city, like
most cities of the ancient world, were not constructed as
one whole, but were expanded in stages ever time. Because
of the uniform application of a few principles on a
consistent basis, the result was a unified ordered pattern
while the same additive procedures in the Western city
produced a chaotic pattern of structures.
The whole city was a work cf art. And this was 
not because it was planned by one mind or even at 
one time, on the contrary, Peking was the result 
of growth additions over five centuries . . . .  it 
was, as it were, a collective rather than an 
individual work of art, and the strict limitation 
of the Chinese system, the constant application of 
a few principles, its constant following of 
precedents, far from being disadvantages, were
part of the means by which the Chinese city
achieved its high degree of harnony and artistic 
unity. (Boyd, 1962, p. 72)
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Boyd goes on to make a very fruitful comparison of the
plan of Versailles and the Palace City of Peking. The order
of the latter, arising as it does from the simple
application of a few principles, displays more spontaneity
and artistic integration than that of the former which tends
toward geometric form and abstraction where buildings are
placed simply to satisfy the requirements of the general
plan and the symmetry of the whole. Even when holistic
planning is attempted in the West, the whole that results
seems to fall short of the harmony and integration of the
planless whole and order of the Chinese.
As natural objects are seldom perfect straight lines or
angles, there was a tendency to favor irregular contours of
the terrain.
There was in general a strong preference for 
tortuous and winding roads, walls and structures 
which seemed to fit into the landscape, rather 
than to dominate it; and a strong objection to 
straight lines and geometrical layouts. (Needham,
1956, p. 361)
There is a certain parallelism here with the Chinese 
artist's love for a asymmetry and ruggedness in landscape 
paintings.
Under the aegis of the harmonizing principles of Feng
Shgj. the Chinese were counseled to use the wisdom of Nature
to shelter human habitations.
In many ways fgaa Shui was an advantage to the 
Chinese people, as when, for example, it advised 
planting trees and bamboos as windbreaks, and 
emphasized the value of flowing water adjacent to 
a house site. In other ways it developed into a 
grossly superstitious system. But all through it 
embodied, I believe, a marked aesthetic component, 
which accounts for the great beauty of the siting
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of so many farms, houses, and villages throughout 
China. (Needham, 1956, p. 361)
Before leaving the topic cf the harmonizing of human 
structures and Nature in traditional China, I should warn 
against reading into this unity Western values of 
conservation and ecology. . This unity did not serve to 
preserve Nature in her virgin state. Tuan (1968) makes the 
point that if one were to compare the “total tonnage of 
earth removed there may not be so very ouch difference 
between European formal and the Chinese naturalistic garden. 
Both are human artifacts.” (p. 177) From a purely 
ecological standpoint, both the Chinese and the Westerner 
were engaged in transforming the pristine condition of 
Nature. It was rather that different ideals and purposes 
directed these human endeavors in this transformation.
The Unified Functioning of Humans toward Nature
The example of architecture easily broadens into a
general spirit of human functioning toward Nature, Needham
(1971) relates a story scrrounding one cf the oldest
references to the practice of feus Shui. it is alleged that
Heng Thien, after building a particularly large section of
the Great Wall, committed suicide because he had through his
excavations disturbed the pattern of Nature. Meng Thien was
reported to have given the following reason for his suicide:
‘Indeed I have a crime for which I merit death. 
Beginning at Lin-thao, and extending to Laio-tung,
I made ramparts and ditches over more than 10,000 
li, and in that distance it is impossible that I 
did not cut through the veins of the earth. This 
is my crime.' (p. 53)
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It can be seen from this that there was the expectation 
that human beings should respect the veins of the earth as 
they respect the veins of their own bodies. Human function 
and the function of Nature were to be closely linked, such 
that the functioning of the former was a necessary element 
to the functioning of the latter.
ff^ hology §&<| meteorology. Again the practical area of
medicine is helpful as a point cf focus. Changes in Nature
were indicative of changes in human health. In traditional
Chinese medicine there was a linkage between pathology of
the human body and climatological changes in Nature. The
underlying unity cf pathology and meteorology became the
unguestioned medium for much of medical practice, both
diagnosis and therapeutic treatment.
It is axiomatic in Chinese thought that all realms 
of Nature— the macrocosm and all microcosms— are 
interconnected inductively. The energetic 
processes of the Cosmos unceasingly modulate the 
changes that take place in every individual 
organism. For this reason systematic and 
qualitatively unequivocal descriptions of 
temporally variable meteorological, 
climatological, and imnunclogical influences are 
needed for diagnosis and therapy of both the 
exogenous . . .  diseases and the epidemic and 
pandemic diseases. (Porkert, 1974, p,. 55)
In this context, an elaborate system of medicine was
developed which allowed the doctor to function within this
relationship. Pales (1974) gives an insight into what his
medical practice entailed:
Ever since ancient times an interrelationship has 
been observed between climate, seasons, and 
variations in temperature on the one hand, and a 
balanced state cf bodily health on the 
other . . . .  According to the 'Su Hen', Spring is
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the season of increasing vitality* fecundity in 
Nature* the time of restitution* During this 
period the liver can suffer harm if Man does not 
adjust himself to the natural order of things.
Summer is the time when celestial and terrestrial 
forces combine. Particularly characteristic of 
this season are cardiac diseases and 'the 
intermittent fever' (malaria). In Autumn the 
forces between heaven and earth balance out* and 
this season can be harmful for the lungs.
Finally* Winter is the period when Nature rests 
and it is now that kidney diseases frequently 
occur. It was noted that windy weather in Spring 
caused diarrhea and that summer heat brought on 
feverish illnesses. The autumnal dampness 
coincided with 'coughing* and the Winter cold with 
feverish ailments which broke out in Spring.
(pp. 3h-35)
From the special case of the relation of meteorology to 
the health of the person, it is an easy step to the more 
general case of the relation of the natural world to the 
health of society. In this way* astronomical phenomena* 
being among the most pronounced of natural phenomena* were 
related to the condition of the social order.
Agtgofiomy 3fid society. Very early in their development* 
the Chinese became interested in recording changes in the 
celestial world. As Needham (1S70) notes* the Chinese were 
the most persistent and accurate observers of celestial 
phenomena in any culture before the Benaissance. It is no 
accident that seme modern day radic-astronomers use ancient 
Chinese records to validate their theories. The ancient 
Chinese were extremely astute and accurate observers of the 
heavens for this interest was motivated not by the love of 
abstract knowledge* but by the desire to gauge the events 
that were occurring in their own society. Their records of
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supernova and nova have teen found tc be extremely valuable.
The orbit of Hailey's ccmet was originally estimated from
Chinese records (Needham, 1970).
Behind this astute astronomical observation was the
state astrology which locked tc the heavens for portents of
events to come in the political realm. Thus, astronomy
became an integral part of the government. This is in clear
contrast to the West of the same period where the astronomer
was an independent seeker after truth. The contrast is most
striking when a comparison is made between the social
position of the astronomer in ancient Greece and China:
As has been said, 'while, among the Greeks, the 
astronomer was a private person, a philosopher* a 
lover of the truth (as Ptolemy said of 
Hipparchus), as often as net on uncertain terms 
with priests cf his city; in China, on the 
contrary, he was intimately connected with the 
sovereign pontificate of the Son of Heaven, part 
of an official government service, and ritually 
accommodated within the very walls of the imperial 
palace.' (Needham, 1959, p. 171)
To the Chinese, astronomy was the "cardinal science."
In addition to observing the portents of heaven, astronomers 
also had the vital duty cf fixing the calender which in turn 
would order all of the actions of human beings, especially 
the actions of the emperor himself. The Chinese firmly held 
to the notion that "'comets dc foretell the death of 
princes.*" (Needham, 1970, p. 2) Given this ethical 
solidarity between changes in astronomical phenomena and the 
political climate in the society, meteorological and 
astronomical events became an important political force and 
were used as an important check on the power of the ruler
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(Eberhard, 1957).
Responsibility to flal^ gpe. Central to this entire 
discussion is the notion that the emperor was responsible 
for the harmony of Nature. Thus, any abnormality of this 
natural order was immediately related to some disturbance in 
human society. All human beings had a responsibility to 
maintain a harmonious social order in order to promote a 
harmonious natural order, Mei (1968) reminds us' that there 
is a persistent importance applied tc the responsibility of 
human beings, where human beings. Heaven and Earth are 
spoken of in the same breath.
This responsibility was true for all human beings but 
for the "One Man," the emperor, this responsiblity was 
extremely great, for as the "Son of Heaven" he sat at the 
apex of all of humankind and at the vortex of the triangle 
where the human world meets the natural world. It follows 
that his personal behavior was extremely ordered lest the 
natural order be disturbed. The emperor was required to 
travel about his empire with the regularity of the calendar. 
He had to "regulate his progress so as to find himself in 
the East during the vernal equinox, in the South during 
summer solstice, in the Rest when autumn came and in the 
North during winter." (Beincourt, 1965, p. 79)
The extent of this integration of the life of the 
emperor and the changes cf Nature was extremely detailed in 
its correspondence; Hallnofer and von Bottauscher (1965) 
give the following directives for the emperor’s activities
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from the Spying ajjd
Daring the three spring months, the emperor 
remains in the Eastern wing of the Hall of Light 
(the principal building for cult rituals). He 
rides in a carriage drawn by green-shimmering 
dragon-horses. all the tanners are green. His 
officials and entourage are dressed in green gowns 
and wear jade jewelry. The emperor conducts the 
sacrificial rites on.the palace's East lawn. He 
orders his ministers to be magnanimous and to 
exercise gentleness, and tc prevent the felling of 
trees and the taking of arms (wood is destroyed by 
metal!). (p. 5)
It is interesting to note the detail: the emphasis on green
and the prescription of the place (by compass position) in
which the emperor must perform the rites.
He can compare the above with the directives for the
autumn months:
During the three autumn months, the emperor stays 
in the Western wing of the Hall of Light. His 
war-carriage is drawn by white horses. The 
banners are white. His officials wear white gowns 
and white jade jewels. He conducts sacrificial 
rites on the palace's West lawn. The emperor 
orders his ministers to revise the laws and to 
conduct the court trials. Dressed in his war 
habit, the emperor personally takes part in the 
hunting expeditions. (Hallnofer and von 
Eottauscher, 1965, p. 6)
If the emperor faithfully performed the rites that were
prescribed, it was believed that the order of human society
would be integrated with the order of Nature.
It is important to stress that every action or ritual
had its proper place and time in the order of Nature. It
was not a question of having enough time to do the
prescribed activities, as much as needing to perform the
correct ritual at the precise time. For example, there is
written in ancient texts that "there is upheld the idea that
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punishments can only be carried out in autumn, when all 
things are dying; to execute criminals in the spring would 
have a deleterious effect on the growing crops." (Needham, 
1956, p. 527)
To fail to execute these rituals at the proper time was
to court disorder and disaster from the natural world.
Again, the emperor was a mcdel for all humankind.
The smallest acticns of the emperor were believed 
to affect the cosmic mechanism. Thus, the Becords 
2a Ceremonial . . .  informs us that if the emperor 
were, in the last month of summer, to wear white 
clothing instead red, 'even high ground would be 
flooded, the grain in the fields wculd not ripen, 
there would be miscarriages among women.' (Creel,
1949, p. 77)
Such a ritualistic function of humankind toward Nature 
would not be thought to be fertile ground for the 
development of scientific ways cf thinking. This is not to 
say that the Chinese were net very astute observers of 
empirical phenomena. As noted above, the Chinese 
astronomers maintained extremely accurate records of the 
heavens and changes in celestial phenomena. They were, for 
example, the first to observe sun-spots. Yet, something 
more is meant by science than simply empirical observation. 
It is the welding of these empirical observations into a 
theoretical framework that is the essential mechanism of 
science. In this respect, the Chinese were extremely 
limited by their experience of unity with the natural 
phenomena being observed.
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The essential scientific process of hypothesis and
refutation could net easily function within their system of
ethical solidarity. Eberhard (1957) speaks to this point:
But instead of attributing apparent discrepancies, 
i.e., unusual celestial or natural phenomena, to 
inadequacies of the theories, such phenomena were 
thought tc be the result of human activity, human 
interference in the balance of Nature. Therefore, 
instead of correcting or adjusting the theory, men 
sought the sources of human interference. (p. 39)
The traditional Chinese thinker was deprived of the basic
mechanism by which scientific kEOwledge is fostered the
refutation of hypotheses and the corresponding modification
of the theory to account for ancmalous findings.
In summary, the Western thinker could play upon the
assumption of divisibility and deal with Nature as something
separate and objective. The purpose for the knowledge of
Nature in China was different tc use the assumed unity of
the human world with Nature tc promote a harmonious
relationship, all within the ever present Tao. The Chinese
purpose toward Nature could net foster scientific endeavors,
but favored an ethical treatment of Nature:
In order to grasp the universal order, man should 
not dream of knowing and dominating Nature with 
the help cf scientific kncwledge, but should seek 
to integrate himself harmcniously into Nature.
Instead of science, he adopted siisj)§ii£ and 
ceremony as the suitable agents for the desired 
integration. Whatever he did or thought, every 
item of his life had to be *in tune* with Nature, 
related by a set of complicated rules to the 
revered Tao. (Reincourt, 1965, p. 78)
These different assumptiens and purposes for knowledge have
lead to different actions toward Nature in each system.
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GVEBVIEW
This chapter has examined the consequences of the unity 
of the human world and Nature on the levels of experience 
and function. Beginning with calligraphy and landscape 
painting, a feeling cf unity with Nature was the central
inspiration for the artistic vision in China.
This unity was expanded to the general case in which
the human world was experienced as a microcosm in detailed
relation to the macrocosm of Nature. In Chinese medicine, 
the characteristics of the human body were experienced as 
being in relation to tbe characteristics of the natural 
world. Within the state analogy, the characteristics of the 
social order were conceived as a microcosm of the natural- 
This experience of unity was reflected in practical 
areas of function such as architecture where gardens and 
courtyards were designed as integral part of human 
structures. This permitted the blending of Nature with the 
protection and privacy of a building. A form of geomancy, 
§hui, allowed a harmonious ordering of all human 
structures with their natural setting.
In response to this unity, human actions were perceived 
as having consequences in the functioning of the natural 
order. In medicine, human pathology was related to 
meteorological changes, as were changes in the cosmos 
related to changes in the social world. In this context, 
astromony was a most highly valued endeavor. All human 
beings and the emperor in particular were responsible for
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the smooth functioning of the natural order through the 
maintenance of harmony in the social order. This resulted 
in ritualistic behavior inhibiting the growth of a system of 
knowledge based on scientific principles.
CHAPTER VI
CONSEQUENCES IN HUHAN RELATIONS
In this chapter# the discussion will turn from the 
macrocosm of human relations to Nature to an examination of 
the relative microcosm cf the relation of human beings to 
other human beings. I have taken pains to make this 
statement in microcosm-macrocosm terms for the purpose of 
stressing that# at least for the Chinese, we are exploring 
the same unity# only another plane. This is not a separate 
section independent of the last, but a further refinement of 
the unity of humankind and Nature.
As has been stressed above the major priority for the 
human being in China was to maintain social harmony with 
Nature. It follows that all sccial phenomena were 
experienced as having a large component which was related to 
Nature; Nature is always assumed to be the background for 
human interactions. Sometimes this background may be 
ignored# but at ether times# as we shall see below# it is 
the most important determinant of social structure.
Before beginning the discussion of human relations# two 
problems which relate to this area should be considered at 
the outset. Firstly, there is the problem of the extreme 
complexity of the social history of China. This history 
extends over at least 4000 years# a period which has seen
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the introduction cf man; different ideas about social 
structure, the rise and fall of many different social 
systems, and the elaboration through time of many social 
ideas. This area does not easily reduce itself to simple 
relationships which have endured unchanging over time.
Yet within this kaleidoscopic sccial history, I think 
most scholars would agree that the Ccnfucian vision of human 
relations has been the major constancy and pillar for 
Chinese civilization over the centuries. In the following,
I will concentrate on presenting human relations as they 
were envisioned from the Ccnfucian context. I will deal 
with conflicting schools of thought only to the extent that 
they can aid in defining these Confucian ideals.
Alas, even Confucianism is a kaleidoscope of different 
ideas and has been modified over time. If Confucius were to 
be resurrected, he would no doubt find it difficult to 
understand many of the ideas that were propounded in his 
name by the Neo-Confucians centuries later. To further 
complicate matters, Confucianism, like any all-embracing 
system, deviated in social practice from the ideals of the 
vision itself.
With these admonitions, the reader should be fully 
aware the following does not represent the full structure of 
traditional Chinese social thought or even of Confucianism 
for that matter. In the following discussion, I will 
attempt to rise above these issues and examine an ideal 
model of the Confucian vision of human relations.
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Secondly, the Western framework of divisibility 
presents a further problem. In dealing with human 
relations, the Western framework forces upon us two foci of 
attention and two areas of discourse— the human being and 
the society. Within the Western framework, this division is 
merely "assumed" as a matter of course. For example, the 
psychologist does not feel it necessary to defend the notion 
that individual psychological processes can be investigated 
independently of social variables, but in many cases assumes 
the division and proceeds to work within this assumed 
context. In a similar manner, the sociologist does not find 
it necessary tc defend the isolation of social processes 
from individual processes, but merely assumes that social 
processes can be known independently of the individual human 
beings that produce them.
The Chinese framework does not allcw such luxuries. If 
I were to make this assumption of separation, the Western 
framework would tend to obscure the framework of traditional 
China which has as its mcst important feature the unity of 
human beings and the social process. However, to make this 
discussion intelligible, I must adhere to Western standards 
of discourse.
Hy solution will be a compromise— I shall assume both 
foci of discourse, the human being and the social process, 
and attempt to illustrate that in traditional China both 
foci tend toward the same point, to the unity of human 
beings with ether human beings. In this way, we can begin
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to appreciate a framework of unity from the perspective of 
Western categories of division. What will emerge from the 
discussion will be the identification of the family as a 
major aspect cf the organization which contains both the 
individual human being and the social process 
simultaneously.
EXPERIENCING CTHERS 
The last chapter presented a point cf entry into human 
relations. It is best to examine the interface between 
Nature and the social process and expand this entry point to 
a consideration of social process in general and the 
individual human being's experience. The pattern that I 
shall follow is based on the assumption that the unity of 
humankind and Nature reguires a certain unity within human 
society itself.
Human Relations at the Center of Social Process
I wish first to establish social prccess in traditional 
China as a viable alternative tc Western social structure; 
and to do this, I shall examine the same condition in both 
China and the West and observe the different reactions of 
each. As a point of comparison, I have chosen gunpowder.
As is well known, gunpowder was discovered in China and used 
there for some time before being introduced into Europe.
The interesting feature which I want to consider is the 
alternative reaction of the different social systems.
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As Breuer (1970) indicates, the invention of gunpowder 
did not produce any major changes in Chinese social 
structure and simply found its way into the arsenal of 
armies. In complete contrast, its introduction into the 
social structure of Europe produced catastrophic changes in 
the social structure. Icgether with the invention of the 
printing press, these two forces were instrumental in 
changing the entire social order from the feudalism of the 
Middle Ages to the Renaissance, heralding the beginning of 
the modern era.
In this context, Bzeuer asks how the same element can 
produce such different reactions. He goes on to account for 
this difference by discussing differences in the social 
structure of feudal Europe and traditional China. What he 
points to is a difference in the social structure and power 
structure itself. In short, the power and influence of the 
emperor in the Chinese social system was much different from 
that of the feudal lords in Europe when gunpowder was 
introduced. I would be anticipating the material that will 
be presented below if I were tc account for the anomaly of 
gunpowder at present other than for the purpose of 
demonstrating the alternative character of the two social 
structures. I shall attempt to resolve this issue below.
Qpe sixilizgi ftymank4gd|. At the outset, it is important to 
recognize the restrictions imposed by the unity of humankind 
with Nature. It was suggested that this unity placed a 
responsibility upon each human being to maintain the order
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of Nature through personal action. To the Chinese,
Humankind, Heaven, and Earth formed a ternion. Each element
of the pattern was equally important. £t the apex of all
humankind was the empeccr whose responsibility it was to
perform set rituals at set times to insure the smooth
function of Nature.
For this model to function properly, there must be
assumed a uniformity of rituals cf all civilized human
beings. Mancall (1968) writes:
In this sense the Chinese state was not a state at 
all, in the conventional meaning of that word, but 
rather the administration of civilized society i& 
the emperor, far from being the ruler 
of one state among many, was the mediator between 
heaven and earth, a cardinal point in the 
universal continuum, the apex of civilization, 
unigue in the universe. In other words, the 
emperor was net cnly a temporal political ruler 
but a figure of cosmic dimensions. The rituals he 
performed, or those performed about him, were not 
particularistic but universal. In the annual 
fertility rite he plowed the sacred furrow not so 
the Chinese crops could grow but so that crops per 
se could grow. (pp. 63-64)
From this linkage of the social and natural orders, two 
of the major characteristics of traditional Chinese society 
derive— the necessary unity of all civilized humankind 
behind the emperor, and the necessity for the basis of the 
social order to rest on the rituals and personal relations 
of human beings extending upward from the mass of peasants 
to the emperor himself.
Like many major civilizations, the Chinese saw 
themselves as being at the center of the world. However, 
for the Chinese this view of centrality was taken to an
184
extreme- The traditional Chinese experience of the world 
could almost be diagramed in the fcrm of Dante's Hell with 
concentric circles converging on the emperor at the center 
and unfolding outward with circles of ever increasing 
diameter representing lesser and lesser degrees of 
civilization, until one is delivered in the outermost circle 
to pure barbarians who did not perform the rituals necessary 
for civilized human beings.
Nonetheless, all human beings had their respective 
places in this system as they were contained in the major 
interface between the human world and the natural. The 
quite common expression which relates this is 22i§n h§i<|, 
which is translated, quite literally, "all-under-Heaven."
One finds this expression used quite commonly to refer to 
human society, implying the unity of all humankind beneath 
Heaven. As Fairbank (1968) indicates, this expression was 
used to embrace the whole, including everything outside 
China. He concludes that the dominant Chinese experience of 
the world was that of sinocentrism.
This sinocentrism, however, must be correctly 
understood. It was not experienced as the dominance of 
China as a political entity thrcughout the world- It must 
be remembered that the nction of "China" as a political 
entity is a quite recent development of only the present 
century. The noticn of sinocentrism was more basic: the 
Chinese experienced themselves as the center of civilized 
humankind having the only channel of communication with
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Nature.
Again, the Chinese reacticn to the infusion of Buddhism 
is a very enlightening case in Feint. The Chinese 
conception of civilization led to the rejection of Buddhism 
not as a competing civilization or system of thought, but as 
barbarism lying beyond the rituals of civilized humankind. 
Since, as Mather (1955) points out,
. . .  China has never exhibited the kind of 
xenophobia with which we are familiar in the West, 
the almost chauvinistic contempt for ’barbarian* 
culture characterizing nearly all critiques of 
Buddhism in China seems paradoxical enough. But 
it was precisely because the Chinese intellectuals 
did not champion nationalistic culture, but 
insisted instead cn maintaining a universal one, 
that divergent practices were rejected, not so 
much on the grounds that they were Indian or 
Parthian or Kuchean, as that they represented £0 
culture. If the foreign missionaries had accepted 
this universal culture and lived by its 
principles, no objections would have been raised.
The cultured man (and he is inseparable from the 
moral man) is one who accepts the pattern of the 
universe, as it has been perceived and transmitted 
by sage kings and emperors, and cultivates it 
within himself. (p. 34)
This salient feature of Chinese social thought 
perpetuated itself intc modern times. Peyrefitte (1977) 
relates a statement made by the emperor on receiving a 
British delegation to China in the last century. The 
emperor stated: "Governing the whole world as I do, I have 
only one aim in view— to uphold perfect government and to 
fulfill the duties of the State." (p. 2U5) It was this 
quite unrealistic attitude that prevented the Chinese from 
taking action against the increasing Western incursion into 
China until the situation was irreversible. Notwithstanding
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the reality of Western material and technological
superiority, to the Chinese, given their social and cosmic
unity, the Westerner was still only a barbarian, not a
member of civilized humankind.
Within this experience of the unity of humankind, there
was no place for isolated and autonomous groups of human
beings. As Fairbank (1968) indicates, even our Western
language and ideas seem to fail us for there are no concepts
such as nation, sovereignty, and equality of states within
the Chinese experience of the world order. All of these
concepts suggest a division of human beings into different
societies and nation-states which runs in direct opposition
to the experience of the unity of all humankind at the basis
of the Chinese world order.
In a very revealing contrast, Fairbank (1968) writes of
the differences between the European order based on division
and the Chinese order based on unity:
The European order, with its interest in precise 
division of territories and its own concepts of 
legitimacy, came to depend upon a balance of power 
among the nation states. The Chinese world order, 
in contrast, was unified and centralized in theory 
by the universal preeminence of the Son of Heaven.
It was not organized by a division of territories 
among sovereigns of equal status but rather by 
subordination of all local authorities to the 
central and awe-inspiring power of the emperor.
(P- 9)
Even during the Chinese Feudal period and during the chaotic 
period of the Warring States, the relation of subordination 
to the emperor as the Son of Heaven was carefully 
maintained.
187
Yet, this experienced unity of all humankind within 
civilized society extends far beyond the political order 
itself to every aspect of Chinese civilization. Buck (1970) 
writes:
The essential unity of China is not in its 
political life, which has not until the present 
generation been of great importance. China's 
unity, so much more profound than our own, 
consists in its people's coherence as Chinese, the 
unity of a people who has lived in one part of the 
world for thousands of years, a unity of history 
and of habit. To such a people, accustomed to so 
profound a unity, the mere unity of a transient 
government means little. (p. 3)
From this context, we can begin to appreciate the phrase:
"the experienced unity of civilized human beings."
This experience of unity, cf course, became a central
concept of the dominant system, Confucianism. Indeed, the
unity of all human beings within society is the very essence
of this system and the source from which the Confucian
vision arises:
The essence of the Confucian vision was that of a 
'cooperative world. ' It was the conviction that 
antagonism and suspicion, strife and suffering, 
were largely unnecessary. It was a profound faith 
that men's true interests did net conflict but 
complemented each other, that war and injustice 
and exploitation injured those who profited by 
them as well as those they caused to suffer. This 
was, indeed, a thread which 'ran through' all of 
Confucius' thinking and frcm which much of his 
philosophy can be derived by logical deduction.
(Creel, 1949, p. 123)
M i i s  £21 social ord^r. The second requirement imposed by 
the unity of the human world with Nature relates to the 
basis of the social process itself. If a human being's 
function affects the function cf Nature as I have tried to
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establish above, it follows that the smooth function of the 
social order and, consequently, of the natural order, must 
be based on the uniformity of rituals of all human beings. 
Social order, within this system, must evolve from the 
"grassroots" so to speak, it this pcint, our Western 
concepts again seem to fail us, for the basis of the social 
order in the West is of a reverse nature: Western order is 
imposed from above to regulate an assumed chaotic system. 
This is the reason why divine revelation, natural law or 
social contract become the central issues around which the 
social process and order revolve.
In China, we find the reverse process where each 
element displays its own crder and, through a summation of 
these individual orders, the ordering of the whole is 
achieved. We have already met this inverted ordering 
principle, above in the discussicn concerning geomancy. I 
attempted to establish that the geomancer, working at each 
individual site, by producing order in the specific was 
producing order in the general case.
What I am suggesting is a two-factor theory of how 
order can arise within any given system. One factor orders 
the system from the specific tc the general, while the 
second factor orders the system frcm the general to the 
specific. To take a simple example, if the purpose is to 
produce order on the highways, we can proceed in cne of two 
ways. We can attempt to order traffic from the general to 
the specific, in which case we would pass new laws for
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speeding and enforce the laws with heavy penalties, increase 
the quality and guantity of lav enforcement, and, as a final 
effort, place speed controls cn every engine manufactured.
However, ve could attempt to accomplish the same 
purpose by moving frcm the specific to the general. In this 
case, ve would attempt to make individuals through their own 
actions produce the order in the larger whole. We could, 
for example, attempt tc produce in each driver a sense of 
religious shame if he should exceed a prudent speed,. From 
the Western perspective, it is extremely difficult even to 
conceive of how this latter option would be effected, for 
the Western framework is heavily weighted toward the first 
factor.
The predominant way to produce crder in the Chinese
framework is from the specific to the general:
As I see it from my many years in the Orient and 
my few years in my own country, it seems to me 
that the two peoples begin thinking from opposite 
ends. That is, the Chinese reason from the 
individual tc the general, we reason from the 
general to the individual. That is, the Chinese 
principles of living, the Chinese essentials of 
what constitute justice and righteousness are 
drawn not frcm any religion, not from any 
idealism, but from thousands upon thousands of 
individual cases. (Buck, 1970, p. 64)
To apply this principal difference to the problem of
social order, in the West the basis for social order is to
be found in the general: in religion frcm God and his divine
revelation, and in the world of science from some discovered
laws about the world. In China, the basis of the social
order is from the specific to the general with the basis
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resting on bow human beings conduct themselves.
Within the Western tradition there are few examples to
draw upon. & notable and important exception is the
philosophy of Leibniz. Within his theory of monads, we find
a system of order which, in many characteristics, has an
uncanny resemblence to that of the Chinese. The monad is
thought tc produce, frcm its pre-established harmony, order
in the whole world. While ve cannot overlook the fact that
this order derives from God, a Western concept to be sure,
the philosophy of Leibniz stands out as being signally
unique in this regard and has suggested to me evidence of a
possible infusion of Chinese thought into European
philosophy. For those readers who would like to pursue this
speculation further, seme preliminary materials are
presented in the Appendix.
Returning to the problem at hand, the experience of the
social order develops frcm the relations of individual human
beings. This process cannot be isolated within the Chinese
perspective frcm the behavior cf individual human beings.
Human relations become the source of all social order. The
Chinese categorized these relations into five relationships
central to the society:
Consider now the Confucian conception of the 
ordering principle in society. According to the 
sage's grandson, Tzu Ssu, it involved the 
establishment of five relationships: (1) Between
ruler and subject; (2) between father and son;
(3) between husband and wife; (4) between the 
elder and the younger brother; and (5) between 
friend and friend egually . . . .  There can be no 
trust in government, no proper relation between 
sovereign and subject, without a trust of friend 
and friend. Thus, the first of the five relations
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depends on the fifth. Bat there can be no trust 
of friend in friend unless men are dutiful to 
their parents. There is no point more important 
than this for understanding of Chinese culture, 
both traditional and contemporary. A proper 
filial relation in the family is prior to, and the 
necessary prerequisite for a wider social 
organization in the business world or in 
government. (Northrop, 19*46, pp. 326-327)
It can be seen that the Chinese conception of social order
and social process is based directly on human relations of
human beings to other human beings. Further, the
relationships themselves are interdependent, with all
relations, and ultimately social crder, resting firmly on
the relation of filial piety.
I would be remiss at this point if I did not examine
one of the virtues of the Chinese social process and one of
the corresponding dangers of the Western social process. It
is quite obvious from the discussion above that, since the
social process is based on the function cf human beings, the
human being is experienced as being at the center of social
process and order. In the Western framework of social
order, there is a corresponding tendency for the process to
be increasingly abstracted from human actions. In the West,
the principles of crder tend to take on an importance beyond
the individuals that have constructed them. There then
develops the danger that human beings become estranged from
the social process and manipulated by it.
As Harx recognized, there is a tendency in Western
economic systems for human beings to be alienated from the
means of production. In traditional China, however, a
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corresponding danger could not exist, for the economic
process has at its heart the function of individuals that
produce it. Wilhelm (1947) writing to this point draws the
following contrast between the two economic systems:
The leaders of Chinese economic policy, above all 
Confucius, have always endeavored tc place man in 
a central position in regard to fchjggs . . . .  No 
one was allowed to sink to the level of a mere 
tool. Hence the tendency to have tools as simple 
as possible and artisans as skilled as possible.
The emphasis was entirely cn the perfection of 
men, not on the perfection of means of production.
In economic activity it was sought to organize as 
a natural expression of man. Han was to guard his 
humanity even in the midst of the economic 
process. (p. 6)
What is true here for economics is also true for the 
entire social process. Since human beings were experienced 
as being at the basis of the process, they were experienced 
as being unified with that process. Contrastingly, in the 
West, the social process while still being constructed by 
human beings for human beings has the tendency to abstract 
itself from its human origins tc become at times an 
adversary.
The Human Being in Relation to Others
I will new assume the alternative focus to the social 
process and examine the experience of the individual, if you 
wish the psychological process. It is difficult from the 
Western perspective tc appreciate the Chinese experience of 
the human being. The individuality of the human being, 
especially in the modern West, is so much a part of the 
Western intellectual and emoticnal apparatus that it is
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difficult to assume an alternative point of view. The words 
of Hsu (1970) are helpful in this regard:
. . .  in the American way of life the emphasis is 
placed upon the predilections of the individual# a 
characteristic we shall call individual-centered.
This is in contrast to the emphasis the Chinese 
put upon an individual’s appropriate place and 
behavior among his f.ellowmen# a characteristic we 
shall term situaticn-cen-t;erefl. (p. 10)
Hsu’s work is an elaboration of this contrast as it is
manifest in many diverse areas cf human function in each
system.
In the West# the predominant experience of others tends 
to be individually centered with the person being conceived 
as an isolated ego# almost an atom# functioning among other 
equally autonomous, isolated centers of consciousness. In 
this context, the Western ethic reinforces the 
individual-centered mode cf life by fostering values of 
independence.
In the situation-centered context of China# the 
tendency is precisely the reverse. The human being is 
experienced as being in relation to ether human beings as an 
initial condition. Consequently# the Chinese tend to foster 
inverse values to that of the West: "the Chinese is inclined 
to be socially or psychologically dependent on others# for 
this situation-centered individual is tied closer to his 
world and his fellow men." (Hsu# 1970# p. 10) In China# the 
individual ego becomes diluted# or# perhaps more precisely# 
never becomes differentiated# from the matrix of other egos.
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A coaisst o£ ESisiioasiijBS- This is not to say that the
Chinese have no individual egos, but that this individuality
is submerged in the egc's pattern cf relationships with
other human beings.
The 'ego' of the Chinese peasant is not in the 
first place his own insignificant person but 
embraces the larger ego of the family. The 
fortunes of the fanily are the fortunes which he 
directly experiences. A typical example of this 
is the answer of a peasant who was asked how long 
he lived in the locality: *three hundred years,* 
he said; 'at that time we came to this 
neighborhood from the South.' Of course, personal 
consciousness also exists. The individual is 
conscious of himself as a separate member of his 
family. But he does not think of himself 
abstractly as an individual but as a collective 
type. He is someone's sen, or someone's father, 
or holds some other position in the family . . . .  
(Wilhelm, 1947, p. 19)
The approach tc the individual ego is always through 
the direction of others and the relations that the ego has 
with others. To know an individual within the Chinese 
context, we do not begin with the attributes of the 
individual as one is inclined to do in the West, but the 
entire direction is reversed. One must first inguire of the 
person's status within the social structure, then the 
family, then the relationship within the family, and, 
finally, at the ultimate extreme one begins to examine the 
individual consciousness.
To illustrate this situation-centered experience, I 
turn to art. I have concentrated above on landscape art 
which is given form by the Taoist ideal of unity with 
Nature. However, there are some examples cf portraiture 
which display more of the Confucian ideals and concentrate
An Example of Chinese Portraiture Illustrating 
the Interest of the Artist in the Subject’s 
Belations to Other Human Beings 





on human beings as theix subject. Because of the rather 
formalized character of Confucian art, the entire area has 
been treated with benevolent neglect by most scholars of 
Chinese art who seem to prefer the vitalism of the Taoist 
landscapes.
Displayed in figure 9 is an example of Chinese 
portraiture. The overriding first impression is that of 
formalism— the subject seems tc have very little 
"personality” as the artist has painted him. This contrasts 
sharply with the vitalism that characterizes Chinese 
landscapes where Nature seems most alive. Commenting on 
such a painting, Hsu (1970) writes:
The facial expression of such figures is nil. The 
viewer obtains a much better idea of the status, 
rank, prestige, and other social characteristics 
of the subjects portrayed than he does of their 
personalities . . . .  In fact when we do see human 
faces in Chinese paintings, their blankness bears 
a remarkable resemblance tc the expressionless 
figures portrayed in 1 Daughters of the American 
Revolution.* However, the absence of expression 
in the Chinese faces results because the Chinese
artist is net concerned with personality whereas
the very blankness of the features in Grant Wood*s 
work is intended by the artist as a satiric 
representation of character. (p. 18)
This is quite significant for it is po^ that the subject of
the painting in Figure 9 dees not have a personality, as
much as it is that the perception of the artist upon which
the painting is based is not frcm the focus of the
individual with his independent attributes, but from a
preoccupation with others and their relations to the 
subject.
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In seeking to define the human being in China, ve are
not looking at a single human being cr an isolated sliver of
living protoplasm as much as a nexus of relationships within
an ever wider whole. It is this context of relationships
that Cheng (1976) has recognized as being at the center of
the Confucian world. He identifies a paradigm which sees
all life as interrelated within wholes upon wholes:
Life is not a single part cf a whole, but a whole 
of parts; nor is it an isolated phenomenon which 
is externally related to external things. For 
life phenomenon or life experience, an item or 
part is always internally related to other parts 
in the whole as well as the whole as a whole. To 
say that parts are internally related to one 
another and to the whole is to say that without
relation the parts will net be parts and the whole
will not be a whole. In this sense, parts and 
wholes are defined in the relationships in which 
they find themselves, A part is, therefore, 
unlike an atom which has its essence independently 
of relations with other things, nor is it like a 
member of a class, which is a result of 
abstraction in conceptualization and which is also 
independent of the existence cf the class to which 
it belongs as the latter could be granted 
existence as in Platonism.
The life paradigm is not cnly restricted to 
things individually, but extends to the whole 
world, as the whole world cf things is conceived 
of as resulting frcm the same source of life, 
which is the Heaven. The whole world under this 
conception is a great organic whole and unity with 
internal relational or interrelational structures 
in both time and space dimensions. (p. 9)
Again, we begin to see the importance of patterns
within wholes. It is not that a part has an essential
nature which makes it what it is, but rather that the nature
of the thing arises frcm its position within the pattern of
relationships within the whole. Focusing this on the human
being, it is the Chinese conviction that to know a human
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being one must know the place occupied by this human being
in the pattern of relationships within humankind.
This to some degree accounts for the importance of the
family* for it is in the context of the family that a human
being's relations are defined. The Confucian paradigm of
life demands that each individual person be experienced in
the proper relation within the total stream of life. The
individual is viewed as being embedded in this stream of ,
life not only spatially in present but* more importantly*
through time itself.
according to the stream-of-life theory as seen in 
the family system* immortality is almost visible 
and touchable. Every grandfather seeing his 
grandchild going tc school with a satchel feels 
that truly he is living over again in the life of 
the child* and when he touches the child's hand or 
pinches his cheeks* he kncws it is flesh of his 
own flesh and blood of his own blood. His own 
life is nothing but a section of the family tree* 
or of the great family stream of life flowing on 
forever, and therefore he is happy to die. (Lin 
Yutang* 1940* p. 190)
The emotions that Lin Yutang attributes to the Chinese 
grandfather are certainly universal human emotions of any 
grandfather toward his grandchild. However* the difference 
lies in degree* and it is an important difference. The 
Chinese have made this universal human experience the most 
central of their culture. This accounts for the care with 
which ancestor worship is maintained through many 
generations and the egual care that the younger generation 
takes for the cider. Lin Yutang (1940) writes: "The
Chinese ideal of life is to live so as not to be a shame to 
one's ancestors and to have sens of whom one need not be
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ashamed.” (p. 191) This simple principle accounts for many 
characteristics of Chinese society. The individual is 
conceived of as a vital connection with the unity of all 
humankind.
The family. In the institution of the family, one
experiences the full stream of life in the concrete rather
than the abstract. Scharfstein (1974) gives a concise
definition of the family within a context of unity:
Ideally, the family consisted of a number of 
generations living together in the same household. 
Because the Chinese believed that spirits of their 
ancestors remained scmehow active and 
understanding, the spirits were invited to all 
family occasions. Tablets commemorating ancestors 
were kept and honored in a special hall. It was 
supposed that the ancestral spirits, if pleased, 
would help the family, and, if seriously 
displeased would cause it harm. The children yet 
unborn were considered members cf the family, 
which was morally obliged to hand its tradition 
and property on to them. (pp. 4-5)
From the Western context, it is possible to
misunderstand this emphasis on human relationships within
the context of unity as an affirmation of Christian values
of love for all humankind. Quite to the contrary, the
relationships were graduated such that differing degrees of
responsibility were associated with various relationships.
The love for all humankind would be a most uncomfortable
abstraction for the Chinese. They would rather deal with
concrete love beginning with the intimate relationships
within the family and radiating outward from this source.
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Confucianism did net only remain neutral to the 
unregulated love of all humankind as a basis for society, 
but was actively involved in a condemnation of such a view 
on the grounds that to adhere tc such a position would 
destroy the obligations within the family and, ultimately, 
the society itself. Thus, the Classic of Filial Piety 
states that "He who does net love his parents, but loves 
other men, is called a rebel against virtue; and he who 
does not revere his parents, but reveres other men is called 
a rebel against propriety." (legge, 1879, p. 479)
The Confucian position can be contrasted with the 
system of no Tzu (Hohism) which advocated a principle of 
all-embracing love guite similar to that of Jesus in the 
Nest. The reaction of the Confucians was guick and 
complete. Hohism threatened to dissolve the unity of the 
family and the graduated love within these familial 
relationships. For the Confucians, love must be modulated 
by the five relationships noted above. Hohism was 
completely suppressed to the extent that only modern 
scholars have recognized its importance in Chinese thought.
Host central of all relationships was that of filial 
piety, the relation of the child tc the parent. This is the 
fundamental relationship in Chinese culture because it is 
the essential linkage between generations, from one’s 
ancestors to one’s offspring. It was this filial relation 
that was the source of all love and benevolence toward 
others. Yu-Wei (1962) writes: "Hence, the Confucian tenet
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'The benevolent man loves ethers' must be interpreted in the 
light of filial piety to the effect that 'The benevolent man 
loves others, with his own parents as the starting point.'" 
(p. 415)
From this fountainhead of filial piety, it was thought,
the other relationships would be ordered in a loving manner.
With genuine and comprehensive love toward one's 
own parents in its developing process, one may 
naturally learn to be benevolent to all living 
creatures, affectionate toward mankind as a whole, 
loyal to his country and to the duties of a free 
citizen, faithful in keeping obligations, 
righteous in action, peaceful in behavior, and 
just in all dealings. All these eight virtues, 
moral items, together with many others, may 
emanate from filial piety through its expansion.
The C ^ s s i c  2f yiftty says, 'It is filial
piety which forms the root of all virtues, and 
with it all enlightening studies come into 
existence,.' (Yu-Wei, 1962, p. 417)
The Chinese favor the immediate, concrete and universal love
of the child for the parent as the basis for the love of
humankind rather than the abstractions of the West which are
given force by the commandments cf Gcd or the categorical
imperatives of an ethical philosophy.
The Centrality of Human Relationships
This discussion has had two foci: the human being and 
the social process. In both, I have been impressed at the 
degree to which these two points of focus are inextricably 
drawn together. In the social process, the dominant 
conception of the society was that of a network of human 
relationships. Likewise, the experience of the human being 
is deeply rooted in human relationships and not in the
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attributes of the individual. In this context, the
artificial Western distinction between society and the human
being becomes blurred and merges intc the family structure.
The relations within the family beccme the major idiom
for experiencing the world. It is interesting, for example,
to see how the Chinese used the family concept to deal with
a foreign doctrine. Nakamura (1964) points to the Chinese
interpretation of Indian concepts of atomic structure.
Indian knowledge conceived cf the world as arising from the
union of two primordial atoms. The Chinese interpretation
of this relation was in terms of kinship referring to the
child atom and the parent atom. As he points out, such
concepts were not present in either the Greek or Indian
notions of atoms.
The family as a concept becomes the key model for all
human experience in China. The family has far reaching
implications for all social functions producing many
differences in social institutions with respect to the
West— for example, differences in the perception of
government. Since government is considered in China to be
paternalistic, there is no need for laws which protect the
rights of the individual:
The most striking characteristic in our political 
life as a nation is the absence of a constitution 
and of the idea of civil rights . . . .  A 
•constitution' presupposes that our rulers might 
be crooks who might abuse their power and violate 
our ’rights* which we use the constitution as a 
weapon to defend. The Chinese conception of 
government is the direct opposite of this 
supposition. It is kncwn as a ’parental 
government’ or ’government by gentlemen,* who are 
supposed to look after the people’s interests as
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parents look after their children*s interests, and 
to whom we give a free hard and in whom we place 
an unbounded confidence. (Lin Yutang, 1935,
p. 206)
From the perspective of the individual, the isolated 
person without family ties found it difficult to function in 
traditional China. The family system was not a structure, 
but the social structure to the Chinese; the individual and
social process were cnly different aspects of this one
structure.
FUNCTIONING TOWASD OTHEBS 
Assuming human function fellows from experience, the 
present discussion is a continuation of what has preceeded, 
only here the emphasis is on function.
Belationships at the Center of Social Function
Chinese civilization has maintained an extraordinary 
integrity over some 4000 years. This must be placed in the
perspective of other civilizations. While their
contemporaries in Greece soon lest their integral 
civilization to blend into the greater container of Western 
Civilization, the civilization of China retained its unity 
and identity even into the present century. This is a 
remarkable record, for in no ether place on earth has as 
large a portion of humankind lived for such a long period of 
time, over such a large land area, as have the Chinese.
This is perhaps the best testament tc the functional effects 
of an assumed context of unity.
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It is not difficult to understand why many observers 
have labeled traditional Chinese society as the most 
successful social system ever constructed,. The scholar 
latourette (1964) comments: "Nowhere else has any group of 
mankind succeeded so long a time as have the Chinese in 
holding together under a single rule so large a section of 
the earth." (p. 18)
f§£i2I§ £I2ffl2iiS3 lopgevity. Several factors are paramount
in accounting for this stunning record of success. The
first is the experience of the unity of human beings at the
heart of the definition cf civilization for the Chinese.
Contrary to the definitions of the West, civilization was
defined as the unity of all humankind. While the Westerner
associates civilization with liberty and individual human
rights, the traditional Chinese have endorsed the reverse
conception where civilization was associated not with
individual autonomy but with the human being's
responsibilities to others.
Abegg (1952) writes of these differing perceptions of
"civilization":
The East Asian has an instinctive aversion as much 
to the idea of political liberty, as to 
individualism. He does not regard it as an ideal.
By liberty he understands mostly something 
licentious, uncontrolled and uncivilized. He 
associates this idea first and foremost with the 
wild animals of the jungle, or with primitive and 
barbaric tribes of nomads or hunters. Liberty is 
for him a kind of barbaric and primordial 
condition associated with the earliest ages of 
man. He considers civilization and culture to 
begin at the moment when men band together in a 
community and establish a communal, legal, and 
moral code. Thus, the instincts of the East Asian
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and the way he interprets things are directly 
opposed to ours; for it is generally speaking our 
wont to characterize lack cf liberty and 
collectivism as barbaric and primative, as a 
reversion to a condition ve have long outgrown.
The East Asians relegate freedom to the jungles, 
and we, collectivism. (p. 213)
The functional result of this experience of civilization was
that the traditional Chinese endeavored to produce a
civilization based on the unity of human beings within one
social system.
This tendency toward integration can be found in the
earliest records cf Chinese social history. Latourette
(1964) recalls that frcm 1766-1122 B.C., "the Chinese
fostered the idea that all men must be unified under a
whole, one unitary government." (p. 32) In the West,
government was taken almost by assumption to be the result
of the balance of competing interest groups and their
interaction. By Shang times, the central features of
Chinese civilization, together with the central notion that
all China should be under one government, emerged. This
vision of civilization was to continue over the centuries,
quite unchallenged, until the impact of the West in modern
times. Through these centuries, the basis for the function
of Chinese society was the conviction that "All truly
civilized mankind— as the Chinese understood
civilization— must be under one ruler." (latourette, 1964,
p. 33)
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Another factor was the very structure of the society 
itself. The basis for the society rested not so much on the 
external government as cn the grassroots support of the 
people themselves. This produced a great strength, for the 
unity of the society was not identified with any one 
governmental structure, but rested on Chinese civilization 
itself. Thus, as governments and dynasties rose and fell, 
the integrity cf Chinese civilization maintained itself.
Even the conguest of barbarians did not challenge this 
unity, for as time passed the barbarians themselves became 
Chinese, assimilating Chinese ccstoms.
Traditional Chinese government, at least to Western 
eyes, presents an enigma. On the one hand, the Chinese have 
steadfastly maintained a central government with a defined 
hierarchy of positions, while cn the other hand, 
paradoxically, this condition cf centrality did not lead to 
rigidity cf norms or totalitarian control of every aspect of 
society. To unravel this paradox, I will examine how this 
alternative mode of social order was integrated into the 
governmental structure.
S2ZSEBl$Bi- Traditional Chinese government was a 
centralized government, converging from every point in the 
empire to the point of the emperor. However, while the 
power of the emperor was widely recognized and upheld 
throughout the empire, the structure of the social system 
and its order from the grassroots demanded almost complete 
autonomy at the village level. Thus, as Fairbank (1968)
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remarks, the role of the empercr or Son of Heaven
. . .  could be maintained over so broad and 
diverse a terrain and so vast a population 
precisely because it was sc superficial. The 
emperor remained supreme as a symbol of unity 
because his officials did not attempt to rule 
directly in the villages, (p. 8)
It was the nature of the social ordering principle that 
the central government and the empercr relied on the 
automatic functioning cf society. In this context, the 
emperor*s immediate concern was merely tc serve as a model 
for this order by ordering his own behavior in the manner of
self-cultivaticn. The society did net have to be "ruled” in
the active sense cf this word; to promote order, the
Chinese emperor had only to adhere tc certain set rituals
and perform certain ceremonies at certain times during the 
year.
From this personal focus cf order in his microcosm as 
it surrounded him, the macrocosm of his empire would be 
given, almost automa£ica^Jy, a corresponding crder. Needham 
(1964) reminds us that "the ancient definition of the Ideal 
Buler was that he should sit simply facing the South and 
exerting his virtue (Te) in all directions so that the ten 
thousand things would automatically be well governed."
(p. 144) we find in the role cf the emperor quite a 
contradiction in terms by Western standards— a figure who 
was openly and unquestionably revered as a symbol of unity 
and who, at the same time, cared to exert little actual 
power which, one wculd think, should develop from such an 
exalted position.
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There was generated then the Chinese proclivity toward
non-intervention of the central government in village
affairs and the equally dominant tendency to use force only
as a last resort. The classical distinction between wei and
M  w<r4- is quite illustrative of this:
The central authority relied a great deal upon the 
•automatic* functioning of the village 
communities, and in general tended to reduce to a 
minimum its intervention in their 
life . . . .  This difference is expressed 
epigrammatically in the Chinese terms wej. and wu 
M i  meant the application of force, of 
will-power, the determination that things, 
animals, or even other men should do what they 
were ordered to do; but vjj wqi was the opposite 
of this, leaving things alone, letting Nature take 
her course, profiting by going vith the grain of
things instead cf going against it, and knowing
how not to interfere. (Needham, 1964, p. 142)
Thus, the wq wei action cf human beings toward Nature
favored by the Taoists becomes reflected in the wu w^j
function of human beings in the ideal Confucian society.
As will be recalled, I left hanging the issue of the
different effects of gunpowder in East and West. The reason
gunpowder failed to radically alter Chinese society as it
had that cf Feudal Europe lies in the alternative nature of
government and the power relations in the two social
systems.
Given the wu wei pattern fcr the power structure of 
Chinese society, the emphasis was on one central government 
with little desire in this central government to exert force 
to govern its people. Consequently, fortresses and 
independent principalities were net common. In this 
political context, the introduction of a powerful weapon
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like the cannon would not have great moment. As Qreuer 
(1970) asks, in such a power relationship, against whom 
should the weapcns of destruction be employed within the 
country? There was only one nominal, unguestioned center of 
power— the Son of Heaven— and his power existed with or 
without cannons.
Feudal Europe, by contrast, did not have a central 
authority with many petty princes, each coveting small 
pockets of humanity from the security of fortified castles. 
In this situation power and force ruled. With the 
introduction of gunpowder and cannon, fortified places could 
now be breached and power centralized. This produced major 
social changes for the West.
Scholar-officials. In practice, China was governed by a
bureaucratic structure managed by a class of 
scholar-cfficials. The word "scholar" is here used because 
the major source of appointment and promotion within the 
system was scholarship in the Confucian classics. We should 
pause at this point to note the immense importance of 
education in Chinese society. In a very democratic fashion, 
education was a important source of social mobility for 
families. The fortunes of families rose and fell in 
relation to the success of their members in the state 
examinations.
The Chinese very early in their social development 
(traces can be found from 165 B.C) instituted a civil 
service examination system. This examination system was
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theoretically open to all. There are stories of many a 
peasant's son who, through diligent study and excellent 
grades, obtained an important cffical position. As in any 
system, the son of a rich man or a man of the official class 
had a better opportunity to pass the examinations, for his 
family could well afford th9 services of a tutor.
The examinations were based primarily on the almost 
complete memorization of the Confucian classics. In his 
study, the perspective scholar-official became totally 
immersed, mind and body, in the Confucian vision of human 
relations and the unity cf all humankind within a Great 
Harmony. Yang (1959) writes of the content of these 
Classics:
The Confucian classics are oriented toward the 
achievement of T^ai-p^ing (Great Peace) through 
knowledge of the general social order based on a 
harmonious system cf human relations and moral 
norms.. . .. The Great Peace will obtain when 
things and people are structured into the smoothly 
operating order of these principles and norms, 
ideally with all frictions and obstructions 
eliminated. (p. 138)
Thus, as the scholar-official was graduated to his post and
assumed his position in the hierarchy, he tended to function
in accordance with this Confucian ideal of the unity of
humankind.
This system of examination and education had two 
profound effects on the governmental bureaucracy,. First, it 
fostered a certain unity and uniformity throughout the 
governmental system to the far flung ends of the empire.
All the scholar-officials would have essentially the same
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knowledge and be functioning from the sane framework. 
Throughout the empire there was a unity of purpose and 
action. Every educated human being read the same language 
and interpreted the world from the same set of Confucian 
co-ordinates.
Secondly, a knowledge of human relationships and the
Confucian view of the unity of human beings within a
cooperative world became the basis for the entire
governmental system. Every scholar-official was pulling in
the same direction toward the same vision of society.
Contrary to most bureaucratic systems where the
specialist becomes highly valued, appointments and
advancement in the Chinese bureaucratic order went most
often to the generalist with a knowledge of Confucian ideals
about human relationships. The person who had knowledge of
the Confucian classics and could apply these principles to
the relations between people became most highly valued.
Qalazs (1964) writes of the requirements for success in
the Chinese buraucratic order:
They [the schclar-cfficials] did not require any 
detailed, specialized knowledge, what they did 
require was worldly wisdom and savoir-faiye. and a 
certain amount of rudimentary knowledge about 
technical matters together with the fine art of 
being able tc manage people; or, it might be 
better to say, these duties called on aptitude 
acquired through experience for planning and 
directing public works and being in command of the 
technicians, experts and specialists. The social 
system did not permit its elite to narrow their 
personalities by specialization. To know the 
classics by heart and have a smattering of music, 
to master the rules cf polite behavior and acquire 
a polished literary style, to be something of a 
calligrapher and an occasional writer of 
verse— these were the kinds of accomplishments
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considered likely tc contribute more to the 
exercise of social and political functions than 
would training in seme profession or study of the 
exact sciences . . . .  (p. 9)
As a conseguence, there arose the belief that a
knowledge of the Confucian classics and an ability to apply
this knowledge to concrete relations between human beings
qualified a person for ajiy position within the society.
Yang (1959) guotes Lu K'un who is reported to have said:
’With a deep acquaintance with the principles of 
human relations and worldly affairs, one can take 
up any official position, however high; with 
adaptation to the principles of nature and the 
inclinations cf men, one can accomplish any 
task.’ (p. 139)
To be accomplished in the art of helping people live in 
harmony immediately qualified one for any duty. In his 
books, Lin Yutang never tires of quoting Confucius: "'Truth
may not depart from human nature; if what is regarded as 
truth departs from human nature, it may not be regarded as 
truth.'" (Lin Yutang, 1935, p. vi) It fellows that the 
person who is the most skilled in the art of living 
possesses the highest truth and must be highly valued by 
society.
Law. Turning to the practical problems of producing order 
in the social system, while the West has relied increasingly 
on the law for the basis for this order, to the Chinese, law 
was considered to be rather unimportant. The major 
importance of the law was its punitive action, in an attempt 
to restore the harmony cf the social order with that of the 
natural order lest this disruption of the social microcosm
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have cosmic conseguences.
Law had a very degraded pcsiticn as contrasted with the 
position it has had in almost any other civilization. To 
set the tone for this discussion, I mention two comments 
which illustrate this point. Lin Yutang (1940), for 
example, writes in his usual flippant style that in China 
all guarrels and disputes are settled at dinner tables 
instead of at the court of justice. In the same vein, a 
Chinese proverb reads: win your lawsuit and lose your
money.
The Chinese perception of the law was extremely
negative in comparison to the honored position it is given
in most societies. Bodde and Morris (1967) write:
"What is really arresting, however, especially 
when we remember the honored status of law in 
other civilizations, is the overt hostility with 
which its appearance is initially greeted in 
China—^seemingly net cnly as a violation of human 
morality, but perhaps even of the total cosmic 
order." (p. 13)
This degraded position of the law, it wculd seem, has its
roots in the unigue structure of Chinese society: in the
nature of the social ordering principle placing an emphasis
on individual morality and on the interface of the social
and natural orders within the microccsmic and macrocosmic
dimension.
Within this conception, people’s virtuous behavior was 
the source of the order, not the abstraction of the law. As 
a consequence, an appeal to law to settle a dispute was used 
only in the last resort, when all else had failed. As
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Meskill (1973) writes: "an appeal to law often had the
connotation cf a failure in virtue. The resort to law meant 
not so much a confirmation of rights as a way of reaching a 
decision when more civilized means had failed." (p. 86)
Law was conceived as having a dubious and dispensible 
role in providing for order in the society. On this point 
the two great sages of China are in complete agreement. 
Confucius says:
Guide the people with government measures and 
control or regulate them by the threat of 
punishment, and the people will try to keep out of 
jail but will have no sense of honor or shame.
Guide the people by virtue and control and 
regulate them by respect, and the people will have 
a sense of honor and respect. (Minick, 197 4,
P. 94)
In a more laconic manner characteristic cf Taoism, Lao Tze 
says essentially the same thing: "the greater the number of 
laws and enactments, the more thieves and robbers there will 
be." (p. 94)
Both of these statements assert the superiority in the 
Chinese mind of virtue ever the law. The argument is that 
if each individual’s behavior in relation to other human 
beings is virtuous, there will be no need for laws and a 
legal system; society would become automatically ordered. 
Thus, Confucius says: " ’In hearing litigations I am like 
anyone else, but what is necessary is to cause the people to 
have no litigations!*" (Legge, 1970, p. 364) In the Chinese 
mind, to become involved in litigation was an humiliating 
affair to be avoided at all costs.
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£§S §§ PPflitiye. Another source of the devalued position 
of the law in China relates to the perceived interface 
between the social order and the natural order along the 
microcosm-macrocosm dimension. As noted above, disruptions 
in the social order were experienced as being disruptions in 
the natural order* This interrelation leads to what Bodde 
and Morris (1967) call a naturalization of the law. Within 
this conception, the law was net to function only in the 
social sphere, but was to be instrumental in redressing 
relationships in the whole of the social-natural world.
In the Chinese legal framework, the law was less--if at 
all— the protector of human rights than the administrator of 
punishments. This is evidenced in the overriding penal 
nature of the law, with minimal concern being given to civil 
matters.
The law was only secondarily interested in 
defending the rights— especially the economic 
rights— of one individual or group against another 
individual or group and not at all in defending 
such rights against the state. What really 
concerned the law— though this is to be surmised 
rather than explicitly read in Chinese legal 
literature— were all acts cf moral or ritual 
impropriety or of criminal violence which seemed 
in Chinese eyes to be violations or disruptions of 
the total social order. The existence of the 
norms of propriety was intended to deter the 
commission of such acts, but once they occurred, 
the restoration of social harmony required that 
punishment be inflicted to each retribution from 
their doer. In the final analysis, a disturbance 
of the social order really meant, in Chinese 
thinking, a violation of the total cosmic order 
because, according to the Chinese world-view, the 
spheres of man and nature were inextricably 
interwoven to form an unbroken continuum. (Bodde 
and Morris, 1967, p. 4)
In this context, law always had the connotation of
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punishment. There was the tendency to refer in their legal 
system to penal laws as punishments fh^j.pg) instead of as 
statutes (f§ or 2u). (Bodde and Horris, 1967)
Thus, there was yet another reason for people to avoid 
litigation at all costs fcx fear of punishment. The courts 
were almost bound to administer some punishment, even if it 
be a token one, for any crime brought before it. Holcombe 
(1895) relates that an ancient rule cf procedure in Chinese 
courts was to have boph litigants flcgged before the case 
was to be heard. The purpose cf this procedure was "to warn 
them not to rush lightly into litigation." (p. 213)
Acquittals of a defendant were extremely rare. The 
legal framework demanded that if social order had been 
disrupted, a punishment must be administered to return the 
system to a state of balance. It was thought that no matter 
how occasioned the defendant's crime demanded punishment.
As a case in point, Bodde and flcrris (1967) relate that once 
a
. . . .  district magistrate, riding in his sedan 
chair at dawn through a driving rain to 
participate in the sacrifices at the Confucian 
temple, was borne before he knew it beyond the 
outer enclosure where, according to ritual, he 
should have dismounted. The Board's conclusion is 
that 'his failure to dismount from the chair in 
time, though occasioned by the great accumulation 
of rain water on tie ground and the error of the 
chair bearers, nevertheless constitutes a 
violation of the established regulations,. * It 
accordingly sentences him to 100 blows of the 
heavy bamboo and dismissal from his position.
(P- 181)
Behind this rather harsh decree of the Board is the 
naturalization of the law and the need to restore harmony to
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the natural order:
. . .  a criminal act is not merely a violation of 
the human order, but also j.gso facto of the total 
cosmic order of which the human order forms a 
part. In order to restore the original state of 
cosmic balance, therefore, a punishment precisely 
corresponding to the original violation must be 
exacted in return. (p. 182)
The function of the legal system in China transcended 
the mere administration of justice in some abstract manner; 
it was most concerned with the delicate task of 
administering punishment to the guilty in the degree to 
which their crime had upset the balance of the natural 
world. The task was a difficult one because the balance 
must be just restored, and in no circumstances should 
punishments be toe harsh, for this tco would endanger the 
balance.
Bodde and Morris (1967) write:
. . .  crimes produce disccrd; once a crime is 
committed, harmony is restored by suitable 
punishment. An inept punishment is as bad as, or 
worse than none; it will net restore natural 
harmony; on the contrary, it will disrupt order 
still further. (p. 497)
It was common practice to pronounce sentences and execute
punishments even aft^y the individual offender had died. If
this ultimate administration of the law were not effected,
the continued presence cf the case on the books would
otherwise make impossible the task cf repairing the
imbalance in cosmic harmcny originally caused by the
offense. (Bodde and Morris, 1967)
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E£2££i§i2 22§£ lay. If abstract law was not to be the
basis for social order, the concrete actions of individuals
were to be. Social order was to arise from individual
function and not be imposed from without. To make this
point clear, it is helpful to distinguish between the
Confucian position and that of a competing school, the
Legalists, and, in this context, to distinguish between the
social order of the Confucians based on li and the social
order of the Legalists based on fg.
As a school the Legalists, or School of Law (Jg ghia).
was less theoretical than the Confucians. The Legalists in
general were practical men who had as their purpose the
construction of a strong empire with a central authority
which actively administezed through a system of laws which
were fixed and known beforehand. Thus, everyone's behavior
could be evaluated against a fixed standard.
Quite in contradiction to the general trend of Chinese
society, the Legalists had great faith in the laws to
provide for a stable social order. Bodde and Morris (1967)
give this example of the Legalist position:
'For governing the people there is no permanent 
principle save that it is the law (fg) and nothing 
else that determines government . . .. He who 
rules makes use of the many while disregarding the 
few, and hence he ccncerns himself not with virtue 
but with law (fg) . . . .  In governing a state, 
t e regulating of clear laws (fg) and 
establishment of severe punishments (hgggg) are 
done in order to save the masses of the living 
from disorder . . ..' (pp. 25-26)
It is clear that the Legalist advocacy of the law (Jg) runs
directly counter to the Confucian and dominant Chinese view
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that the function of society and its social order cannot
rest on the law, tut on personal action and virtue.
In contrast to the Legalist glorification of the law,
the Confucians put their faith in ^i. The term ij., like
many central concepts in Chinese knowledge, has some
ambiguity associated with it, given Western criteria for
definition. The term originally referred to the cutting of
jade along its natural cleavage. The term is most often
translated into the English by the word ’propriety.* In the
Confucian world, it referred to the virtuous behavior of the
individual— the fcllcwing with meticulous care the
prescribed rituals and rites, it the center of the 2i and
its meaning was the Confucian concept of human
relationships. In the most general sense, 1^ was "a
designation for all the institutions and relationships, both
political and social, which make fcr harmonious living in a
Confucian society." (Bodde and Morris, 1967, p. 19)
Mu (1962) believes that it is significant that the term
li has been translated many different ways in European
literature as "ritual," "decorum," "courtesy" and
"propriety." This indicates a significant difference
between the two systems. He writes:
When we give different names to ideas like 
'propriety,* 'morality* and 'manners,' which are 
connected with and partly similar to each other, 
we emphasize their differentia at the expense of 
their common nature. To the western mind, these 
ideas carry different ethical values so that being 
immoral, for instance, is considered worse than 
having had manners. To the Chinese, however, the 
undifferentiated term by constantly making 
people think cf what is common among manners, 
morality, decorum and so on, gives all socially
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approved actions in China a single motivation and 
ethical support and makes all «proper1 behaviour, 
from good manners to charity, equally important.
(p. 51)
Li was closely tied to and reinforced by the key
Confucian human relationships:
The five major relationships of Confuc­
ianism— those of the father and son, ruler and 
subject, husband and wife, elder and younger 
brother, friend and friend— are instinctive to man 
and essential for a stable social crder. The i± 
reinforce these and similar relationships by 
prescribing modes cf behavior differing according 
to status, whereas law obliterates the 
relationships by imposing a forced uniformity.
(Bodde and Horris, 1967, p. 21)
Since tfce Legalists wanted to administer an abstract
law to order the entire society and the Confucians preferred
the order of the li, a conflict between the two approaches
was inevitable. The basis cf the Confucian criticism of the
fa of the Legalists, as Needham (1956) nctes, is that
. . .  since correct behavior in accordance with 
j-i always depended on the circumstances, such as 
the status of the acting parties in social 
relationships, to publish laws beforehand which 
could take insufficient account of the complexity 
of concrete circumstances, was an absurdity.
(P- 545)
In short, it seemed ludicrous tc the Confucians to attempt 
to evaluate the virtue cf a particular action before the 
action had occurred.
As an historical fact, the Legalist position did gain 
power in the third century B.C. However, the triumph of the 
Legalists was short lived, perhaps due to the harshness 
dictated by their own system. Huch cf the structure of the 
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THE TENDENCY AND HISTORICAL SHIFT TOWARD INTERNAL CONTROL 
IN THE MAJOR SCHOOLS OF CHINESE THOUGHT 
(AFTER CHIANG, 1971)
of Legalist domination. Following their decline in power, 
the Confucian vision was again the guiding force for Chinese 
society. There followed a process which scholars have 
labeled the "Confucianization cf the Law." Within this 
process, the Confucian ideal of the 2J. slowly began to 
moderate and subsume the positive law (J§) of the Legalists.
This historical example tends again to stress the 
general tendency in Chinese thought to view the source of 
social order as resting with the individual and individual 
function rather than with some independent process external 
to the individual and imposed from without. Of the many 
positions taken by the numerous schools and social thinkers 
of China, this general trend remained dominant.
These historical relations are presented 
■diagrammatically by Chiang <1971) in Figure 10. The median 
line at stage I (before the second century B.C.), lies with 
Confucius and favors "internal control." With the 
disappearance of the Mohist and Legalist schools in the 
second century, the median line shifts even more toward the 
left. It is clear that even given the great diversity of 
different schools of social thought in China, the overriding 
tendency in Chinese social thought has been toward a 
reliance on the self-directed behavior as a source of order.
The ii was a representation of this personal ordering 
principle as it permeated all human action and resulted in 
an ordered social system. This system of the 2i was thought 
to be able to go beyond the shortcomings of a legal system
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of order. Mu (1962) summarizes:
. . .  what the Chinese called 24 manners,
custom, ritual, mcral code all mixed together. It 
has a cqmmqfl4cative function in that it provides a 
means by which people can understand but not 
embarrass each other; an arti^-frjc function in 
that it satisfies and regulates man's desires by 
giving his emotions articulate expression; and a 
social function, in that, based on experience, it 
defines the acceptable and safe limits of conduct 
and thereby ensures peaceful relations. It is 
only in the abstract, however, that the 
distinction can be made between these functions.
For example, losing temper is giving up lucid 
expression, calling forth wild and violent feeling 
and making oneself disagreeable to others, all at 
once. The law as such may not carry any ethical 
sanction and clever offenders will break it in 
spirit but not in letter; moral philosophies may 
be interesting as academic theories, but carry no 
moral compulsion; but the Chinese 22, being a 
habit to which each individual is trained, 
benefits even those ignorant of law and incapable 
of philosophies. To conform to 24 in its manifold 
aspects is a uniform duty cf every member of the 
society because no matter whether a man is acting 
with good manners or participating in established 
ceremony he is maintaining an order through which 
the Chinese society stands. (pp. 59-60)
In this way the li became the mainstay of the social
structure providing a bread and resilient base upon which
the Chinese culture could be anchored. So universal and
simple was the 24 that the concept cculd appeal to all
sections of the empire, to people of great learning as well
as to the illiterate peasant.
Human Function in the Context cf Relationships
From the perspective of the individual, it would be 
anticipated that the individual's function will be modulated 
by the structure cf human relationships in which he is 
embedded. It is helpful to keep in mind that the
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relationships vers themselves graduated, centering around 
the relation of the father to the son. Following this 
graduated nature of relationships, it would be expected that 
the human being's responsibilities and function would be 
correspondingly graduated and correlated with the ordering 
relationships.
Belation^hjp? and behavior. In the following discussion, I 
will concentrate on relatively extreme conditions of human 
conduct, i.e., life and death conditions. The false 
impression should not be given that these extreme examples 
of the modulation of human function hy relationships are in 
any way abnormal. I have simply focused upon these cases 
because the society has taken particular care to make the 
relationships as explicit as possible. However, in more 
mundane aspects of human function, the same principle of 
modulation holds.
Beverence within the context of human relationships was 
viewed as the basis for human function, the source of all 
the harmony in the world. Thus, we read in the Classic of 
IkliZl lASiZ:
The Buies of Propriety are simply (the development 
of) the principle cf Beverence. Therefore, the 
reverence paid to a father makes (all) sons 
pleased,. The reverence paid to an elder brother 
makes (all) younger brothers pleased; the 
reverence paid to a ruler makes (all) subjects 
pleased. The reverence paid to one man makes 
thousands and myriads of men pleased. The 
reverence is paid to few and the pleasure extends 
to the many; that is what is meant by an 
'All-embracing Buie of conduct.' (Legge, 1879, 
p. U82)
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The meaning here is guite clear; if human beings use 
reverence as a rule of conduct in their relationships with 
others, the result will be harmony and pleasure throughout 
the entire society- In the Confucian system the behavior of 
the individual was always thought to go beyond the immediate 
effects of the personal world tc become the ordering 
principle for the entire system.
Beyond mere reverence and respect in relationships, the 
manner of human function was carefully and precisely 
modulated by the degree of relationship, as a preliminary 
example, I will examine the institution of revenge as it was 
practiced in traditional China, as Chu (1965) notes, the 
obligation to revenge was formulated in terms of the five 
relationships. Further, since the relationships were 
themselves ordered, the obligation tc revenge was modulated 
in respect.to the degree of relationship, chu writes: "The
five human relationships are not equated in Chinese thought
and thus the obligation to revenge varied according to the 
relationship between the victim and the avenger." (p. 79) To 
illustrate this modulation of revenge we find the following 
passage in the Li £i translated by Legge (1926):
Sze-hsia asked Confucius, saying, 'How should 
(a son) conduct himself with reference to the man
who has killed his father cr mother?*
The Master said, 'He should sleep on straw, 
with his shield for a pillow; he should not take
office; he must be determined not to live with
the slayer under the same heaven. If he meet with 
him in the market-place oi the court, he should 
not have to go back for his weapon, but 
(instantly) fight with him.'
'Allow me to ask,' said (the other), 'how one
should dc with reference tc the man who has slain 
his brother?'
Figure 11
The Self as Embedded in a network of Belationships to 
Others which Modulates the Self's Mourning 








•He may take office,' was the reply, 'but not 
in the same state with the slayer; if he be sent 
on a mission by his ruler's orders, though he may 
then meet with the man, he should not fight with 
him.'
'And how should one do,' continued Sze-hsia,
'in the case of a man whc has slain one of his 
paternal cousins?*
Confucius said, 'He should not take the lead 
(in the avenging). If he whom it chiefly concerns 
is able tc do that, he shculd support him from 
behind, with his weapon in his hand.' (p. 140)
In this case, a human being's function in revenge is
modulated by the avenger's relationship to the victim. The
filial relationship of the son to the parent was regarded as
the paramount relationship, and consequently, the death of a
parent through foul play required the highest obligation for
revenge. Confucius makes it quite clear that the son should
not live "under the same heaven" with the slayer meaning
that the son is not to live in the same world with the
slayer of a parent. As one moves down from this paramount
obligation to the lesser relationships, the avenger's
required function is equally lessened.
Hhile the example of the modulation of human function
within revenge illustrates the principle clearly, it fails
to do full justice to the complexity and precision with
which the prescriptions for action were given within
Confucianism. To make this aspect more available, I will
now consider the area cf responsibilities to the dead
through mourning behavior.
Figure 11 represents, diagrammatically, the web of
relationships which surround the individual and how these
relationships modulate the mourning behavior of the
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individual in respect tc the deceased. There were five 
degrees of mourning differing in the duration of time in 
which mourning rites were to be maintained. These degrees 
of mourning were correlated with the self's relationship to 
the deceased. Because cf this correlation, the closeness of 
relationship becomes defined according to the individual's 
place in the mourning system and visa versa (Chu, 1965).
Note for example that the mourning behavior demanded of
a son for his father is cf the first degree reguiring a
duration of three years, while the degree of mourning for an
uncle and his wife is crly the second degree reguiring a
duration of mourning for one year. A careful examination of 
this diagram is particularly rewarding for it not only gives 
substance to the noticn I expressed above that the human 
being or individual self is embedded in a matrix of human 
relationships, but it also illustrates the integration of 
the self with other human beings in both time and space.
Note that the "great-great-grand father" occupies a place in 
the matrix of human relationships and modulates the mourning 
behavior of the self guite as much as contemporaneous 
relationships do.
I cannot leave Figure 11 without noting the complexity 
and precision with which these relationships are presented. 
For example, note the remote relationships included— "the 
Wife of 1st cousin twice removed" or "the Great 
grand-nephew's wife." Such examples tend to underline the 
preoccupation with human relationships in the Chinese mind.
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Even in the most elaborate kinship system in the West, one 
seldom finds such an intricate and complex structure of 
relationships.
Another interesting observation is the change of an 
individual’s mourning behavior when the relationship of 
others change. For example, the duration of mourning for an 
unmarried sister is of the second degree reguiring one year 
while for the same person when married it is of the third 
degree requiring only nine months. Thus, the same person’s 
position in the system changes with respect to that person’s 
relationships with others.
As I examine the structure of relationships in Figure 
11, I am impressed by the holistic, field-like character of 
human experience and function. The impression that I get is 
that of a fish swimming in a sea of human beings with the 
fish modulating its direction and speed by the contours of 
the currents in the body of water. The central current, the 
central relationship, is that of filial piety.
Fjli^j £1S±2* Since the filial relation was seen as being 
the "root of all virtue," it net only modulated the son’s 
behavior directly, but also modulated in great degree all of 
the human relationships in the society. So in the 
examination of the responsibilities of the son to the father 
in terms of reguired behavior, we are really examining the 
full spectrum of human function. The Classic of fili^j 
ElSiy states: "fie who loves his parents will not dare (to 
incur the risk of) being hated by any man, and he who
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reveres his parents will net dare (to incur the risk of) 
being contemned by any man." (Legge, 1879, p. 437)
It is difficult for the Westerner tc appreciate the 
imperative that the filial relation holds for the Chinese 
mind- To attempt to illustrate this, I will relate a story 
from contemporary China found fcy Hsu (1970) in a North China 
newspaper. It tells of Chang and his wife who left their 
home to work in the coal fields of Manchuria.
Chang*s wife died while there and was entombed.
Finding that he must leave, Chang unearthed his wife*s 
corpse and ventured with his small children toward their 
home. Unable to afford transportation, he walked with his 
human cargo several hundred miles. During their journey, a 
thief, thinking the bundle valuable, stole it.
Through various means, Chang was able to recover the 
body from the authorities who subsequently reguired that he 
bury the corpse locally. Whereupon Chang replied: "*burial 
here will never do. Even if I agree, my sons will object.
I carried her over a thousand miles. I used the bundle as a 
pillow every night, but I am still net sick!*" (pp. 1-2)
Chang was allowed to return to his heme and bury his wife.
After reading this story, the Western reader is no 
doubt puzzled as tc why Chang felt such a deep conviction to 
act as he did. We can certainly understand the love of the 
husband for the wife, but the Westerner finds it difficult 
to understand the extremity of Chang*s behavior simply from 
the context of this single motivation.
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At the heart of his behavior was the filial relation# 
as Hsu (1970) comments:
. . . to be buried with body intact in the 
village of one's birth is# to the Chinese, part of 
the complete life, and it is a son's obligation to 
carry this out. Because the miner's [Chang's] 
children were too ycung tc bury their mother# the 
father acted for then, regardless of whatever 
hardship this entailed. (p. 2)
In both life and death, the filial relation must be adhered
to. The relation becomes the ultimate container for all
living human beings. Again, frcm the Classic of Filial
Piety: "'The services cf love and reverence to parents when
alive, and those of grief and sorrow to them when
dead— these completely discharge the fundamental duty of
living men." (legge, 1879, p. 488)
As another example, consider the situation posed by
Buck (1970). The scene is a simple one: a family of father,
mother and. son are strolling by a lake when far out upon the
water a man is seen going down for the last time. The son
leaps into the water and attempts to save the drowning man
and the son is himself drowned in the attempt. Mow,
evaluating this train of events from the Chinese and Western
contexts leads to a different feeling about the action of
the son:
An American son would leap into the water to save 
a stranger, without thcught, probably, of his 
parents. Indeed, his parents would be proud of 
him, and would consider him a hero. If he lost 
his life, it would be a melancholy comfort to them 
that he lost it in saving someone else. Thus, his 
action might even bring honor tc his parents. Not 
so a Chinese son. A filial Chinese son would 
remember his parents and would reason that his 
body belonged to his parents, not to a stranger, 
and that he therefore had no right to leap into
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the water at all. If he did sc forget himself as 
to think of the stranger as a human being and put 
out his hand to save him and thereby lose his own 
life, he would bring actual shame tc his parents.
He should have had more control— he should have 
thought of them first, of their dependence upon 
him emoticnally, cf his duty to them all his life 
long. He may not risk his life so heedlessly.
(Buck, 1970, pp. 61-62)
Two points present themselves from this example.
First, filial piety, for the Chinese, is a perennial 
modulator for human action thrcugh every second of life. 
There are no times when this principle may be forgotten. 
Secondly, filial piety is an indispensable standard for the 
evaluation of a person's behavior. The actions of the son 
cannot be evaluated apart from the human relationships in 
which he is embedded.
Before leaving the consideration of the modulation of 
human behavior through the relation of filial piety, I 
should attempt to relate the full spectrum of this 
modulation from the small and seemingly unimportant to the 
area of extreme sacrifices that are obligated. At one end 
of the spectrum, we find the following passage from the
When his father or mother is ill, (a young man) 
who has been capped shculd not use his comb, nor 
walk with his elbows stuck out, nor speak on idle 
topics, ncr take his lute cr cithern in hand,. He 
should not eat of (different) meats till his taste 
is changed, ncr drink till his looks are changed.
He should not laugh so as to show his teeth, nor 
be angry till he breaks fcrth in reviling. When 
the illness is gene; he may resume his former 
habits. (Legge, 1926, p. 83)
Here, we find the filial relation modulating the commonplace
aspects of one's life in rather absurd detail.
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However, the sane relation required, at the other
extreme, that very severe measures be taken. Hsu (1970)
remarks that it was quite common for the filial relation to
require that a sen slice part cf his flesh for use in a
medicine to be given to an ill parent. The filial relation
sometimes required even more harsh behavior as this
oft-quoted story relates:
A poor man by the name of Kuo and his wife were 
confronted with a sericus problem. His aged 
mother was sick in bed. She needed both medicine 
and nourishment which Kuo could ill afford. After 
consultation between themselves, Kuo and his wife
decided that the only way out was to get rid of
their three-year-cld only son. For Kuo and his 
wife said to each other, 'We have only one mother, 
but we can always get another child.' (Hsu, 1970, 
p. 78)
Reminiscent of the biblical story of Abraham and his son
Isaac, just as the couple were to dig a hole to dispose of
the child, they discovered gold and the child was spared.
Relationships and the l^w. Given the context of our
examination of the modulation of human function in the
mourning rites and in tie case cf filial piety, it follows
that the evaluation of any human function cannot be made 
without placing this function within the context of human 
relationships from which it developed. The guiding 
principle for Confucian law was that any criminal action 
could be understood only with reference to the matrix of 
human relationships frcm which it arose.
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This emphasis becomes particularly apparent when we 
examine the Confucian position in contrast to the competing 
school of the Legalists. The Legalists, as was noted above, 
favored a uniform standard for the law tc be administered 
equally to all, irrespective cf the status or the 
relationships of those involved. In clear contrast, the 
application of the law fcr the Confucians was a particularly 
complex affair, taking into account the nature of the crime, 
the human relationships involved and the relative intimacy 
or degree of the relationships.
As a concrete example, let me examine the offense of 
beating. To evaluate this crime, it was important in 
Confucian law to establish who was beating whom and within 
what relationship in order to evaluate the behavior and 
administer a punishment. As Bcdde and Morris (1967) relate, 
if it is the son who beats his parent, the son is given the 
punishment of decapitation regardless of the circumstances. 
If, however, it is the parent who beats the son, no 
punishment is administered unless the son dies from the 
beating, in which case the parent is given 100 blows if it 
was justly provoked by the son's disobedience and a year of 
penal servitude if it was net.
This principle not only obtained for the key 
relationships such as the filial one, but also filtered down 
to the lesser relationships. Thus, Bodde and florris (1967) 
write of the crime of beating within the relation cf brother 
to brother:
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Thus if a ycunger brother beats an older brother* 
he receives two and one half years penal servitude 
plus ninety blows cf the heavy bamboo, even if no 
injury results. If, however, an older brother 
beats a younger one, he incurs no penalty at all.
(p. 38)
The same modulation of punishment by relationship extends 
even further tc include cousins and lesser relatives- 
It is particularly interesting in this context to 
examine the conflict between the two powerful institutions 
of the law and filial piety. In most respects, the result 
of this interface was the dominance cf the human 
relationship of filial piety over the law. Bodde and Morris 
(1967) remark that it was the duty of the son tc conceal a 
crime of the father; implied here is that a son who brings 
parental wrongdoing before the authorities is thereby 
unfilial and hence subject to heavy punishment.
In this regard, the traditional Chinese legal system 
was unusual for it was the only legal system which entailed 
a punishment for reporting a genuine crime to authorities! 
There is some evidence, as Chu (1965) indicates, that the 
authorities simply acted as punishing agents. He remarks 
that often the parent wculd simply have to report that the 
son was unfilial and, without the demanding of evidence, the 
son was punished according to the parent's wishes. In the 
case of filial piety, the legal system tended to only serve 
the human relationship involved.
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The Centrality cf Relationships in Function
In the context of traditional China, the examination at 
each focus propelled us inextricably toward a median point: 
the importance of human relaticnships as the determinant of 
function. As we examined the function of the social system, 
we were constantly drawn to the Confucian vision cf society 
based on a hierarchy of relaticnships among human beings.
The examination of the bureaucratic crder likewise 
demonstrated that positions were given on the basis of the 
person's knowledge and ability to deal with human 
relationships.
Assuming the opposite pole of the individual's 
function, we found an egual tendency toward the median of 
human relationships. He found that individual human 
function, particularly in the cases of the mourning rites 
and filial piety, was dependent on relationships with 
others. It seems that human function in traditional China 
cannot be found exclusively in either the social or 
individual mode.
The one institution that ccmes closest to the median 
and middle ground between social process and the individual 
is the family. The family was seen as the important 
container for human relationships with ethers, and, 
conseguently, the family was the basis for social and 
individual function. The function of the father in a family 
was seen as the proper function for the ruler of the 
society, in the case of the individual, the person without
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some family affiliation as a basis for function was an 
outcast and doomed tc an ineffective life.. Thus, the 
relationships of the human being within the context of the 




This chapter has examined the consequences of the 
assumed context of unity on the experience and function of 
human beings toward others. The Western framework directs 
us to make a distinction between individual process and 
social process. An attempt was made to undercut this 
dichotomy by examining both foci and illustrating how they 
converge to the same point— relationships within the family 
for the Chinese.
Developing from a context of the unity of human society 
and Nature, in order for this relationship to be maintained, 
there could be only one social system of civilized human 
beings. The social order was experienced as resting on 
individual human behavior. The individual human being was 
always experienced as being in relation to others. The 
individual process was submerged in a network of 
relationships which were graduated in importance from the 
cardinal relationship of filial piety.
Functionally, these factors resulted in an extremely 
durable social structure which prescribed in detail the 
behavior of the individual toward ethers. Much of the 
longevity of Chinese civilization can be attributed to the 
structure of the government which did not rule by force but 
by example, and to a bureaucratic system which trained well 
its scholar-officials in the Confucian vision of a 
harmonious society. The educational system and a civil 
service examination system insured that the scholar-official
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had a generalized knowledge to deal with human relationships 
within the Confucian model.
Abstract law was not valued as a basis for ordering 
human relationships. The dominant Confucian alternative was 
to encourage individual human behavior in accordance with ii 
or propriety. When the legal system was used, it tended to 
assume a punitive role and had the major purpose of 
restoring social order and redressing the imbalance of 
Nature produced by the crime.
Relationships with ethers actively modulated the 
individuals behavior, much of the time in great detail.
For example, revenge and mourning behavior were rigidly 
modulated in accordance with the degree of relation between 
the individual and the deceased. The central relationship 
of filial piety was the most important determinant of an 
individual's function. In the Chinese mind, this 
relationship was always to be considered in evaluating any 
action.
CHAPTER VII
CONSEQUENCES IN RELATION TO SELF
He now turn to yet an inner circle of an inner circle 
to examine the microcosm of the human being. I hesitate to 
use the term "self" to describe this inner circle. It is 
extremely easy to read into this term all of the Western 
assumptions about individuality and personality. As the 
last chapter has attempted to illustrate, the self in 
traditional China, even if we may use the word at all, was 
extremely diluted by Western standards. The self or the 
individual was always conceived as a node in the matrix of 
human relationships, as being in relation to other human 
beings within the context of the family. In this way, one 
could guestion if the self as it is known in the West was 
ever an appropriate category within their knowledge.
In purely descriptive terms, it may be impossible to 
define the self in traditional China as a point of focus. 
However, one could identify a focus for action which is 
directed toward the individual. For example, medicine has 
as its purpose the administering of therapy to an individual 
human body at some point in its use. Equally, exercise 
systems may be thought of as making prescriptions for 
certain actions for the individual person. In this way, 
even a system which does not place a high value on the
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individual ego and its conscious experience does focus on 
the self at least at this functional level.
EXPERIENCING SELF
In this section, I would like tc look at the 
experienced unity of the human being. The human being that 
is presented to the cbseiver in the West, is, many times, a 
fragmented human being, a composite cf divisions: cf body 
and mind, reason and emotion, and so forth. The Western 
context, which endorses such pre-existent divisions, places 
certain limits on the following discussion. All that can be 
suggested is how the Chinese experience of the human being 
is somehow the interrelaticn of these divisions forming a 
unity.
This manner of approach can only hope to approximate a 
system where the divisicns are not part of the assumed 
context. The unification of something divided seldom eguals 
the unity before the object is fragmented. In the following 
discussion, my approach will be to examine how the Chinese 
have experienced what we in the West have often assumed to 
be divided, knowing full well that such an approach does not 
do justice to a system where all was unified in its 
beginnings within the unity of the Tao.
The Human Body in Chinese Medicine
Any medical system begins with the human body and its 
structure as the basis for medical practice. In this both 
Western medicine and traditional Chinese medicine agree.
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After this point, the divergence begins as each system is 
elaborated, based on different conceptions of the structure 
of the human body. Western medicine, developing as it does 
from the context of divisibility, will tend to experience 
the human body as a composite of separate anatomical parts 
which are statically defined and, then, functionally 
related.
In contrast, developing frcm the context of unity, 
traditional Chinese medicine, with equal vigor, attempted to 
develop an experience of the human body as a whole with 
function being a product of relations within this whole. 
Contrary to the Nest, the major purpose for Chinese medicine 
was not to increasingly fractionate the human body, but the 
purpose was to identify functional relations within the 
body.
An alternative anatomy. The approach to Chinese 
medicine's anatomy of the human body is somewhat hampered by 
Western biases. There is the tendency in many books written 
on this subject to simply translate the relational terms 
used by Chinese medicine to describe the structure of the 
human body into Western terminology, reducing them to 
Western physiological correlates. In this manner, the 
experience of the unity of the body and relations within 
this whole become obscured.
Recognizing this tendency, Porkert (1974) indicates 
that instead of attempting to deal with the body in Western 
terms by relating Chinese concepts to the underlying Western
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substratum of organs* cne should approach the human body as 
the Chinese do from the perspective c£ a functional unity.
He suggests the concept cf "orb." Orbisiconography, as he 
uses the term, attempts to undercut the analytic tendencies 
of Western anatomy and to do justice to the inductive 
synthetic character of Chinese medicine which is concerned 
with functional manifestations cf different body regions.
Orbisiccncgraphy is antithetical to the Western 
approach to the human body which assumes a static structure 
of isolated organs which can be known separately and then 
interrelated in a functional way. The two conceptions may 
be contrasted in this way: traditicnal Chinese medicine sees 
functional wholes and relations within these wholes, while 
the Western experience of the body is that of discrete 
pictures of anatomical substrata. As Porkert (1974) 
indicates, the attempt to reduce one picture to the other in 
a one-to-one manner is the source of much confusion in 
dealing with Chinese medical kncwledge.
When one examines the Chinese experience, there is a 
tendency to view the Chinese conception as an early 
developmental stage of Western anatomical thought. Such a 
view fails to account fcr the possibility of different views 
of the human body and different purposes for developing such 
knowledge. Manaka and Orguhart (1972) warn: "Thus, the 
ancient anatcmy charts cf the Chinese dc not show ignorance 
of physiology, as some have claimed, but illustrate their 
overriding concern with establishing the relationships
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between organs and function." (p. 38) For example, defining
the anatomical structure cf the "heart" is, for the Chinese,
subordinate to the majcr purpose of defining functional
relationships. Thus, the "heart" is not conceived as an
isolated organ but is viewed as a system with blood vessels
and other organs. Egually, the "heart" becomes functionally
related to other functions like respiration.
Within this framework, the experience of the body is
that of a netwcrk cf orbs which have an ill defined
anatomical focus and little precise meaning in terms of
Western notions of physiological structure. Porkert (1974)
gives the following example:
The Chinese word 'lungs,* for instance, calls
to mind coincidentally and vaguely mcst of the 
ideas someone with a Western education associates 
with the lungs. Instead, fei designates primarily 
and predominately an orb cf function defined 
systematically and logically, the ♦qrbis 
pulmon^lis.* The qualifiers used in 
orbisiconography (EfiiJBSaallS* c a r d i t i s . and so 
on) must be understood as definiticns of effective 
relations or functions, not simply as expressions 
of crude anatomical insights. This is why 
statements bearing on a certain orb can under no 
circumstances be made to agree completely with 
statements bearing on the corresponding organ in 
Western thought. The better both statements are 
supported in context' by empirical data integrated 
into their logical system, the less reconcilable 
they turn out to be. (pp. 106-7)
He goes on to relate that many times an orb will be given
meaning in traditional Chinese medicine and have no
corresponding anatomical substratum in Western medicine,
while the reverse relation also tends to hold where an
anatomical organ has no corresponding orb in Chinese
medicine.
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DjagftggiS disease. Given these different views of the
human body, it follows that diagnosis will take on a
different character in each system. Chinese diagnosticians
would be more likely tc experience relationships between
external aspects of the body with the function of internal
organs than is the custom in Hestern medicine. Coupled with
this purpose, as I observed above in the case of
astronomical observation, is the general proclivity of the
Chinese for making detailed empirical observations. Both of
these factors laid a groundwork for the development of a
diagnostic system which rested upon detailed and subtle
observations about the patient to an infinitely higher
degree than in Hestern medicine.
For example, an entire diagnostic system was developed
around the careful cbservation cf the tongue on the
assumption that its condition was related to the condition
of the visceral organs. Being faithful to their tradition
of careful and detailed cbservaticn, the Chinese doctor
distinguished more than cne hundred varieties of tongue
condition. These conditicns of the tongue were experienced
as being related tc the condition of the internal organs:
The middle of the tongue is correlated with the 
stomach.
The two sides of the tongue are correlated with 
the liver.
The root of the tongue is correlated with the 
kidneys.
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The tip of the tongue is correlated with the 
heart.
(Wallnofer and von Bottauscher, 1965, p. 113)
Hore generally, the body was experienced as having a
network of ducts or meridians which connected the internal
organs with the external skin of the body. Thus, the skin,
with its acupuncture points, was experienced as being in
relation to the corresponding pcints in the interior of the
body. as we shall see below, it is this projection that is
the functional basis for the therapy of acupuncture.
Nowhere is the difference between Western and Chinese
diagnosis more pronounced than in the case of the clinical
indications of the pulse. For Western medicine, the pulse
is experienced as being related to the function of one
organ, the heart. In traditional Chinese medicine,
pulsology is a central diagnostic tocl and provides
information not only about the function of the heart, but
about the functioning of many iiternal organs.
Chinese pulsology recognizes three spots along the 
radial artery cf each wrist that give pulse 
readings of the functioning of different internal 
organs, horeover, at these three spots each wrist 
has a deep and superficial reading, giving a total 
of twelve different pulses in all. From these, 
the trained physician— and it is an art which 
requires long experience as well as great 
sensitivity— can diagnose malfunction in any of 
the internal organs ox in the various 
physiological processes of the body.
(Croizier, 1S68, p. 22)
This is only the beginning cf the intricate knowledge 
that pulsology can provide to the Chinese physician. For 
example, the pulse is itself differentiated into three types 
to be felt with three different fingers: "The index finger
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feels the ts'sun cx 'inch pulse* . . .  the middle finger
feels the kuan or *passage« pulse . . .  and the ring finger
feels the ch*ih or 'cubit* pulse." (Wallnoffer and von
Rottauscher, 1965, p. 99)
It follows that, given a different system of
diagnostics, a different experience cf pathology would be
associated. Disease was experienced as affecting the body
as a whole and having its source in an imbalance in the
relations within this whcle. While Western medicine was
concerned with localizing the cause of the disease, the
Chinese came to the conclusion that disease is seldcm
localized in one part of the body, but generally affects the
entire human being (Veith, 1973). As a result of this, the
concept of a diseased entity was net an important concept in
Chinese pathology.
Health and disease of the body were thought to be
related to the relation of yin and yang within the body. If
these two forces were balanced and in harmony, then the body
enjoyed health; but if one force dominated over the other,
a pathological condition would arise. Yin and yang became
the key nosological schema for Chinese medicine:
The functioning of the bedy depended upon the two 
forces that created the world and men, the Tin and 
the Yang. While Yang, the male or positive 
principle, predominated in man, and Yin, the 
female or negative principle, predominated in 
women, neither of these forces ever existed alone, 
but a certain proportion cf both had to be present 
in every well-functioning human being. These two 
ever-active forces, alternatively opposing and 
supplementing each other, were held to exist 
within all parts of the body and tc circulate 
through the vessels that carried blood and pneuma. 
Pathological conditicns arcse out of abundance of
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either the Yin or the Yang., obstruction of the 
flow of bicod and especially the pneuma. All 
these deficiencies and obstructions disturbed the 
balance of the organism as a whole, but usually 
affect one particular organ. (Veith, 1973, p. 20)
In summary, the Chinese physician was functioning
within a different conception of the human body than his
Hestern colleague. The contrast was quite
pronounced: Hestern medicine begins with the experience of a 
static anatomical structure, diagnosis centers around the 
knowing of this structure, and disease is conceived of as 
the result of a diseased entity which has affected this 
structure; the traditional Chinese view was dominated by 
the experience of relation and function, with diagnosis and 
ideas about the nature of disease becoming adjusted 
accordingly.
Unity of the Material and Non-material
The human body may be conceived of as a microcosm, the 
innermost circle of a hierarchy of concentric circles of 
ever-increasing radius. A dimension can be identified which 
begins with the whole of the body, integrates the mental 
function with the body tc form another whole, and unifies 
both of these within the whole of the material world. As 
one progresses along this dimension, the assumed divisions 
of Hestern knowledge become subsumed.
First, the separations of the mental processes 
themselves such as reason and emotion, then to the 
separation of the mental and the physical, to the separation 
of the soul from the body and, finally, the possibility of
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flight from the material world are progressively merged one 
with the other. Again, the problem is to approximate the 
unity of the Chinese experience of the individual human 
being from the context of Hestern divisions.
In attempting to relate this unity, a persistent 
problem is generated. It is a difficult task to illustrate 
the unity of the self within a framework such as that of the 
Best, which relies so fundamentally on a dualistic premise.
A separation between the material and non-material aspects 
of human beings and a differentiation of psychological 
functions, while a point of argument in the Hestern 
framework, in final analysis, is the basic orientation in 
the Hest. This is not tc say that there have not been 
attempts to unify these separate functions within a single 
process such as beccming. However, the legacy of the 
Hestern thinker is that cf a differentiated human being 
which must then be integrated, after the fact. The Chinese 
did not share this legacy, so the integration process was 
not necessary.
The problem is reflected in Hestern language itself.
The language we use to talk about human beings has the 
assumption of divisibility embedded within it. In this 
regard, Abegg (1952) goes directly tc the heart of the 
matter: "the chief difficulty— a fundamental one— lies in 
the fact that our terms are these of the 'split* type of 
man, while the East Asian's terms are those of the 'total' 
type." (p. 15)
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Thialsiia- Tc illustrate this point, let me take the
example of the concept cf thinking as this concept is given
split and total meanings in the two contexts. In the
Hestern context, thinking is conceived of as an autonomous
process in the human being, fcr the most part independent or
split from the other psychic functions like will or emotion
as well as being split frcm the processes of the body. This
does not mean that one function is not experienced as
affecting another, but they still maintain a high degree of
independence.
In the traditional Chinese context, thinking is
totalized with other psychic functions such that thinking
becomes only one part of a greater unity being harmonized
with other psychic functions. Thinking takes on a total
type of meaning in which thinking, instead of standing out
from other human functions, assumes a relative position in
the totality of function:
The chief characteristic of this way of thinking 
lies in the fact that it remains constantly aware 
of the relative value of the actions of individual 
functions. One function hereby controls the 
other; sensations control feeling, the intellect 
and the will, the intellect controls the 
sensations, the emotions, the will and so on— and 
all are directed collectively by the psychic 
center . . . .  (Abegg, 1952, p. 32)
This view, based on integration and unity, produces
different criteria for evaluating the development of the
self. The iest places great value on the differentiation of
psychic function and has a criterion which reflects this.
Inversely, the Chinese regard this form of development as
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primitive and will look to a criterion which positively
values integration:
In the East Asian's view it is not the 'total* 
manner of thinking but, on the contrary, that 
which treats the thought func-friqn as something 
separate— that does not take 'the entire man* as a 
starting point— which is the more primitive. The 
East Asian has known at first hand enough of the 
dangers of such cleavages and the problems they 
create, and he has, therefore, constantly striven 
for the opposite, namely the reconguest of 
totality. (Abegg, 1952, p. 17)
2f mind and body. Beginning with the unity of the 
mind and body, "Traditional Chinese medicine strove to treat 
the whole person rather than isolated parts, and to think of 
him in relation to his emotional sphere and physical 
environment." (Cooper and Sivin, 1973, p. 203) This is a 
fair summary of the integration of human function in Chinese 
medicine.
Given this orientation, the psychosomatic cause of 
disease was early recognized as being important. Of the 
causes of illness, third in the order of importance after 
environmental causes such as ccld, wind, and epidemics, were 
the seven emotional states: joy, anger, anxiety, worry, 
grief, fear and shock. "The fact is worth noting that, even 
at that early date, Chinese medicine was aware of 
psychophysical interrelationships and recognized the 
importance of psychic factors as a cause of physical 
disorders." (Palos, 1974, p. 91)
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Turning to psychic processes themselves, there was the
feeling cf unity where reason and emctions were not
experienced as separate functions, but as being in relation.
One way of looking at this would be to see the human being
in China as retaining a psychic unity, while the Westerner
has taken this unity and differentiated it. This does not
mean that the Chinese psyche has not undergone a
"development," but it is a development that cannot be
characterized as a process of differentiation.
The psychic development of Western man consisted 
above all in the progressive differentiation of 
his psychic functions. Feeling, intellect, the 
will and sensations went their separate ways and 
accomplished those remarkable feats peculiar to 
each of them. Deep religious feeling and abstract 
philosophy, miracles of technology and marvelous 
harmonies of music, the conguest of the earth and 
the conquest of the atom— all these things we have 
experienced and acccmplished in the course of our 
development. Things such as these are not found 
in East Asia or anywhere else in the world.
(Abegg, 1952, pp. 12-13)
All of these developments have been made possible by
differentiation. In East Asia, the term is hardly
appropriate where changes in psychic function over time
could best be characterized as an unfolding of a totality.
SsiiZ of th§ jjoui IdiSlial SSI.13- Moving from the 
unity of psychic functions to the next larger circle, one 
begins to experience the unity of the soul and the body 
within the material world. There is absent here the belief 
that the individual has an immortal component which could 
flee the prison of the flesh and this material world, to 
attain freedom and fulfillment in ancther, heavenly world.
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The earlier discussion concerning the difficulties with 
Buddhist doctrine is relevant here. A concept the Chinese 
could not accept was the Buddhist conception of this world 
as illusion* maya. and the practicing of methods which would 
allow the individual to flee this life for Nirvana in 
another world. Fart of the difficulty was with the focus of 
the Confucians on relaticnships between human beings within 
the context of the family. The notion that monks should 
attempt to attain enlightenment and sever all obligations to 
others in this world in favcr cf Nirvana in another was 
clearly disruptive to society.
It is unfair to characterize the this-worldly 
orientation of the Confucians as merely materialistic in the 
Western sense* but rather as collapsing the non-material 
into the material. The material world* as the Chinese 
conceived of it, contained both matter and spirit* mind and 
body, emotion and reason, all cf which were contained in the 
here and now* in the immediately experienced world. It was 
not so much a world of sculs or matter as a world of 
soul-matter all contained within the Tao of the World.
In the Chinese view* even if pecple were to die, and 
their souls were tc leave their bodies, these souls did not 
gain entry to some higher realm, but were experienced as 
only changing form and continuing to exist in this world. 
"Soul," to the Westerner, implies a separability of the soul 
from.the body, suggesting a freeing of the individual from 
the prison of this world to attain another-worldly
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existence. Such an implication of division was not present
in the Chinese mind. The soul to them was always viewed as
having a corporal component and as such could not free
itself from this relaticn even if it were desirable to do
so. In this way# the individual was always to be of this
world and in this world.
To the Chinese# a soul without a body would no doubt
have been a meaningless abstraction.
It was not that the Chinese lacked any conception 
of 'souls' or subtle spiritual essences; on the 
contrary, there were more cf them than the 
European mind imagined— 'but it was not 
thought . . .  that an individual personality could 
continue to exist without some bodily component.
In other words# their conception of the living 
organism was an organic one# neither 
spiritualistic nor material. (Needham# 1956# 
p. 156)
This perspective on the nature cf the soul can undercut 
one of the major paradoxes China presents. As Bodde (1942) 
remarks# it is paradoxical that in a country where ancestor 
worship is strong and the belief in spirits and ghosts is 
rife among the unlearned, the sages of China either are 
agnostic about immortality or discount any personal 
survival. Confucius is a case in point. Confucius did not 
discount life after death as much as he tried to redirect 
the attention of the questioner to the practical problems of 
living in this world.
In an oft-quoted passage from the An^lect^. Confucius 
is questioned by a disciple abcut an afterlife;
Chi lu asked about serving the spirits of the
d$ad.
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The Master said, 'While you are not able to 
serve men, hew can you serve iljgil spirits?'
Chi lu added, 'I venture tc ask about death?*
He was answered, 'While you do not know life, 
how can you know about death?'
(Legge, 1970, pp. 240-41)
Here, Confucius tries to redirect his disciple from the
contemplation of another world to action within this world.
Bather than speculate about the possible glories of the
world beyond this, the duty of a Confucian was to make this
world a paradise through one's harmonious relations with
others and through self-cultivation.
The full impact of the emphasis on living in the here
and now can be found in seme ideas of the Taoists. The
Taoists, it will be recalled, experienced themselves as
unified with Nature. Within this view, the human body was
not separate from Nature or the material world, but was
contained within the eternal Tac. Whereas the Westerner
sought the eternal in seme afterlife, there was a tendency
for some Taoists tc seek immortality and the eternal within
this world.*
In contrast to notions of immortality in the West, the 
Taoists became captivated with the idea of a material 
ilSSCiality, the cult cf the hsiep. Needham (1956) has 
stated that in respect to this goal of material immortality, 
there does not seem to be any close parallel in any other 
part of the world. The goal of the Taoists was quite simple
*The guest for practices which would promote physical 
immortality was an exclusive pursuit of popular Taoist 
Religion (Tao-ghj.§g) and was scorned by Esoteric Taoism 
(S^2z£b^a) of the great mystics.
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and direct: "To become a hjisjJ, or a *True Man* (sk§fl
meant that one would go on living forever (chhang s eng) with
a youthful body in a kind of earthly paradise." (Needham,
1956, p. 141)
One such conception was that of the £i hsien or
"Earthly Immortal" who would become unified with Nature and
merge into Nature like a mountain "aged but not dying,"
quite immune to human frailties:
. . .  able to spend the rest of eternity
wandering as a kind of wraith through the
mountains and forests, enjoying the company of 
similar enlightened spirits and the cycle of the 
seasons ever repeated yet with glory ever renewed.
These are the beings that one can discern against 
the immensity of a landscape, flitting across 
remote ravines in many beautiful Chinese 
paintings. (Needham, 1974, pp. 11-12)
In this conception, the infinitesimal becomes the infinite;
in dealing with the microcosmic whole of the human being,
one becomes involved with the largest whole of the universe.
Conceptions of a paradise, if there was to be one, had
a materialistic form for these Taoists. Paradise was
thought to exist in seme remote regions of th4.s world.
Since the soul was not allowed the luxury of astral travel,
it must seek its paradise here on earth. Even when the
was to defy gravity and rise Cbristlike into the
clouds, it was thought only to be part of a journey to
another place in this world (Bauer, 1976).
The conception of paradise was that it was continuous
with present existence and that in this paradise one would
have current human needs:
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Even where the legends evidently report ascensions 
to heaven# the extent to which the gravitational 
pull of the earth gradually overtook the 
'immortals#' the degree to which their flight 
through the clouds became a walk across mountains# 
is easily recognizable. Ascensions were less and 
less often presented as the transition to a wholly 
different mode of being# but rather as a kind of 
voyage into another country . - .. Very typical 
in this connection are the stories telling of the 
eagerness of many hjsjsh to take along into the new 
world the greatest”possible number of objects for 
their personal use. There is even the case of an 
'immortal' who was accompanied by his entire 
family and household goods as he ascended to 
heaven# a naive parallel tc the previously 
mentioned custom of placing models of all the 
things the dead had come tc cherish during their 
lifetime into the grave with them. To free 
oneself from all the ties of this world# to take 
one's leave from all the companions left on the 
shore before the great ocean was crossed was no 
longer the essential element in gaining 
blessedness# but mere nearly the opposite: the 
attainment of immortality, the promise of 
everlasting life# but precisely a life on earth# 
or at least, a life as it had been lived on earth. 
(Bauer, 1976# p. 103“
For the Chinese# if there was to be a soul# an immortal
element to the human being, it must function within this
world and could not migrate to an other-worldly realm.
FUNCTIONING TOWARD SELF 
Before I examine the functional conseguences of a 
unified and differentiated view of the individual# I should 
stress that each of these views has its own strengths and 
limitations, one is always balancing possible benefits 
against possible disadvantages. Given certain criteria and 
certain purposes# one approach will be more functionally 
sound than the other; when the criteria and purposes 
change, so does the ratio of adverse effects to the
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benefical.
As as example, I can follow the reasoning of Abegg 
(1952) given above in the context of the discussion of 
psychic differentiation. It will be recalled that the West 
has developed along the lines cf differentiation of 
psychological processes while the parallel development in 
China is best conceived of as an unfolding of a unity. As 
she points out, many of the great achievements of Western 
civilization have their source in the differentiation of the 
Western mind. The development cf technology, putting a 
human being on the moon, the writing of great literary 
classics and the great advances of modern medicine, all have 
been made possible because of the ability of the Western 
thinker to differentiate one aspect cf the psychic function 
and give it full power, submerging the ether components of 
the mind.
Such was not possible for the Ccnfucian or the Taoist. 
The purpose was to balance and harmonize all functions, to 
make the whole human being an actuality, at the expense, 
perhaps, of the possibility of developing the creative force 
of one component. There was no space here for pure thought 
as we find in Western philosophies.
Nothing is gained without an equal sacrifice. For the 
great heights cf intellectual and technical achievement, the 
West has had to pay with the inherent instability of these 
separate faculties. It must be remembered that the mind 
that is capable of great achievements of good is also the
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aind that can journey into the deep valleys of despair.
The unity of China, on the other hand, provides for 
greater stability and continuity over time. The full weight 
of the society is net on individuals and their achievements, 
but on the community of human beings and a continuity of 
tradition. At this point, the Westerner would ask: 
‘•Stability at what cost?— at the cost of stagnation!" True, 
over the history of China, by Western standards of 
technological progress, there has been little progress, but 
one must weigh this against the benefits of a human society 
which was able tc support humankind, with continuity, for 
4000 years.
My only reason for examining these issues is to 
counterbalance the tendency fcr viewing the benefits of the 
Chinese framework without also seeing the disadvantages.
The same is true for the West. In the following, I will
examine the conseguences in function of the unity of the
self in traditional China. It is beyond the scope of this 
presentation to evaluate these conseguences; it is left to
the reader*s judgment if it is better to retain the unity of
psychic functions or to develop along the road of 
differentiation.
Unity as a Functional Basis for Medicine
In a theory of disease there is a prescription for 
therapeutic function. If one defines and experiences 
disease, as in the case cf Western medicine, as being the 
result of a diseased entity in some part of the body, it
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follows that one should develop therapeutic methods which 
will remove the cause of disease and return the body to a 
state of health. This is the primary direction for Western 
medicine. The Western physician's armamentarium is well 
stocked with therapeutic devices for discovering the site of 
the diseased entity and with techniques for the removal of 
this entity-
In contrast, the armamentarium of the the traditional 
Chinese physician is stocked with therapeutic methods which 
derive from a different definition of disease and a 
different experience of the body. Traditional Chinese 
medicine assumes the unity cf the body and, consequently, 
defines the disease of the body as a result of the 
disharmony of relations within this whole. Therapeutic 
methods, instead of proceeding analytically, will attempt to 
work with the whole of the body by altering relations within 
this whole. In terms of Chinese diagnostic categories, 
disease is an imbalance cr disharmony between yin-yang 
relations within the body, and the purpose of therapeutic 
methods is to restore this balance and harmony.
In the following discussion, I do not begin to do 
justice to the full spectrum of therapeutic methods used by 
the Chinese doctor. The latter's armamentarium was quite 
eclectic by Western standards including not only the use of 
drugs or herbs, but, more generally, attempts to administer 
to all of the dimensions of physical health with methods 
such as gymnastics and diet therapy. I cannot hope to fully
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document this entire array. Consequently, I will focus on a 
contrasting set of therapeutic methods, surgery and 
acupuncture, as they developed or did not develop in each 
framework.
&b§§a£§ 2! suruerv. While surgery has been an important 
component to Western medicine, surgery is conspicuously 
absent in traditional Chinese medicine. Since Chinese 
medicine did not conceive of disease in entity terms, it is 
quite understandable that techniques, such as surgery, for 
the removal of the diseased entity would not have been 
developed and, even if introduced, would not find fertile 
ground in China.
There is much evidence that suggests that what surgical 
techniques did exist in the history cf Chinese medicine can 
be traced to the introduction of Buddhist thought and tend 
to originate in Indian medical practices. Chen (1964) feels 
that many Chinese surgical techniques can be attributed to 
Indian surgeons. He notes that the father of Chinese 
surgery, Hua T«o, is described as performing many operations 
that are guite similar tc the accomplishments of the Indian 
physician, Jivaka, a contemporary of Buddha. This has led 
some scholars to conclude that the accomplishments of the 
former are mere echoes of Jivaka.
Be that as it may, the important point is that in China 
the absence of a divisibility concept prevented the fruition 
of surgical methods. Even with the introduction of an 
alternative model of the body, surgical methods never became
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a major therapeutic technique in Chinese medicine. The 
major thrust of Chinese medicine was in the opposite 
direction. Every effort was directed toward the aim of 
administering treatment to a whole bcdy and to maintaining 
this wholeness as a result cf treatment.
Confucianism supported the unity of the body on an 
ethical basis: the body was net the property of the cwner, 
but a gift from one*s ancestors which must be returned to 
them in good order. For this, there was no lesser authority 
than The Clas§i£ £ilial ffi?ty» which says: "Our 
bodies— to every hair and bit cf skin— are received by us 
from our parents, and we must net presume to injure or wound 
them— this is the beginning of filial piety." (Legge, 1879, 
p. 466) In gocd Confucian fashion, it was not an uncommon 
practice to retain any severed organs or limbs of the person 
to be buried with them at the time of death.
The Confucian imperative to maintain the unity of the 
body was sometimes carried to rather paradoxical extremes. 
For example, Bodde and Bcrris (1967), in their consideration 
of systems of punishment in Chinese law, state that the 
Chinese often chose the slow and painful death by 
strangulation over the swift method of decapitation, for the 
former left the bcdy intact for burial.
J)£3E3&£iS£g qpd moxibustfgn. In direct contrast to the 
absence of surgical therapy in Chinese medicine, there 
developed therapeutic techniques which were capable of 
treating the body as a whcle and changing the balance of
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relationships within this whole. As noted above, since the 
human body is experienced as a whole such that the internal 
organs become projected via meridians onto the surface of 
the skin, therapy to internal organs was possible by the 
stimulation of the skin alone. This is the theoretical 
basis for the complementary methods of acupuncture and 
moxibustion.
Wallnofer and von Bcttauscher (1965) describe the basis
of acupuncture as fcllcws:
As the teachings of acupuncture claim, each 
internal organ is in close affinity with its own 
definite spots, cr points on the skin . . . .  The 
insertion of the needle in these respective points 
is said to exert either a stimulating or an 
equalizing effect, thereby reinstating order and 
harmonious balance within the disturbed 
collaboration of the nerves . . .  or the Yin and 
X§I1S# as the Chinese have it. (p. 128)
Acupuncture becomes an effective treatment for disease by
restoring the yin-yang balance.
Closely related and complementary in effect to
acupuncture was the method of mcxibustion. While
acupuncture is primarily a cold methcd, moxibustion is a hot
method which seeks to heat points cn the skin to produce
changes in the function of internal organs. Both methods
are based upon the same basic relation and in tandem can
manipulate the yin-yang balance:
To bring Xiji and Yang into proper balance is also 
the purpose of moxibustion . . .  cauterization 
with moxa. While acupuncture is employed 
especially for diseases caused by an excess of 
Xafi3» the moxa method seeks to restrain an excess 
of jia. (p. 144)
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The contrast between surgery and acupuncture is a 
special case of the more general tendency for Western 
medicine to localize the cause cf disease in a substratum of 
the body and to focus treatment on this point. Chinese 
medicine, on the other hand, working on the contrary 
assumption that disease is a general condition of the whole 
body, seeks to effect treatment by altering the functional 
relationships within this whole.
Sfrr^pgths aqd weakpess<=s. These alternative medical 
strategies have different strengths and weaknesses in 
respect to function. Eorkert (1976) has defined this 
relation guite clearly, noting the particular strengths of 
Western and Chinese medicine. Western medicine has its 
strength where the substratum condition can be met, where a 
disease can be localized in a particular organ or part of 
the body. For example, in the case of an accident, where a 
part of the body is injured. Western medicine is most 
effective with immediate remedial treatment to the injured 
part. However, when this substratum condition cannot be 
met, western medicine reveals a weakness.
In contrast, the strength of Chinese medicine lies in 
another direction. It will be recalled that the substratum 
is unimportant to Chinese medicine; what is important is 
the functional relationships within the body as a whole.
Thus, the Chinese doctor may begin to treat these functional 
relationships, his patients symptoms, immediately, with no 
need to localize his diagnosis. The practical consequence
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is that therapy can be administered at an early stage of 
development without having to wait, as the Western 
therapeutic framework must, for the sore advanced stages 
when a particular part of the body reveals the disease.
These factors produce a certain contrast in function: 
Chinese medicine tends toward early diagnosis and prevention 
while Western medicine tends toward late, localized 
diagnosis and reactive therapy. This difference becomes 
very important in seme chronic diseases such as diabetes and 
cancer.
There is general agreement that serious organic 
diseases . . .  are preceded by stages of 
functional disorders. If they are given specific 
diagnoses and treatment, they can be prevented 
from entering the organic stage, which in the 
opinion of Chinese doctors, represents an advanced 
if not terminal stage of every disease. (Porkert,
1976, p. 67)
It is interesting that Western medicine seems to be 
most useful and effective for contagious and 
accident-related illness, whereas, in a complementary 
fashion, Chinese medicine has its greatest strength in 
degenerative, chronic disease. From all indications, these 
two approaches, and thus their respective strengths, are 
being integrated today in the People’s Republic of China.
Functional Unity of the Material and Non-Material
Again I must deal with three wholes: the unity of body 
and mind, the unity of psychic functions themselves, and the 
unity of the human being in the world. Each of these 
unities has implications for the human being’s function in
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traditional China.
Chi. In examining the unity of mind and body, it is 
best to begin with a concrete example of this integration.
I will begin with ya4 Chi, a traditional exercise system 
which attempts to work with the unity of mind and body.
There are currently many books in the pcpular press on the 
study of T§i Chi which attempt to introduce the reader to 
its forms and postures. Few of these volumes relate the 
fact that this exercise system is deeply embedded in the 
philosophy and culture of China, in particular the central 
classic of the J Chj.qg. According tc Lui (1972) , the T^4 
Chi postures or forms are related in direct correspondence 
to the hexagrams cf this book, such that in doing the 
various forms one is almost mirroring in microcosm the cycle 
of changes in Nature.
Of the many tales concerning the origins of Taj chi, 
the one which I prefer relates the source of this practice 
to the inspiration of Nature. In this legend, a twelfth 
century sage, San-feng, observed from his window the gentle 
combat of a snake and crane. He saw in their agile 
movements, in a living fcrm, the principles of the J China, 
with the latter*s stress on the relation between strength 
and yielding. "The great master studied the crane and the 
snake, the wild animals, the clouds, the water and the trees 
bending in the wind. He codified these natural movements 
into a system cf exercise." (lui, 1972, p. H)
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This system net only prescribed bodily movements/ but 
also demanded a unity of body and mind. As with many 
Eastern arts, a leng period of study is required; while one 
may learn the basic physical movements of each form in but a 
few months, it takes many years or even a lifetime to fully 
integrate the body and mind. Here, the guidance of a master 
is necessary, a mcdel who demonstrates that such a mind-body 
integration is possible.
The subtitle of Iiu‘s book on TajL Chi is indicative of 
this purpose: "A Choreography gf ?Qfly and flisd." Chi
is much more than merely a combination of physical dance 
movements, but is much closer to a meditation in motion 
where the mental and physical are brought into a dynamic, 
harmonious movement. One of the Tai Chi classics relates: 
"First in the *will,* afterwards in the body.” (Haisel,
1963, p. 211) Given this holistic point of focus, the same 
classic goes on: "It must be remembered; as one part moves, 
all parts move; if one part is still, all parts are still." 
(Maisel, 1963, p. 211) The purpose of Chi is to 
coordinate the movements cf these parts so that they form a 
fluid whole with no seam between mind and body, thought and 
action. In contrast. Western forms cf exercise seem very 
shallow.
The mind-body unity of T^j 
Chi translates quite easily into a unity of thinking and 
doing, thought and action, which is characteristic of 
Chinese thought, host scholars of China, I think, would
agree that the Chinese embrace practicality o*er theory.
This guality is even more pronounced when placed in 
comparison to the West where theory predominates guite as 
much over practice.
It is interesting to relate the observations of a 
relatively unbiased observer. Needham (1970) guotes an 
Arabic scholar of Damascus whc lived about 830 A.D. who had 
a privileged position in which to view the two systems 
living as he did at the juncture of the two worlds. The 
scholar made this rather astute observation: M,The curious 
thing is that the Greeks are interested in theory but do not 
bother about practice# whereas the Chinese are very 
interested in practice and do net bother about theory.,M 
(P. 39)
At the basis of this observation is a very basic 
insight into the knowledge of the Greeks as opposed to the 
knowledge of the Chinese. Developing the system completely, 
the Greeks made a division between mind and body, thinking 
and doing, allowing them to take flights into abstraction. 
The Chinese viewed mind and body as unified and in so doing 
placed an emphasis on accomplishing things within this 
unified structure.
This difference manifests itself very early in the 
development of each system. He can, for example, compare 
Platonism with Confucianism on the issue of what constitutes 
knowing: MThe Platcnists were ccncerned with knowing in 
order to understand, while Confucians were more concerned
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with knowing in order to behave properly toward ether men."
(Munro, 1969, p. 54)
Underpinning these alternative purposes for knowledge
is an alternative process of guestioning:
In China, truth and falsity in the Greek sense 
have rarely been important considerations in a 
philosopher's acceptance cf a given belief or 
proposition; these are Western concerns. The 
consideration important to the Chinese is the 
behavior implications of the belief or proposition 
in guestion. What effect does adherence to the 
belief have on people? What implications for 
social action can be drawn from the statement?
For the Greeks, study was valued both for its own 
sake and as a guide to action . . .  but bliss lay 
primarily in study for its own sake. In 
Confucianism, there was nc thought of knowing that 
did not entail some conseguence of action.
(Munro, 1969, p. 55)
Before I examine specific examples cf the unity of 
thinking and doing in the majox traditions of China, I 
cannot avoid a very thorny thicket— relating this unity of 
the Chinese to pragmatic philosophies of the West. Even 
though this issue is difficult one, I think it can provide 
some valuable insights into the differences between East and 
West.
As soon as one mentions the unity of thinking and doing 
and the emphasis cn the practical, cne is immediately drawn 
to the philosophy of American pragmatism, to Dewey, peirce, 
and James. There is a fcrmal identity between the 
philosophies of these men and that of China, but some very 
important differences. Both stress the importance of the 
unity of theory and practice. However, there is a most 
important distinction. Pragmatism is a philosophy, per 5 5 ,
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and because of this is firmly committed to the purposes for
knowledge in the West, fls a philosophy, pragmatism attempts
to deal with the characteristic metaphysical problems of the
Western world.
In China, given the unity cf mind and body, the unity
of thinking and doing cannot be only part of a philosophical
system but must relate to the whole perscn, to what one
thinks as well to what one feels and, most importantly, to
how one acts. Here lies the basic difference between the
Confucian proclivity fcr the pragmatic and the pragmatic
philosophies of the West. Wu (1971) writes:
Generally speaking, the unity of theory and 
practice in pragmatism is more concerned with, in 
addition to human survival, scientific and 
epistemolcgical problems . . . .  The term 'theory* 
as used in Confucianism is not to be understood in 
terms merely cf conceptual framework or 
hypothesis. It should be conceived as deep 
SSaxiSiiofi or even uJiisatg concqpn. 'Practice' 
in Confucianism is not to be interpreted in terms 
merely of something to be exercised or performed 
in daily life, like 'diet,' 'dance,* or 'table 
tennis*; it should be interpreted in terms of a 
deep moral sense; it is ccncerned with the toi;^
ESial £§Ei2Iiaace of £h§ From the
Chinese viewpoint the total moral performance of 
the individual and the totality of his beliefs or 
theories should be in harmonious unity, without 
any gap or inconsistency, (p. 10)
This practicality is less the product of the discovery of
philosophical truth than it is the result of a number of
unities, including the unity of reason and emotion, which
are all contained within one consistent whole that is the
ideal to the Confucian.
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It is possible tc lock at a central philosophical text 
of China, for example the J Chj$g, with the view that it was 
a theory of the universe on an abstract level. To do so is 
to impose Western priorities. The J Ching is first and 
foremost a book of divination which helped the user in the 
search for decisions for action. In short, one must be very 
careful not to treat manifest similiarities as indicating 
similiar latent processes.
The unity of theory and practice is a central theme in 
Confucianism. Wu (1971) notes that "Confucius is probably 
the first philosopher to have insisted on the necessary 
correspondence between words and actions." (p. 9) One of 
the basic building blocks of the Confucian social order,
"The Rectification of Names," illustrates the need for a 
close correspondence between the title of the person and the 
actions of the person, only when the title corresponded to 
the correct behavior would the social order function 
harmoniously. The Ana^ect? say: "So, to rectify names in a 
state means: *Let the ruler be a ruler, the minister be a 
minister, the father l>e a father, and the son be a 
son."' (Chan, 1967, p. 39)
It is in Taoism, however, that the full fruition of 
this unity is realized. In the above discussion on the 
nature of the Tao. I noted that the Tao is not simply a 
mental concept to the Chinese tut encompasses both thinking 
and doing, while an approach cnly frcm the mind, from 
reason, must fail. It was in this context that I related
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the story of Ting the batcher who sc worked within the Tao.
the unity of thought and action, that he could use the sane
chopper for 19 years and have it remain sharp. Certainly, 
any civilization has its craftsmen who transmit their craft 
directly from the master to the apprentice without the need
for abstraction. The Tacists, however, carry this notion
much further, beyond a mere skill— tc quote Thing the 
butcher, to a full encompassing of the person within the
Needham (1956) writes that such "knack-passages," as he
calls them, are quite common in Taoist literature. In all
of these passages, there is expressed the conviction that
the arts and crafts from one generation to another naturally
involved the total education of both body and spirit of the
learner. In this context, I would like to quote at length
another famous knack-passage from Tacist writings:
Duke Human (of Chhi), seated above in his hall, 
was (once) reading a book, and the wheelwright 
Pien was making a wheel (in the courtyard) below.
Laying aside his mallet and chisel, Pien went to 
the steps, and said, 'I venture to ask. Sir, what 
you are reading?* The Duke said, • (The words) of 
the sages.* ’Are these sages, then, alive?* Pien 
continued. *They are dead,* was the reply.
'Then,* was the reply, 'What you my ruler are 
reading are only the dregs and refuse of bygone 
men.' The Duke, angered, said, 'How should you, a 
wheelwright, have anything to say about the book 
which I am reading? If you can explain yourself, 
very well; if you cannot, you shall die!' The 
wheelwright said, 'Your servant will look at the 
thing from the point of view of his own art. If 
my stroke is too slew, then the tool bites deep 
but is not steady; if my stroke is too fast, then 
it is steady but does not go deep. The right 
pace, neither (too) slow ncr (too) fast, is the 
hand responding tc (some influence which) the 
heart (sends forth). But I cannot tell (how to do 
this) by word of mouth— there is a knack in it. I
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cannot teach the knack to my son, nor can my son 
learn it from me. Thus, it is that though in my 
seventieth year, I am (still) making wheels in my 
old age. But those ancients, and what it was not 
possible for them tc convey, are dead and gone— so 
then what you, my ruler, are reading is but their 
dregs and refuse.* (Needham, 1956, p. 122)
Here, the unity thinking and doing as revealed by action in
the present is to be valued even above the sacred documents
of the sage-kings cf antiquity.
This unity may be expanded to reveal a general tendency
toward unity within Chinese education. Memory and
repetition have been the core cf the transmission of
knowledge in China, reguiring cf the learner the use of both
mind and body simultaneously. Consequently, education or
apprenticeship was
. . .  not a matter of intellectual understanding, 
not at all the appreciation of mathematical 
functions describing the behavior of deeply 
analysed physico-chemical entities. ¥et to some 
extent, the skill of the artisans was handed down 
orally in the ubiquitous and invariable practice 
of *learning by rote* mnemonic rhymes.
(Needham, 1965, pp. 47-48)
This principle of learning by rote extends not only through
the traditional crafts, but to all areas of education
including medicine and proto-chemistry.
It must be remembered that the medium for recording
knowledge in this system was the Chinese language which
rested on memorizing the characters and learning the
Confucian classics by heart. Needham (1956) recalls, from
personal experience in the 1940s, the silence of the Chinese
countryside being disturbed by the bee-like hum of school
children reciting the classics by heart.
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One would not be stretching a point to agree with Abegg 
(1952) that Asian culture is tc a considerable degree built 
upon the basis of memory and the kinds of values associated 
with the latter. One could almost expand this to say that 
memory replaces the process of thinking in the Chinese mind. 
Many of the characteristics and accomplishments that the 
Westerner attributes to thinking are viewed as the products 
of memory in China.
Tfris-worjdlY focus. Moving to the next plane, to the 
whole of the psychic functions themselves, I find that this 
unity also produces differences in function. For example, 
it is helpful to make the contrast between the method of 
prayer in the west and the method of meditation in Taoism 
and Ch*an (the Chinese predecessor to Zen Buddhism of 
Japan). Prayer rests upon a division between body and 
spirit whereby the human being reguests something of God, 
and a division of psychic functions themselves whereby 
prayer acguires an extreme emotional component which is 
separate from the intellect; consequently, one often prays 
when reason fails and one is left in a Jobian condition 
relying on the will cf Gcd.
Meditation, on the ether hand, is very much a centering 
process, built upon unities where the purpose is to 
harmonize and unify all functions. To do meditation in 
Ch'an (Zen), one generally first assumes the lotus position 
which is a centered and balanced posture of the body. One 
proceeds to center and balance the mind in a similar manner
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allowing, in most cases, the natural development of thoughts
and emotion until the mind becomes, as some Zen Buddhists
say, an empty mirror. In meditation, one is integrating all
functions in one act.
Each of these methods derive from the assumptions of
their respective systems:
Whereas prayer is a primary feature of the 
Christian religion (if net in theory, at least in 
practice), meditation similarly characterizes 
Eastern Asian religions. Viewed psychologically, 
this shows the difference between the religiosity 
of the ’divided,* 'unintegrated * type of man and 
that of the ’total* type, for prayer has a strong 
emotional element, which explains references to 
'fervent* prayer, while in the East meditation is 
a matter of total contemplation . . . .  Thus it 
can generally be said: we think o£ feel,, we 
philosophize gr pray, while the East Asian tries 
to combine the two. (Abegg, 1952, pp. 40-41)
This unity of meditation leads directly to the unity of
the soul and body in a this-worldly existence. This was the
conception of the hsiss ^or tk*3 Tacists, a person who exists
in a material paradise for all time. This unity had direct
implications for function.
Prior to the introduction of Buddhism, there was not a
real notion of sin and punishment. (Eberhard, 1967) Such
concepts rest on the assumption of division between this
world and some other world where the person will be judged
for his deeds. The Chinese were very reluctant to make such
a differentiation, preferring this world as the only world.
Prior to the Buddhist introduction of the concept of a world
beyond, there was no real answer to the eternal guestion of
why evil people enjoyed an unpunished earthly existence.
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There was no notion of an after-life in which the person 
could be tried for the sins of this life. There was an 
absence of what Needham (1974) has called ethical 
polarisation in pre-Buddhist Chinese thought, nothing to 
provide for the judgment of the living after death, no 
provision whereby the sheep and the goats were brought to 
justice and separated into cther-wcrldly heavens and hells.
Without the possibility of an other-worldly flight, the 
Taoists sought an eternal life in this material world. To 
accomplish this end, the Taoists developed a number of 
practices to achieve material immortality. Needham (1956) 
lists the following practices: respiratory technigues, 
helio-therapeutic technigues, gymnastic technigues, sexual 
technigues, alchemical and pharmaceutical technigues, and 
dietary technigues. Twc things are apparent from this 
list— the Taoists were attempting to implement a wide 
variety of methods which focused on the whole person, and 
their methods anticipated many modern therapeutic methods.
£ comparison can be made between alchemical and 
pharmaceutical technigues in the East and West as they 
relate to the search for immortality. Alchemists in both 
civilizations included as their purpose the development of 
elixirs for immortality. In China, however, the emphasis on 
these elixirs was much more extensive than in the West.
There was widespread evidence of a much greater degree 
of elixir poisioning in traditional China in comparison to 
Europe. (Needham, 1970) This higher incidence can be
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attributed tc two factors. One was the lack of any 
prejudice against the use of mineral drugs which existed in 
European alchemy but which did not in Chinese alchemy.
Unlike their European colleagues* the Chinese alchemists 
persistently compounded dangerous elixirs of poisonous heavy 
metals like mercury* arsenic* and lead. In contrast* the 
European elixirs would mere likely be compounded with more 
innocuous substances of an organic base.
An egually important factor was the dominance of the 
idea of a material immortality and an absence of thoughts 
about the possibility of an other-worldly existence after 
death. This latter situation, which did not have a 
counterpart in Europe, primed the traditional Chinese for 
any elixir that would offer any hope of producing this 
longed-after immortality.
In Europe* there was a clear possibility of human 
survival after material death* when the soul would depart 
the body and be transported to heaven* hell, or purgatory.
In China, given only the context of the material present* 
all that could be experienced as real was the possibility of 
human survival in a material sense* as a Hsi<=»n. Needham 
writes:
Heaven or paradise in any seriously credible sense 
did not exist* but the visible world was eternal 
and uncreated* nor wculd it ever cease* and he who 
could make himself worthy might continue to enjoy 
it with sense-percepticns perpetuated but 
purified. This was the inner meaning of the 
proverbial salutation: jjajj jhoji wu chi^qg (»life, 
world without end!«)- (Needham, 1970* p. 337)
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Given this view of the unity of the body and soul 
forever as it is now in the present, the sophisticated 
Chinese of the time were left easy prey to the promises of 
any elixir which would make the goal of material immortality 
a reality. So widespread was the use of such elixirs among 
the rich and educated, that it is difficult many times to 
know whether tc evaluate the writings of any one author on 
their own merits or as simply a by-product of the early 
stages of mercury poisoning.
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OVERVIEW
In traditional China, when the system did focus on what 
would be termed individual process, the emphasis was on the 
self as a unified whole. The Western separations between 
mind and body, soul and body, and the material and 
non-material worlds were not important distinctions to the 
Chinese. These unities were examined in a number of 
concrete areas.
Chinese medicine viewed the body from a perspective of 
functional relationships vithir a whole, flany times these 
relationships did not have referents in Western anatomical 
structures. Given this alternative experience of the body, 
diagnosis and disease were given alternative meanings. 
Diagnostic procedures such as pulsclcgy were much more 
highly developed than in Western medicine. To the Chinese 
doctor, the condition of the pulse not only gave indication 
of the functioning of the heart, but numerous other 
relationships within the body. Disease was not viewed as 
being localized, but was conceived of as an imbalance of 
yin-yang relations within the whole body.
The functional conseguences of this view of disease and 
the body fostered the development of holistic therapies 
which operated with the body left intact. For example, 
there was a general absence of surgical methods and an 
emphasis on acupuncture and moxibustion which could function 
without the need cf removing a disease producing entity.
This provided for a medical system which was very effective
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in treating and preventing chrcnic disease.
In general, the Western distinctions of mind and body, 
reason and emotion, and soul and bcdy were all viewed as 
integrated within the Chinese experience. Thinking, for 
example, could not be separated from feeling. In both 
Confucianism and Taoism, there was a rejection of the idea 
that the soul could flee this world for an other-worldly 
paradise. Confucians were reguired to make this world a 
paradise through their harmonious relatonships within this 
world, while many Taoists sought the elusive goal of a 
material immortality in this life.
Functionally, practices such as Tai Chi attempted to 
foster the unity of mind and body. Thinking and doing were 
viewed as unified, with an emphasis cn correct actions in 
Confucianism, and unity with the Tao which transcended mere 
skill, as evidenced by numerous knack passages in Taoist 
literature. Education tended to place high value on memory 
and associated abilities.
The this-worldly focus was revealed in the practice of 
meditation as opposed to the dualistic orientation of prayer 
in Western religions. The search for a material immortality 
left many Taoists easy victim tc dangerous elixirs which 
promised eternal life in this world.
CHAPTER VIII
THE UNITY OF THE HUHAN B U N G  AND THE PROCESS 
OF QUESTIONING
We come new tc the end of a journey into China, As I 
indicated in Chapter IV, the method employed, focusing as it 
does on three key relationships, does net do full justice to 
the underlying unity of experience and function that is 
characteristic of traditional China. My discussion has 
fragmented this unity, imposing Western divisions where 
divisions do not exist, always attempting to approximate a 
unity by ever more complex relationships between segmented 
parts. For the Chinese, in my opinion, all was continuous 
and integrated as a given condition and did not have to be 
constructed from a series of parts.
If one were to focus on the human body, for example, 
one would be confronted with wholes within a whole. In the 
Chinese framework, one cannot deal with a microcosm like the 
human body without at the same time dealing with the 
macrocosm that surrounds. This was the essence of the last 
chapter, where in dealing with the individual and the 
separation of the soul and body, we were drawn to the 
largest whole cf treating the human being as integrated in 
the material world of the “here and now."
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Equally, it is net enough to define this unity as a 
static structure, independent of any larger process. My 
purpose is to relate this unity to an underlying process of 
questioning. Each of the last three chapters has asked a 
question about one relationship of the human being. It is 
extremely easy to become so invclved with examining the 
consequences of asking such a question in that context that 
one forgets that this guestion is related to a more general 
process of questioning which bcth determines and 
interrelates the specific question and the consequences to 
each other. My task in this chapter is to deal with these 
two issues and to generate a larger picture within which to 
work.
THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN BEING 
IN CHINA
In the following discussion, I would like to examine 
the unity of the unities, the underlying unity of the unity 
of the human being and Nature, the human being and others, 
and the unity of the individual. The assumption of unity 
along each dimension produces a unity §mogg dimensions.
By way of introduction, I can note the ease with which 
one passes from one area to another of Chinese knowledge.
For example, in the case cf art, one flows guite freely from 
a consideration of calligraphy, to painting and even to the 
structural lines of the frame of a Chinese house.. Each area 
is integrated and mutually reinforcing with the other. To 
be educated in the Confucian sense entailed the ability to
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move freely frcm cue area to the other; it was the unity of 
the generalist. The ideal man would have some medical 
knowledge so that if his parents were ill he could 
administer to them, but he was also required to be an artist 
of sorts and able to write poetry for his paintings. In 
every endeavor, there was always the unity of the T 30 which 
served as a container fcr all creativity and provided 
constancy of activity in that one was always working with 
relationships between yin and yang.
This underlying unity cf wholes can be appreciated 
within the context of a concrete example. I will take the 
two extremities of the unity— the individual body and the 
cosmos. %a4 Chi at the level cf individual exercise can be 
related to the cosmos through the trigrams and hexigrams of 
the 1 Chjng:
The Cosmos is a great spacio-temporal conception, 
graphically represented by the Ta^ Chi. It 
proceeds rhythmically from an immutable and 
eternal principle (T3 0) which is manifested either 
in the form cf repose (yipl. or in the form of 
movement fyaflgl. The succession of the two 
principles vin and vang represented by continuous 
or broken lines makes it possible tc form eight 
trigrams (ca-kua). These lead to a symbolic 
representation of the whole universe, valid on 
both a material and moral plane. It then becomes 
possible for an ingenious mind to draw from one 
single trigram the exposition of a 
physico-chemical phenomenon or historical facts, a 
topic of military tactics or sexual union, an 
anatcmo-physiclogical diagram cr a therapeutic 
formula. (Huard and Hong, 1968, pp. 231-2)
This unity suggests several things. First, one is
presented with a unity cf the small and the specific with
the large and the general as ghj. blends with the cosmos
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into one pattern. Secondly, cne is reminded of the
centrality of the I Chijig. The yin-yang oscillations of Taj,
C£i become diagramnatically represented in the broken and
unbroken lines of the hexigrams of the Bog£ of Change^.
Thus, the I £hiaa becomes the central whole to which all the
other wholes relate.
The effect of this underlying unity of knowledge is to
produce a hierarchy of wholes, with each whole mirroring the
whole above and the whcle below. Within this perspective,
the whole of the cosmos is not unlike the whole of the human
body. This microcosmic-macrocosmic thinking is central to
Chinese thought.
Likewise, in the social world, the whole of the family
is the model for all social relations. The microcosm of the
family was viewed as the model for the macrocosm of the
government. This same relation of wholes applies to many
other areas. For example, Wu (1963) writes that: "The house
is the basic cell in the organism of Chinese architecture,
just as the family it houses is the microcosm of the
monolithic Chinese society." (p. 31)
The total image is one of a hierarchy of wholes
interrelated in terms of experience and function. Consider
the oft-guoted passage from SlSSl
The ancients who wished tc illustrate illustrious 
virtue throughout the kingdom, first ordered well 
their states. Wishing to crder well their states, 
they first regulated their families.. Wishing to 
regulate their families, they first cultivated 
their persons, wishing to cultivate their 
persons, they first rectified their hearts.
Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought 
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thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then 
rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their 
persons were cultivated. Their persons being 
cultivated, their families were regulated. Their 
families being regulated, their states were 
rightly governed, the whole kingdom was made 
tranquil and happy. (Legge, 1926, pp. 411-412)
The same passage cf The <?y^at IsSSSiflS continues: "From
the son of Heaven dcwn to the multitudes of the people, all
considered the cultivation of the person to be the root (of
everything besides)." The conclusion seems clear: the world
is a series of wholes within wholes and the human being is
the center most whcle having responsibility to all others.
Let me attempt to draw all of these wholes together
within the context of one concrete example— traditional
Chinese medicine. Chinese medicine has appeared a number of
times in the preceding chapters.. I will recapitulate
briefly. Along the dimension of the unity of humankind and
Nature, I observed that the human being was related to
Nature in a one-tc-one correspondence via a universe
analogy. As a result, pathology in the human being was
functionally related to meteorclogical changes in Nature.
The body itself was considered to have wholes within wholes,
as the internal organs were projected onto the skin; this
factor had conseguences in function such as the development
of acupuncture as a therapy.
It is possible to look at the skin itself as containing
wholes within wholes. Figure 12 is a diagram of such a
microcosm, the pinna of the ear as it appears in
acupuncture. I ncte that the pinna is a detailed microcosm
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which can be functionally related to a number of internal 
organs. It is possible that this hierarchy of wholes could 
be differentiated further revealing further wholes within 
wholes.
It is important to reccgni2e the difference between the 
Chinese doctor’s field cf activity and that of his Western 
colleague. Functioning within a framework of divisibility, 
western doctors can deal with their patients in a segmented 
fashion, treating cnly the body and one cause of disease 
generally localized in one part of the body. The 
traditional Chinese doctor, on the other hand, cannot deal 
with his patient or the patient’s body as an isolated unit. 
The doctor is treating the whole person and all of the 
heirarchy of wholes which surround. The doctor, in treating 
the yin-yang relationships within the body of the patient, 
is at once dealing with the yin-yang relations in the larger 
cosmos. It must be remembered that an ethical orientation 
prevailed such that any disruption of Nature, including the 
illness of the body, was viewed as a failure of morals and 
the of good human relationships.
This context placed a high degree cf responsibility on 
the doctor:
. . .  the ancient Chinese physician functioned 
not only as a healer of disease, but even more as 
a moral guide who helped his patient to 
acknowledge and rectify their infringements of 
moral and natural laws. Eeing a judge of man's 
behavior as well as of his health presupposed a 
high moral and ethical attitude on the part of the 
early physician and a fairly well organized state 
of the medical profession. (Veith, 1973, p. 22)
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A similar expanding of responsibilities and function 
can be constructed in ether areas. For example# the 
geomancer is not just siting a building in the immediate 
terrain; but# even though he might not have been aware of 
it# he was working with all of the wholes which surround the 
proposed building and had responsibility for the unity of 
Nature and the human world. This is the pga} implication of 
the phrase: "the underlying unity of knowledge and the human 
being in traditional China."
THE PEOCESS OF QUESTIONING AS 
THE SCUBCE OF UNITE
The unity of structure can be related as a product to 
the questions that are asked. I shall attempt to develop 
this linkage in the case of Chinese medicine. At the core 
of each relationship examined was a guestion. For example, 
"What is humankind's relation to Nature?" Given an 
alternative meaning to that of the West# I proceeded to 
examine the consequences on experience and function as they 
developed from this questioning.
However# in the consideration cf each relation# there 
was absent an intermediate step— the mediating process of 
questioning between the key guestion and the conseguences. 
For example# I discussed the general process of questioning 
in which the question "What is humankind's relation to 
Nature?" was given the meaning cf unity# and then I examined 
the affect of this process on the experience and function of 
a geomancer. In this case# the intermediate relation— the
TABLE 1
AN EXAMPLE OF TEE PEOCESS 01 QUESTIONING 
IN TRAEITIONAL CHINESE MEDICINE
1. "At what time of day did the symptoms first
appear?"
2. "What was the patient’s mental state when the
illness was first noticed?"
3. "Were visitors present and what influence did
they have on him?"
4. "Have building operations been recently begun
near by?"
5. "Have there occurred cases of epidemic
disease in the vicinity?"




questions that the geomancer asked— was not made explicit.
The difficulty in making this relation fully explicit 
is that the actual guestions that the geomancer asked are 
not readily available tc us. As is the case with craftsmen 
anywhere* a craftsman can rarely make explicit in words the 
basis of his activities. This makes it extremely difficult 
to construct the complete process of questioning.
However* there is cne area in which this condition does 
not hold— Chinese medicine. It seems tc be true among 
doctors of both the Hast and West that a record be kept of 
the questions asked of a patient. By using these guestions 
for the Chinese dcctor, I will attempt to construct the full 
process of questioning.
In Table 1* Hume (1975) presents us with a look into 
the character cf the process of questioning of a Chinese 
doctor. These would be the typical guestions that a doctor 
called to an ill patient would ask. As I inspect this 
table* I find that some guestions are fairly universal. For 
example* the first guestion— "At what time of day did the 
symptoms first appear?”— is certainly a general guestion 
that any doctor* East or West* would ask.
The same analysis could be given in a lesser degree to 
guestions five and six* "Have there occurred cases of 
epidemic disease in the vicinity?” and "Has there been 
unusual drought or damp, heat cr cold?" It is not difficult 
to see that these guestions would be important to any 
medical system which attempts to be effective.
Uhat is humankind's 
relation to Nature?
The human world is 





Has there been unusual 
drought or damp, 
heat or cold?
Uhat is the 
human being?
A human being 
is a whole 
within wholes
Uhat is a human being's 
relation to others?
A human being is in 
nexus of relationships
Uere visitors present 
and what influence 
did they have on him?
Uhat is a human being's 
relation to self?
The human being's material 
and non-material 
aspects aro' unified
Uhat was the patient's 
mental state when 
illness was first “  
noticed?
FIGURE 13
THE DERIVATION OF THE QUESTIONING IN CHINESE MEDICINE 










The remaining questions, however, appear to be unusual 
from a Western medical perspective, and some downright 
bizarre. Certainly, guestion number two— "What was the 
patient*s mental state when the illness was noticed?"— is 
today, given the development cf psychosomatic medicine in 
the West, a logical question tc ask. Question number 
three— "Were visitors present and what influence did they 
have on him?"— it is certainly a mere unusual question but 
not outright bizarre. The Western mind can still comprehend 
this question and the importance of asking it. However, 
with question number four— "Have building operations been 
recently begun near by?"— we are propelled, at least by 
Western standards, into the bizarre. Why should any doctor 
ask if building operations had been undertaken in the area? 
At this point, the process of questioning departs from 
Western patterns.
In Figure 13, I have attempted to link this 
intermediate process of questioning cf the doctor to the 
general process of questioning. Beginning with the 
question, "Have building operations been recently begun near 
by?", the question that provides the context for all 
questioning is the guestion "What is the human being?"
Within the context of unity in traditional Chinese 
knowledge, this question produces a meaning that the human 
being was a whole within wholes. In this context, the 
question "What is humankind’s relation to Nature?" acquires 
the meaning that the human being is unified with Nature. On
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the next level, guestions concerning this relation become 
significant- Consequently, the guestion "Have building 
operations been recently begun near by?" becomes a mg^t 
significsQt gugsiicn bgsajjgg I&lSies lie £jja§£ fco
M a c s '
In a similar fashion, I can derive the other two 
guestions- The question "Were visiters present and what 
influence did they have cn him?" is dependent on the unity 
of the human being to others and is derived from the unitary 
meaning of the question "What is the human being’s relation 
to others?" This context of questioning becomes a 
significant question because the framework places importance 
on the relation of the human being to others.
Finally, I can lock at the question concerning the 
mental and physical. This question becomes significant 
because the mind and body were considered as related and 
unified as a product of the meaning of the question "What is 
the human being’s relaticn to the self?"
In this context, it is possible, from this process of 
questioning, to derive experience and function. For 
example, the question about building operations in the area, 
relating the human being to Nature, becomes formalized in 
medicine to the relating of pathological conditions to 
meteorological changes in Nature. In a similar manner, 
guestions concerning the mental state cf the patient become 
formalized into an early development of psychosomatic 
medicine.
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In the above, I have taken the time to develop a 
special case of the full process of questioning in Chinese 
medicine. If the questioning were equally available in 
other areas, at least tisSISiisallJ!# it would be possible to 
generate a complete system for that area. In principle, it 
would be possible to generate an alternative system in the 
West— given the assumption of divisibility— which would 
account for the questioning and actions of the Western 
doctor.
In either framework, the important conclusion of this 
investigation is that the process of questioning derives its 
character from the assumed context, and this process then 
places limits on function and experience.
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OVERVIEW
The unity along the three dimensions of the human being 
to Nature, to others, and to the self were themselves 
unified tc produce one unity cf the Tap , it the center of 
this hierarchy of wholes is the human being who has the 
responsibility to maintain the unity of the other wholes, 
beginning with self-cultivation.
This unified framework is the result of the Chinese 
process of questioning. The full linkage between the 
assumption of unity and the assumed context, and the 
conseguences on experience and function were developed 
completely for the case of Chinese medicine. The doctor’s 
questioning was linked to the general process and to the 
consequences in experience and function.
CHAPTER IX
IMPLICATIONS FOB TEI ASSUMPTION OF AN INHEHENT 
NATUfiE TO EUHAN BEINGS
My various meandetings into the philosophy of science 
and into Chinese knowledge will now be applied to the 
problem of challenging the assumption of an inherent nature 
to human beings.
A CHALLENGE TO THE ASSUMPTION CF AN INHERENT 
NATURE TO HUMAN BEINGS
Before the assumption can be challenged and shown to be 
limited, some statement should be made about what the 
implications of this assumption are and how it is used 
within the Western framework of knowledge.
Characteristics of the Assumption
The assumption really presents two arguments: first, 
that the human being has a nature which is inherent and has 
some independence from the process by which this nature is 
known; secondly, it is assumed that this assumption can, ijj 
•EEifiSlEle# be the basis for a universal and complete 
framework of the human being. I will examine these two 
assertions in turn.
As noted in Chapter II, the assumption that the human 
being has an inherent nature is a special case of the more 
general assumption that the universe has an inherent nature
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that can be known. This entire framework rests on the 
assumption of division between the knower and the known.
For this framework to function, there must be an 
independence between the knowing process and the object that 
is known by this process.
In this context, it becomes apparent why the findings 
of quantum mechanics which, in the early part of this 
century tended to challenge this independence, are so 
unnerving. If the nature of light, for example, changes its 
characteristics exclusively on the basis of the experimental 
situations in which it is placed, this challenges the notion 
that light has an inherent nature, ifter all, it is this 
inherent nature that is to serve as a self-corrective 
mechanism whereby one's methods can be tested and knowledge 
advanced.
I would maintain that an analogous situation is 
presented in the case of an inherent nature of the human 
being. The nature of the process of questioning seems to 
change the nature of the human being that comes to be known. 
When one obtains contradictory results, what is normally 
brought into guestion is one's methods, variables, and 
theories, but not the question of whether or not the human 
being has an inherent nature. It is assumed that this 
inherent nature will act as a corrective and allow the 
selection of different methods and variables.
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The second argument is a derivation of the first. It 
is felt that the assumption of an inherent nature of the 
human being can, is p^ip^ipje. become the basis for a 
complete framework of tie human being. The present failure 
to have such a framework is flgt with the assumption of an 
inherent nature, but with our current inability to elaborate 
this framework fully.
To draw an analogy, if a ccin is tossed, it will 
sometimes come up heads and sometimes tails. This 
observation seems tc challenge the assumption of determinism 
whereby all events must have a defined cause. Now, the 
statistician can use the laws of probability to predict on 
each toss the probability cf a head or a tail. In 
principle, however, this use cf probability is only an 
immediate expedient due to our present ignorance of all 
variables that affect the outcome cf the toss. Thus, the 
framework of determinism for the coin toss is at present 
incomplete, but, in principle, can be made complete if all 
the knowledge cf the variables were available.
Now, returning to the assumption of an inherent nature 
to human beings, the psychologist uses probability and 
statistics to describe human behavior; but, I would 
suggest, this is only an immediate expedient, for,
BEiSSiElS* when the inherent nature is completely known, 
when all the variables are available, the prediction will be 
complete and there will nc longer be need for statistics.
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Within this analysis* the present incompleteness of the 
framework is a function of the incomplete articulation of 
the framework and does not establish the inadequacy of the 
framework itself. In general* then* when the inherent 
nature of the human being is kncwn* there will be a complete 
framework based on this nature.
The Challenge of the Results
I would suggest that the results of the method 
challenge both arguments. In respect to the first argument* 
the results suggest the relation between the process of 
questioning and the nature of the human being that is known. 
In detail* the results indicate that the 5§m§ questions 
placed in alternative assumed contexts* defining alternative 
processes of questioning, have material consequences for the 
nature of the human being that comes to be known. There is 
a link between the process of questioning and the nature of 
the human being.
In this manner* the results challenge the independence 
of human nature frcm the process of knowing through which it 
is viewed. If this is the case* how can that which we 
experience as being fixed and structured (perceived to be 
••inherent") in human beings be understood? Much of the 
force of the assumption results frcm looking at the human 
being through a singular process of questioning. It is only 
in the context of alternatives that the full impact of this 
encapsulation beccmes apparent.
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Let me take seme examples and develop them using the 
results of the method. It will be recalled in the above, I 
placed the guestion "What is the human being?" in the 
alternative contexts of the West and traditional China. The 
same guestion generated different meanings: in traditional 
China, the human being was experienced as a whole in unity 
with Nature and with other human beings. In the following 
sections, I developed the implications of this process of 
questioning for experience and function.
As the first example, the results can now be used to 
challenge the notion prevalent among some philosophers of 
the West that loneliness is inherent to the human condition. 
One must ask, "Is loneliness inherent in human nature or is 
it intrinsic to the Western process cf questioning?" One 
way of looking at things is that the assumption of
divisibility generates a process of questioning in the West
which produces an experience and function of human beings 
which places them in isolation from others. If we ask the
same questions in the context of the assumption of unity, an
alternative process of questioning is generated which leads 
to an experience and function of the human being in relation 
to others. Given this parallel development of the two 
processes of questioning, the loneliness of the human being 
in the West is less a product of the nature of the human 
condition and more the product of viewing the human being 
from a singular process of questioning.
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Hsu (1970), for example, has come tc about the same 
conclusion about the universality of loneliness. He writes 
that Westerners seem to assume that loneliness is essential 
to the human condition, but, when this assertion is placed 
in the context of the alternative system of the traditional 
Chinese, it is found net to be essential to the human being 
at all:
The central theme cf Wolfe's voluminous writings 
('Which of us is net forever a stranger and 
alone?') is to be found with varying degrees of 
emphasis throughout Western literature, though it 
has become most explicit in contemporary American 
writing . . .. These writers all appear to assume 
that this is the human tragedy— that is, the 
condition of all mankind. In Chinese literature 
the one kind cf loneliness is that which occurs 
when lovers, or families are separated. There is 
absolutely no expression cf the idea that 
"alcneness" is the ssssatial condition of man or 
of struggling youth. (p. 87)
Another example can be drawn from alternative
conceptions cf the relation cf human beings to Nature. In
the Western framework, it is often assumed that there is
inherent in human nature the need to explore and investigate
one's environment. The human being is given the license to
explore even the hidden places cf Nature, for it “is often
assumed that in these places great discoveries are to be
made which will advance human knowledge. In the Western
context, this function toward Nature is almost the
quintessence of what it means to be "human."
Contrast this ’^inherent" characteristic of human nature
with the function cf the Taoist and Confucian toward Nature.
For the Taoist, the human being was unified with Nature,
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while for the Confucian human society, net Nature, was the
central concern; in either case, the exploration of the
universe that surrounds was negatively valued and there was
little inquisitiveness about the sources of knowledge hidden
in remote areas of the world.
It will be recalled that the Confucian was embedded in
a web of human relationships and responsibilities. For the
Confucian to journey from this womb to a far corner of the
world, let alone the stars, was considered a banishment from
the civilized world itself. Bauer (1976) writes of the
Confucian evaluation of the concept cf a "journey":
While it is true that the "journey" could evoke 
the welcome assumption of an official position in 
the provinces or, at a later time, the adventure 
of the state examinations in the capital, distant 
journeys, particulaxly tc uncivilized areas, let 
alone to foreign countries, suggested war, exile, 
removal from office, or even flight. Not only 
movement itself, but also the encounter with the 
other,, the new, which is cf the very essence of a 
journey, was profoundly disquieting to 
Confucianism. The exhortation: 'Stay at home and 
earn an honest living," could easily have been 
formulated by Confucians. (p. 181)
Given this context, it is difficult for me to imagine a
Confucian looking skyward on a starry night with positive
feelings about a journey to those distant worlds. Yet in
the West, we find such aspirations the very destiny of
humankind.
Taoists, in many cases without the encumbrance of 
Confucian family responsibilities, would often journey to a 
distant mountain to become hermits. Yet, this journey was 
less an exploration of Nature than it was a removal to a
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distant place where one could acre fully appreciate a 
communion with the T§g. As the 332 32 explains, the
sage did not have to discover the secrets of Nature through 
any journey at alls
One may know the world without going out of doors.
One may see the Hay of Heaven without locking
through the windows.
The further one goes, the less cne knows.
Therefore the sage knows without going about.
Understands without seeing,
And accomplishes without any action.
(Chan, 1963, p. 162)
While not everyone could hcpe to attain sagehood, the 
Taoists also provided an image of the ideal society based on 
the above principles, lao Tze describes this community:
Let there be a small ccuntry with few people.
Let there be ten times and a hundred times as many
utensils
But let them not be used.
Let the people value their lives highly and not 
migrate far.
Even if there are ships and carriages, none will 
ride in them.
Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will 
display them.
Let the people again knct cords and use them (in 
place of writing).
Let them relish their food, beautify their 
clothing, be content with their homes, and 
delight in their customs.
Though neighboring communities overlook one 
another and the crowing cf cocks and 
barking of dogs can be heard.
Yet the people there may grow old and die without 
ever visiting one another.
(Chan, 1963, p. 175)
It is difficult for me tc find in either of these traditions 
a reflection of inherent qualities in human nature to 
explore and discover the secrets of Nature.
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I could present several ether instances from the 
results of the method tc show where an "inherent" aspect of 
human nature in the West becomes less "inherent" when 
compared to the experience and function of the human being 
in traditional China. In short, it is ®asy to infer
some aspect to be inherent in the human being when one 
approaches human nature exclusively from a singular process 
of questioning.
In respect to the second argument, the results suggest 
a relational character cf knowledge about human beings. The 
process of questioning and the human nature that results are 
inextricably intertwined. Building a complete framework on 
an assumption of an inherent nature would appear to require 
that this relational quality be collapsed or at least 
accounted for by some variables inherent in human nature.
It is difficult for me to see how any configuration of 
variables can ever, in principle, approximate this 
relational process. It has been my feeling from the 
beginning of this inquiry in Chapter I that the current 
incompleteness of the framework of the human being is not 
the result of the current levels of articulation of this 
framework, but lies in the assumptions and structure of the 
framework itself, fit last, I can give this statement more 
substance.
The results of the method place me in a dilemma. On 
one hand, I need the current framework based on the 
assumption of an inherent nature within which to function.
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and* on the other hand* I also recognize the limitations of 
the very same framework. This dilemma appears to me to be 
analogous to the dilemma of the quantum physicists in the 
early part of this century- Hhat was reguired was a 
complete reformulation of the theories about the nature of 
the universe and a reversal of seme well established 
principles. At least for me* the results suggest the need 
for a similar reformulation of theories about human nature. 
Before I suggest the bread outlines of what this 
reformulation could be* it would be best to deal with some 
of the alternative interpretatiens of the results short of a 
reformulation.
ALTERNATIVE INTEEFB1IAIICNS OF THE RESULTS 
If I may further extend the analogy with guantum 
mechanics* even given the experimental evidence* some 
physicists have not taken the position that a complete 
theoretical reformulation is necessary. Unlike Bohr and 
Heisenberg, these physicists held out hope that variables 
will be discovered which will be able tc explain the current 
anomalous findings. They have become advocates of a "hidden 
variable" solution. A similar position could be taken in 
respect to the results of my method.
The Hidden Variable Solution
In the case cf gcantum theory, Bohm (1957) has 
suggested that the relation between knowledge and the nature 
of guanta can be understood in classical terms by the
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postulation of hidden variables which would again establish 
the laws of causality. In an analogous manner, the critics 
of my interpretation could postulate hidden variables yet to 
be discovered which would invalidate the relational 
qualities of guestions and the knowledge of human beings, 
and reassert the framework based on the assumption of an 
inherent nature. Of course, such a discovery of variables 
would also invalidate my arguments against the completeness 
of the framework based upon this assumption..
As guantum physicists were guick to point out in the 
case of Bohm’s postulaticn of "hidden variables," the burden 
of proof is clearly with advocates of this position. In an 
analogous manner, the burden of proof is on those who would 
assert "hidden variables" inherent in the nature of human 
beings which would explain the results.
It is difficult to speculate abcut what these hidden 
variables could be, but it is net difficult to identify the 
dimensions along which they may be contained. The only 
variables that readily present themselves are variables of 
the organism, environmental variables, or some combination 
of the two. I will now examine some examples of ways of 
accomplishing this.
One could account for the differences between China and 
the West in terms of physiological or anatomical variables. 
Ornstein's thesis (1972) could be extended for this purpose. 
It is asserted that different hemispheres of the brain have 
different functions. The characteristics of Western
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function suggest a dominance of the left hemisphere with its 
emphasis on logic and analysis, while the holistic and 
relational characteristics of Chinese knowledge could be the 
result of right hemisphere dominance.
Along the dimension of environmental variables, one 
could account for the differences in the two frameworks in 
terms of geographical or climatic conditions. Fung (1966) 
suggests that the differences lie in the geographical 
structure of the two land areas. The Greeks were living in 
a maritime country which depended on trade over the oceans. 
The Chinese, on the ether hand, were a continental people 
engaging primarily in farming. Each of these conditions can 
be related to the characteristics of the social structure 
and to the nature of knowledge in each system.
Perhaps the most elaborate and comprehensive 
consideration of such matters is the work of Wittfogel 
(1957). He tries to derive the characteristics of the 
Chinese framework frcm the environmentally induced need to 
manage water for farming purposes. China becomes, in his 
view, an "hydraulic" society which has elaborated a social 
system to deal with this one environmental imperative.
The major problem with any of these variables or 
combination of variables is that they seem so shallow and 
superficial when one examines the depth of differences 
between the two systems. It is difficult to see how any 
combination of variables can account for the full diversity 
of the two frameworks. Again, I always have the feeling of
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trying to approximate a holistic process from the context of 
discrete elements a task that would appear to be extremely 
difficult.
The Cultural Solution
By far the simplest and most direct alternative 
interpretation of the results would be to the use the 
concept of "culture" as an explanatory principle. The 
differences that I have generated in human nature between 
the West and traditional China could be explained as simply 
a difference in culture. The results could be quickly 
dismissed as trivial, the obvious assertion made that the 
two systems are different cultural areas and, therefore, 
should produce different human beings.
The first impression that such a solution leaves with 
me is similar to the impression that the concept of instinct 
leaves with many biologists. Culture seems to explain 
everything and yet explains nothing. Just on these grounds, 
the concept of culture could be questioned- However, there 
is a deeper reservation which rests upon the fact that 
culture is a Western construct.
Kroeber and Kluckhchn (1952), in their classic 
investigation into the concept of culture including well 
over one hundred definitions and meanings, while reluctant 
to provide a broad definition themselves, do conclude with 
the assertion that culture is a "logical construct" within 
knowledge. The social scientist uses this construct, as 
other scientists use their constructs, to explain phenomena.
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Thus, culture must be grouped with ether constructs used in
the Western framework:
Culture is a general category of nature, and 
expressly of human nature. As such it is 
comparable to categories like energy, mass, 
evolution. As a general category it is both 
substantive (or classificatory) and explanatory. 
(Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952, p. 185)
It can be seen from this guotation how deeply embedded in
the Western framework the concept of "culture" is. Culture
becomes something objective, a product of the known, as the
concept of mass is to the physicist.
The concept is dependent on the Western framework. For
example, the assumption of divisibility is made such that it
is possible for human beings to be separated from ether
human beings. It assumes that isolated pockets of humanity
can exist which can develop their own culture standing in
opposition to other cultures. The experience of Chapter VI
has provided the possibility of a different perspective on
this assumption. Within the context of unity in traditional
China, civilization or culture was always singular in
meaning. For the Chinese there was only one civilization
which focused on the "One Man," the Son of Heaven, who had
the responsibility for interfacing all humankind with
Nature. There was no place in this framework for the
Western concept of different cultures.
It is difficult to see how the concept of culture,
dependent as it is on the Western framework, can be a
subsuming construct which would explain both frameworks.
There is always the irresistible tendency for most
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Westerners, in dealing with China, tc simply extend the 
Western framework to beccme the general framework subsuming 
the Chinese as a special case. I hcpe that this inguiry has 
indicated the full alternative character of the Chinese 
framework and the limitations of an approach which attempts 
to expand Western constiucts tc encompass this system.
IH SIftECH OF CBIGIBS
If I am pressed further and reguired to account for the 
differences, I would speculate about the possible source of 
the differences as they are generated not from a complex 
interaction of variables cr from explanatory constructs, but 
as they develop from the process of guestioning itself. It 
must be stressed that the material tc be presented is 
speculation, net historical fact. This speculation is 
presented at the Western reguest tc know the first causes of 
things, a thirst which the Chinese mind seldom shared.
The contemporary aspects of Western knowledge have 
their roots, not in contemporary conditions, but in the 
underlying conceptual framework upon which these conditions 
rest. This underlying framework predates modern times. In 
the discussion in Chapter II, I suggested that the 
contemporary process of guestioning within Western knowledge 
does not differ in essentials from the process of 
guestioning of the Greek philosophers. I further suggested 
that the basis for this process of guestioning could be 
found to develop from the assumptions made by the 
pre-Socratic philosophers.
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Specifically, these philosophers assumed a certain 
divisibility between the knower and the world to be known, 
and a divisibility within the world itself between 
appearance and substance. The origins of the process of 
guestioning and the assumption for this process can be 
traced to the early centuries of the development of Hestern 
knowledge. Tc paraphrase Whitehead, all of Western 
knowledge is but a footnote to the framework which was 
formulated in its essential structure by the Greeks.
It would seem that a search for origins would best 
begin with this process of guestioning as it developed from 
this formative period. The period surrounding the 5th 
century B.C. was a remarkable time in the history of 
humankind. It was a time of philosophical ferment not only 
in the major areas of Greece and China, but also in the 
other pockets of civilization in Iran, Israel, and India.
It was from this boiling cauldron of conflicting ideas that 
the basic foundations of each framework developed.
If we examine this period in Ancient Greece, we discern 
a conflict of ideas. On one side I find the beginnings of 
what was to be the Western framework of knowledge. With the 
Eleatic school of philosophers, Parmenides and his follower 
Zeno, one finds the beginnings of an explicit articulation 
of Western thought— -a clear division between change and 
permanence, and with this, the development of a logic to 
support this position. At the basis of this was the 
assumption that the world has a permanent stuff to be known.
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There was a dissenting voice, a philosopher who 
embraced change over permanence. Heraclitus, called by many 
the “obscure," perhaps because his position departed so 
drastically from that of his contemporaries, rejected the 
dualistic premise of a division between permanence and 
change and asserted that what was fundamental was not a 
“stuff," but a process (Warner, 1963). Change itself was 
considered to be the permanence of the world. In the 
philosophy of Heraclitus, I find the beginnings of a system 
which begins to look very much like that of the Chinese. 
Capra (1975) carries this comparison further by calling 
Heraclitus, the "Greek Taoist" (p. 116). He sees in the 
philosophy of Heraclitus the same emphasis on change and 
cycles of change as is found in the philosophy of Lao Tze.
If we examine the same period in China, one is 
presented with a similar and parallel conflict of ideas. 
Again, one can discern one group of thinkers who became 
representative of the Chinese framework and a dissenting 
group, followers of the philosopher flo Ti (Ho Tse) and the 
school that he founded, flohism. What is remarkable is that 
this system appears to most scholars as almost Western in 
its characteristics.
For example. Ho Ti was the only Chinese who could be 
said to have founded a religion in the Western sense of the 
word (Shih, 1963). This religion had many characteristics 
which ran parallel to Christianity. Abegg (1952) writes of 
Mo Ti: "By comparison with the doctrines and philosophies of
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life which have prevailed in China fcr centuries. Ho Ti with 
his intellectual affinities with the West strikes us as 
distinctly un-Chinese." (p. 227)
I can only briefly touch upon the philosophy of this 
school. For a more complete consideration the reader is 
directed to Mei (1934). aided by the closely related school 
called the logicians. Ho Ti advocated a "proto-Western" 
position which included such novelties, by Chinese 
standards, as the experimental investigation of Nature and 
the development of logic. In this latter case, one finds 
the spontaneous development of logical paradoxes which are 
quite similar to the these suggested by Zeno, indicating the 
development of thought along Western lines.*
As with the philosophy of Heraclitus in Greece, the 
philosophy of Ho Ti was against the dominant current of the 
framework— in this case, the traditions of Taoism and 
Confucianism, one could then build a full parallelism in 
both civilizations; the budding unity of Heraclitus vs. the 
dominant divisibility of the Eleatics, and in China> the 
unity of the Confucians and Taoists vs. the budding 
divisibility of the Hohists and the logicians,. Given this 
setting, it is possible that any particular characteristic
*For further information on this remarkable parallel 
development, see Shih (1963, p. 120) and Needham (1956, 
pp. 194-5). Needham (1956) writes on this 
correspondences "Zeno's floruit was -450; the Chinese 
paradoxes must have been under discussion about -320. I 
find it very hard to believe in any transmission or 
influence at such a time. It would not be unnatural that 
the paradoxical form should arise spontaneously at that 
particular stage of thought, but the temporal coincidence 
remains remarkable." (p. 190)
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of either civilization could have developed. For example,
we tend to view science as a product of Western
civilization. However, the seed was present at this period
in China as well. Needham (1956) observes:
When one puts together the resemblances of the 
early Taoists to the pre-Sccratics, and those of 
the Hohists and Logicians to the Eleatics and 
Peripatetics, and moreover, when one takes into 
account the enormous gaps known to exist in the 
ranks of the ancient Chinese writings which have 
come down to us, one is left with the impression 
that there was little to choose between ancient 
European and ancient Chinese philosophy so far as 
the foundations of scientific thought were 
concerned* and, indeed, that in ceitain respects 
the advantage lay with the Chinese, (p. 203)
At this time, both civilizations were at a point of balance
requiring a small deflection tc alter the course of their
future development.
The factor that has provided for alternative processes
of guestioning and has given each civilization its character
is, in my opinion, the alternative resolution, in Greece and
ancient China, of these parallel conflicts of ideas. In the
West, the views of Parmenides have predominated over those
of Heraclitus. In traditional China, I find the alternative
resolution. The wcrk cf the Mchists and Logicians became
completely suppressed by the dominant Ccnfucian persuasion.
So complete was this suppression, according to Abegg (1952),
that "there is no mention cf his name [Mo Ti] in any
chronicle, or in any of the innumerable and voluminous
Chinese histories." (p. 227)
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Alas, the Western thirst for causes is never fully 
quenched! One would ask what the cause for this alternative 
resolution of ideas was? Unfortunately, such problems must 




The results challenge two assertions made by the 
assumption that human beings have an inherent nature. Much 
of what has been assumed to be inherent in human nature is a 
function of viewing the human being from a singular process 
of guestioning. A framework based on this assumption is 
limited in its ability tc deal with the relational aspects 
of the process of guestioning and the human function and 
experience which result.
The attempt tc explain the differences between China 
and the West via traditional arguments cf hidden variables, 
and using the concept of "culture," were found to be 
inadequate. It was suggested that the differences could be 
traced to an alternative resolution of a parallel conflict 
of ideas early in the development cf each civilization.
CBAPTEB X
GENEBATING AND APPLYING AN ALTEBNATIVE 
ASSUMED CONTEXT
To this point in this inguiry* I have concentrated 
primarily on the negative aspects of the results as they 
apply to the psychologist’s framework of the human being and 
specifically to challenging the assumption that human beings 
have an inherent nature that can be known. I would like to 
concentrate now on the positive implications of the results* 
as these results suggest an alternative assumed context for 
guestioning about human beings,.
AN ALTEBNATIVE ASSUMED CONTEXT AS A GENEBAL PBCCESS
The differences between China and the west have been 
the major focus of the discussion. However* the method has 
not only highlighted differences but alsc similarities 
between the two frameworks. These similarities can become 
the basis for generating a more general process which views 
China and the Nest as special cases.
Tha General Process
In the last chapter* the analysis of the results 
concentrated on the differences between knowledge and the 
nature of the human being in traditional China and the Nest. 
If we now ask the guestion* "What similarities have been 
generated by the method?"* the results can be made to assume
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a different aspect and serve a different purpose.
In the Rest, the results suggest that the assumed 
context of Western knowledge provided the basis for a 
process of guestioning about human beings and in turn 
affected human function and experience. In a parallel 
manner, the assumed context of traditional China affected 
human function and experience with alternative conseguences. 
I find in both areas the identity of one process, a basic 
similarity. From this perspective, both traditional China 
and the west can be viewed as special cases of the general 
process whereby the guestions asked (i. e., the process of 
guestioning) act in a pronounced fashion on the perception 
of human experience and function (i.e., human nature).
It is not necessary to construct an alternative assumed 
context, for the method has generated such an alternative 
through its very function. At the heart of this alternative 
assumed context is the assumption that huja§n figure is a 
£ auction of the process o£ gge^tj.onipg through which it is 
This assumption can form the basis for an 
alternative assumed context of guestioning.
Within the special case of the Western assumed context, 
guestions which relate to what the inherent nature of human 
beings may be are given central importance. From this 
focus, the guestions that one asks derive as indicated in 
Chapter II. within the assumed context here being 
suggested, the guestions we ask about human beings and the 
human nature we desire to have ideally become the focal
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guestions from which all other guestions derive.
If human nature is not inherent in human beings and is 
related to the guestions we ask, we take the responsibility 
for the process of guestioning and the human nature that 
results. I must again recall the insightful comment made by 
the guantum physicist Heisenberg that "tie must remember that 
what we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to 
our methods of guestioning." (Heisenberg, 1958, p. ,81) If I 
may extend Heisenberg*s comment, what we observe of human 
beings is not human nature but human nature exposed to our 
process of guestioning. This latter phrase is the defining 
condition for an alternative assumption and context.
I am not the first, nor, I hope, the last, to suggest 
the importance of this relation in the study of human 
nature. For example, in education, a very similar proposal 
is advanced by Postman and tieingartner (1969) in respect to 
the current views about students in the teaching situation. 
They write: "He have to remember that what we observe 
children doing in schccls is not what they are, but children 
exposed to us by cur methods of teaching." (p. 80) Similar 
realizations cculd no dcubt be produced from other areas.
Integrating the Specific Process in the General
At this point, one would ask what is to become of the 
sizable commitment to the traditional assumed context and 
all of the information produced from this process of 
guestioning. If one truncates the general process to one 
dimension, all of the aspects of the Western process of
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guestioning can be generated. Within this special case, 
there is no difference between the two. However, the 
alternative does have other dimensions of guestioning which 
are not available in the special case. We have a choice at 
this point: one can truncate the process of guestioning and 
limit the guestions that will be asked about human nature, 
or one can expand this process cf guesticning to ask 
guestions that are not usually asked and indeed make one 
uncomfortable. This choice has implications for everyone 
and for the guestions that the psychologist asks in 
particular.
The pragmatic results of this alternative mode of 
inguiry for the psychologist can be realized most directly 
by the guestions that are asked, fls noted above, the 
psychologist is basically asking cnly specific refinements 
of one guestion, "What is the human being?", a guestion that 
has its source in the Western assumed context. The result 
of this, as Dubin (1969) has recognized, is that 
"psychologists seem to be afraid to ask really important 
guestions." (p. 277) This is not a criticism of 
psychologists as much as it is a criticism of the assumed 
context in which psychologists are forced to work, a context 
which assigns the guestions that are to be answered.
The result is that, as Dubin concludes, the 
psychologist is channeled into one process of guestioning, 
and this process cf guestioning guickly degenerates into a 
highly specific mode of guesticning largely dependent on the
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methodology which is currently available:
Thus# it seems to me that we all are far too eager 
to ask guestions as *what can be ea^i^y answered?*
'What else can I dc with my test?* 'What aspects 
of behavior can I study with my computer or with 
my apparatus?* or what problems can I find that I 
can fit this method to? (p. 277)
In short# within the current assumed context, the
process of inquiry is subservient to the process of
guestioning# with the latter being a sacred process which
itself is free from criticism; while within the
alternative, tie process of inguiry is directed toward the
process of guestioning and has as its purpose the criticism
of the guestions we ask and an active manipulation of these
guestions- The choice is really between having control over
this process or continuing to work within the process
without being able tc explore its full potentials and being
limited to only one dimension.
APPLICATION TO TEE PBOBLEM 
The alternative just presented can serve as a solution 
to the problem which initiated this inguiry- It will be 
recalled that the problem was defined in Chapter I as the 
limitation of psychology*s framework to encompass human 
potentials- I proceeded to illustrate the problem by 
examining its two dimensions: the limitations of the 
framework's capacity toward the potentials of others and 
toward the potentials of human beings as knowers. In both 
instances# it was concluded that the attempt to encompass 
human potentials completely within the traditional framework
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resulted in either a paradox of reflexivity or, more 
acutely, in an image of the human being without human 
potentials. Those aspects of the human being that ve 
associate with being human become systematically excluded by 
the framework.
The alternative framework just suggested has the 
capacity to deal with both aspects of the problem. Within 
the alternative, the only limits placed on human potentials 
are those imposed by the human being's own process of 
guestioning. likewise, the acute issue of incorporating the 
knover and the known within the same framework is obviated, 
for the alternative postulates a unified process which is 
uniform and continuous for both the knower and the human 
being who is known. I will new examine the implications of 
the alternative alcng each of these dimensions.
The Alternative and the Potentials of Others
The traditional psychological framework has a limited 
capacity for encompassing human potentials because these 
potentials must be contained within the dimensions of 
something inherent in human nature. The alternative 
framework of the human being obviates the problem by viewing 
human beings as constructing their own potentials within 
their process of guestioning, the only limit being that they 
remain within seme process of guesticning.
Since human potentials are linked tc something inherent 
in human nature within the Western framework, these 
potentials are viewed as being intrinsic to this nature.
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The human being, in final analysis, becomes something inert, 
an elaborate manikin. As I have tried to suggest in the 
preceding chapters, the human being is engaged in a progess 
more profound and active than this view would indicate. 
Within the traditional framework, the purpose is to discover 
what this inert, intrinsic structure is, resulting in 
recourse to ever more complex models of what this manikin 
may be in an attempt to close the gap with observed human 
potentials.
In Chapter I, I presented seme cf the difficulties
involved in such a program; but these difficulties have not
impeded the search which has produced a mosaic of possible
models. Here are but a few:
Han is a telephone exchange, a servomechanism, a 
binary digital computer, a reward-seeking vector, 
a hyphen between S and B process, a stimulation- 
maximizer, a food, sex or libido energy converter, 
a ’utilities* maximizing game player, a status 
seeker, a mutual egc-titillatcr, a mutual 
emotional (or actual) masturbator, a hollow cocoon 
seeking ecstasy through the liguidation of its 
boundaries in the company of other cocoons 
similarly seeking ecstasy,. (Koch, 1974, p. 6)
One could, of course, add to Koch's list. However, as
the list is expanded and one includes more and more
increasingly elaborate models cf human nature, the goal of
encompassing human potentials, instead of approaching
realization, seems, as with attempt to reach absolute zero,
to recede at an even faster pace and seems even more beyond
one's grasp. I attempted in Chapter I to illustrate that
the problem of human potentials cannot be solved in an
additive manner by simply combining different variables and
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models in an eclectic manner. The problem lies with the 
assumption upon which the framework is based and is 
intrinsic to the structure of the current framework.
The alternative obviates the problem of encompassing 
the potentials of ethers by viewing human beings as 
constructing their own potentials through their process of 
guestioning. It is hoped that this inguiry has established 
that at the heart cf human nature is a process, a process in 
which human beings construct themselves. Since human beings 
construct their own potentials from this process and the 
human being can alter the flow cf this process through the 
questions asked and the assumed context in which they are 
asked, a framework based on this assumption has the capacity 
for almost infinite variation in human potentials. The only 
limitation imposed on human potentials within the 
alternative is that the human being must remain within somg 
process of questioning. In short, the major point of 
departure for the alternative is the conviction that the 
human being's potential is to alter human potential.
The alternative, cf course, frees the knower from 
forever looking for some secret to human nature, from the 
search for the model that "fits," and which will account for 
all human potentials. I would submit that the human being 
has no secret nature to be discovered, for this nature is 
the same as that of the knower. One constructs knowledge 
from a process of guestioning. This discussion brings us 
full circle to a consideration of the other dimension of the
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problem— the potentials of the human being as a knower.
The Alternative and the Potentials of the Knower
I elaborated at length, in Chapter I, the separation 
between the human being as a kncwer and the human being that 
is known. I quoted Gouldner (1970) as saying that they are 
thought to compose two breeds cf men. On the one hand, we 
have the human being as a knower displaying one process of 
knowing, characterized by rationality and autonomous action. 
On the other hand, we have the human being as known 
displaying yet another process, characterized by motivation 
and determinism. The current framework, then, confronts us 
with alternative processes for the two categories of human 
beings and, consequently, different orders of potentials.
The problems centering around reflexivity, turning one 
process back upon the otter, defined the paradoxes of this 
approach most acutely.
This situation is quite analogous to the role of the 
observer in the Newtonian universe. Within this framework, 
the observer was tc exist in a God-like framework of 
absolutes separated from the universe being observed. The 
revolution of relativity has removed the human being from 
such a privileged status, and has brought the observer into 
the world being observed. In an analogous manner, playing 
upon the assumed divisibility that underlies Western 
knowledge everywhere, the psychologist, the social 
scientist, and, ultimately, the Western knower are assumed 
to be in a privileged position in respect to other human
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beings. The main thrust of this inguiry has been an assault 
on this aloofness.
The point where the alternative challenges this course 
of events is, at its heart, the assumption that there are 
two processes, that the knower has different potentials from 
the human being who is known. Within the alternative 
framework, I am suggesting, the two processes are collapsed 
into one process. In both cases, there is the unity of one 
process: as knower or known, the psychologist or scientist
constructs knowledge from assumptions and guestions giving 
definition tc a process of guestioning. This process then 
affects one‘s experience and function.
It follows that human beings as kncwers or as the known 
have the s§me potentials, being limited only by the 
guestions they ask and the assumed context in which they are 
asked. Psychologists as knowers have all the limitations 
and potentials of other human beings they are attempting to 
know.
APPLICATION TO AN ABEA OF PSYCHOLOGY
The core of the alternative framework here suggested, 
in direct application tc what a psychologist does, is that 
psychologists are constructing human nature by the guestions 
they ask about human beings and the situations in which the 
psychologist places human beings. Tc apply the alternative 
to an area of psychology would entail presenting evidence 
that psychologists are becoming aware of this relation.
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From the very beginning cf this inguiry, it was 
necessary, in order to define the problem, to examine the 
total psychological framework beyond the limits of the 
customary boundary conditions between areas of psychology 
and between psychclcgy and other disciplines. It was only 
within this perspective of the total field and, in many 
cases, the extrapolation cf the current levels of 
articulation tc ideal levels cf development, that any 
experience of the problem could be generated.
Now, as I attempt tc apply the results of this inguiry 
to a specific area of psychology, I am confronted with the 
inverse of the problem. The results apply to the total 
framework and are not limited to the domain of one specific 
area of psychology. For example, it is difficult to see the 
effects of the construction of human nature in the area of 
the physiology of perception in, say, experiments on retinal 
gradients. Yet, the guestions being asked by this 
experimenter are in fact derivable from the general process 
of guestioning within the larger framework of psychology.
The problem is that as one fragments the framework into 
smaller and smaller components and sub-disciplines, one also 
tends to obscure the relationships that are so central to 
the alternative that I am suggesting. This situation makes 
it extremely difficult tc examine the theories and data of 
one area of psychology and immediately apply the alternative 
in a meaningful fashion.
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With these difficulties and limitations firmly in mind, 
I will attempt to apply the alternative to social 
psychology. This field is a particularly fertile one for 
dealing with these relationships because the subject of 
study is the relatively complex aspects of human behavior 
and involves the effects of one perscn on another.
A major conclusion of this inguiry was the realization 
that investigations into human nature are relational and 
reflexive activities which involve both the knower and the 
known. Approaching from an experimental and empirical 
direction on this issue, some psychologists are beginning to 
assert that psychological research is a relational and 
reflexive activity. Gadlin and Ingle (1975) have suggested 
that psychological research should be considered in this 
light even though this view runs counter to the current 
S§i£a§i§t:
Conducting research means entering into 
relationships with people, and these relationships 
significantly affect the outcome of the research.
Our present methodology prescribes these 
relationships as impersonal ones, leads us to 
minimize the effects of ‘personal* factors, turns 
our attention away from a consideration of the 
relationships, and facilitates treating our 
subjects as objects. Alternatively, we are 
suggesting that there is no way in which human 
research cannot be relational and that 
psychological methodology must attend to the 
relational quality of research; this is the 
beginning of reflexivity. (Gadlin and Ingle,
1975, p. 1008)
They go on to expand this notion of reflexivity to 
viewing both the psychologist and the human subject as 
contained within one process and subject to the same
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process:
Additionally, reflexivity can be created by 
acknowledging that the study of human behavior 
necessarily includes the behavior of 
psychologists. This recognition implies, of 
course, that the psychologist is as prone to 
psychological processes as anyone else and should 
be especially self-ccnsciccs of this fact when 
acting as a scientist. (Gadlin and Ingle, 1975,
p. 1008)
These statements are remarkably close to the spirit of the 
alternative framework for psychology that I have suggested.
As a conseguence of the relational and reflexive 
structure of psychological research, the psychologist, and 
the social psychologist in particular, may be viewed as 
constructing a human nature that one's subjects then 
internalize, and which the social psychologist then 
validates empirically as human nature. In this way, one is 
limiting what human nature can be. fmpirj.gal validation 
dges fio£ m§afi that something i§ inherent ip human nature, 
aalz ifeat a c§£+ain ££§ult is a £££££&&££
m§aas of apppopgh. Argyris (1975) gives the following 
example:
For example, if students read textbooks that 
purport tc describe human nature and if these 
textbooks include dissonance and attribution 
theories, then the psychological processes that 
compose these theories may form the basis for the 
model of man implicit in these theories. Ne are 
told in these tests that human beings strive to 
reduce post decisional dissonance or freguently 
make attributions cf others. The student reading 
these generalizations may understandably come to 
conceive of human nature as including dissonance 
mechanisms and attribution activities. Such an 
inference would be supported empirically. But it 
does not follow that dissonance reduction and 
attribution are part of human nature in the same 
sense that 1/2 gt2 is part of the physical 
universe. The latter is hypothesized to
characterize an essential quality of the physical 
universe. The former can be shown to be an 
artifact# a convention that can be altered Xt 
other concepts of human nature are developed.
(pp. 473-74)
One can see an application of the major structural 




The resalts of the method generate an alternative 
assumed context fox guestioning which encompasses the 
Western and the Chinese frameworks as special cases. The 
alternative assumes that human nature is a function of the 
process of questioning frcm which it is viewed.
This alternative was used as a solution to the problem 
of encompassing human potentials. The only limit placed on 
human potentials withir the alternative is that one must 
remain within some process of guestioning.. The knower and 
the known become viewed as being within the same process and 
as having the same potentials.
The alternative was applied to a field within 
psychology. Psychologists, notably social psychologists, 
have expressed views about reflexivity and the construction 
of human nature which are congruent with those of the 
alternative suggested.
FUTUEE PEESPECTIVES
As I look back upon the distance that this inguiry has 
covered# the speculations that have been made# the expanding 
of some principles beyond the limits to which they are 
normally taken and the placing cf factual elements into# 
sometimes# quite obscure contexts# I ask myself# "For what 
reason has this inguiry teen undertaken?"
I can only answer for myself. To me this inguiry makes 
a positive statement about the responsibilities of the 
knower as a psychologist and as a human being. As a knower# 
I must assume the responsibility for my nature and that of 
others beyond just discovering what that nature is.
This inguiry would imply that if we so focus and limit 
the questions that we ask about ourselves and others# we can 
come to discover and validate § theory of what human beings 
are and what we ourselves are. It is possible to do this# 
and this is a fair description of what is currently 
happening in Western knowledge.
This is currently being dene# but should it be done? 
This inguiry suggests that we have a choice. The 
psychologist can expand the guestions that are asked and the 
resultant human nature that can be ccnstructed and 
experienced. When one asks guestions about what human 
nature is, one will discover what is contained within one's 




The key to approaching what can be is the recognition
that the limits of what the human being can be are not given
by something inherent in human beings, but in their process 
of questioning and in our process of questioning when we 
view that nature. This inquiry has attempted to show that 
at this point in time the Western process of questioning is 
quite invariant. There is one assumption and one central 
question from which the structure of the ques-tioning 
derives. The total effect is a dominance of the notion that 
human beings have an inherent nature that is to be known.
The Only place in the contemporary world where I can
find an example of the wide scale attempt to construct human
nature in an alternative manner is in the People*s Republic 
of China. It is my experience and that of many others who 
have visited China in the last few years that there is a 
concerted effort in that society to remake human nature. If 
one is to accept at face value what one reads, gone is the 
assumption that certain characteristics such as intelligence 
and creativity are inherent in some individuals and not 
others. Working on such principles of the mutability of 
human nature, this country has, since the revolution, 
transformed an entire society.
As one examines this construction of a new human being 
in contemporary China, one begins to ask different 
questions, questions about the questions that we ask about 
human beings in this society, and guestions about what
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guestions the Chinese themselves are asking. William Hinton
writes of this challenge:
What can one say about a society that really takes 
seriously the idea that everyone has untapped 
potential, that everyone can be creative, that 
intelligence is not fixed, that human nature can 
be transformed? What can we make of the idea that 
creativity is not a private matter— a guestion of 
this or that individual genius doing his or her 
own thing— but arises from cooperation, from 
combining the intelligence and efforts of many?
Or, for that matter, of the idea that education 
should teach people to think; that exams should 
test one’s ability to think, or, even the 
collective ability of a group to think; that 
discipline is rooted in a voluntary commitment to 
decisions and rules that are comprehended and 
agreed upon? And how can we deal with the idea 
that education should be ccmbined with productive 
labor while productive labor everywhere should 
generate education— every school a factory, every 
factory a school— with the further implication 
that education should never stop and that no one 
is too old to learn? (Gamberg, 1977, p. xiii).
It is always tempting for the Westerner to regard
contemporary China as a resolution to Western problems.
While the Chinese must be applauded for the enormous changes
in human nature that have been produced since 1949, these
changes themselves have keen generated from and limited by a
Marxist view of the human being which views human nature as
a function of social and economic conditions and not as a
function of the boundary conditions cf one’s process of
guestioning. It was this Marxist ideal cf the human being
which has acted as the guiding force for this tranformation.
As Uao said in pre-revoluticnary days in Yenan:
Is there such a thing as human nature? Of course 
there is. But there is cnly human nature in the 
concrete, no human nature in the abstract. In 
class society there is only human nature of a 
class character; there is no human nature above 
classes. We uphold the human nature of the
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proletariat and of the masses of the people* while 
the landlords and bourgeois classes uphold the 
human nature of their own classes* only they do 
not say so but make it out to be the only human 
nature in existence. (Mac Tse-Tung, 1967, p. 90)
Much of the transformation that has been possible in China
was the result of this relationship where social conditions
were changed and a new humac nature constructed.
One must ask if this is the only ideal which has the
potential to guide the construction of a new human nature.
The Marxist view of the human being places certain boundary
conditions on the guesticns that can be asked and limits the
human nature that can be constructed.
If this inquiry stands for one thing.* it stands for the
principle that there must net be any preset boundary
conditions for the guestions asked about human nature. It
is only within such an open process cf questioning that the
full potentials of the human being can hope to be realized.
APPENDIX
LEIBNIZ AND CHINESE KNOWLEDGE
The philosophy of Leibniz stands out among other 
Western philosophies as being in many ways unique and 
reminds one cf how a Chinese thinker would construct his 
world more than of the way a Western thinker does. This has 
suggested to me that Leibniz may have been stimulated to 
develop such ncn-Western ideas from contacts with Chinese 
knowledge. Since the work of Leibniz is central to much of 
the work of the later European philosophers, it could be 
speculated that, via Leibniz, there was a major infusion of 
Chinese concepts into Western knowledge, or more precisely, 
an infusion of the Chinese framework of unity info the 
Western framework of divisibility. The following all too 
brief consideration of this speculation attempts to follow 
this intuition.
There can be no question, in my opinion, that 
Leibnizian philosophy is fettered to the Western framework 
of divisibility and its attendant philosophical problems 
which derive from this assumed context of questioning. 
Leibniz was very much interested in the traditional problems 
of Western philosophy that the assumption of division 
presents— the relation of God to the human world and the 
relation of mind to body. As Carr (1960) has recognized.
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these two divisions were interrelated for Leibniz such that 
in the mind-body relation he found in miniature the 
God-world relation. Leibniz hoped that by solving the 
mind-body problem a general metaphysic could be produced 
that would solve all problems concerning reality.
While the purpose and problem for Leibniz were defined 
by the Western framework, his approach to these problems was 
quite unorthodox by Western standards. Leibniz suggested a 
radical redefinition of the idea of a substratum to the 
world, abandoning the traditional Western notion of a static 
substratum in favor of an active subject (Carr, 1960),. This 
radical reformulation of the concept of substance is 
essential to an understanding cf his concept of the monad. 
Using this as a basis, Leibniz obviates many of the 
oppositions in thought and suggests an alternative which 
subsumes the dualisms. For example, his doctrine of 
"pre-established harmcny" obviates and subsumes the 
opposition of the causation theory and the doctrine of 
occasionalism in relating God to the world.
All of this tends to suggest that Leibniz, while 
definitely working within a Western framework, has generated 
unique solutions which one finds difficult to derive from 
completely Western sources. This tends to point to a 
non-Western, possibly Chinese, source of influence on his 
thought. I am certainly not the first to see in Leibnizian 
ideas, not the divisions of the West, but the unity 
characteristic of Chinese knowledge. For example, Eeichwein
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(1967) writes:
The doctrine of a * pre-established harmony* has 
its Chinese counterpart in the s£ IfeS Worlfl.
Leibniz believes, like the Chinese sages, in the 
world of reality as a Onity, as a continuously 
rising scale of spiritual beings developing 
progressively. (p. 79)
There is some historical evidence to support the
assertion that throughout his life Leibniz was very involved
with "things Chinese," Lach (1945) indicates that at an
early age Leibniz was guite familiar with Chinese materials
that were being conveyed to Europe from China by Jesuit
missionaries, fts time went on, Leibniz became very involved
in the controversy raging in Europe concerning the
interpretation of Confucian rites within Catholic theology.
The stimulus of China was present. The real guestion is the
degree to which the ideas of his philosophy were a direct
result of this Chinese stimulus and to what degree his ideas
were independently developed.
Hughes (1943) writes That with the one exception of the
existence of Gcd, the position of Leibniz would be in almost
complete agreement with that cf a Nec-Confucianist. He
suggests the thesis that Leibniz was to a great degree
absorbing the Chinese materials presented to him by the
Jesuits. He writes:
The natural inference, and I think, within limits 
the right one, is that the Chinese influence went 
very deep in him [Leibniz], deeper than he knew, 
since the spirit of the man was such that he 
gladly and easily accepted what he read in the 
Jesuit books. (p. 20)
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Mungello (1971), on the other hand, asserts the
somewhat opposing view that the Chinese influence was less
important in the development of his ideas and that Leibniz
only sought confirmation of his ideas in Chinese thought,
Mungello writes that "confirmation, not derivation, of his
key principles seems to have been what Leibniz sought in
China." (p. 20)
It is beyond the scope of the present inquiry to
consider this issue further. He can conclude, however, that
beyond the historical problems involved in evaluating the
particular weight of Chinese knowledge in the development of
the philosophy of Leibniz, there was an infusion of
Chinese-like thought into European philosophy at that time.
The degree to which his unigue contribution was developed
independently or as a result cf the Chinese stimulus may
forever remain a moot point.
Needham (1956) suggests the interesting thesis that
Leibnizian philosophy was instrumental in disseminating the
Chinese philosophy of organism into European thought. It
was this philosophy which was central to the collapse of the
monopoly of the tarren mechanistic philosophy in European
thought. Hith this collapse, new theoretical heights of
science and philosophy were possible. The development of
the organic philosophy necessary for these theoretical
triumphs can he traced, according to Needham, to Leibniz
and, ultimately, to the Sung Neo-Confucianists. He writes:
The great triumphs of early 'modern* natural 
science were possible on the assumption of a 
mechanical universe— perhaps this was
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indispensible for them— but the time was to come 
when the growth of knowledge necessitated the 
adoption of a mere organic philosophy no less 
naturalistic than atomic materialism. That was 
the time cf Darwin, Frazer, Pasteur, Freud,
Spemann, Planck and Einstein. When it came, a 
line of philosophical thinkers was found to have 
prepared the way— from Whitehead back to Engels 
and Hegel, from Hegel to leibniz— and then perhaps 
the inspiration was.not European at all. Perhaps, 
the theoretical foundations of the most modern 
•European* natural sciences owe more to men such 
as Chuang Chou, Chou Tun-I and Chu Hsi than the 
world has yet realized. (Needham, 1956, p. 505)
This is a very interesting line of thought along which
there has been little in the way of systematic scholarship.
I have long felt that many of the theoretical developments
of the West could not have been executed from only the
Western framework of divisibility. The Chinese framework,
on the other hand, with its assumption of unity, provides a
certain freedom which cannot be found in the Western
framework.
It is indeed an intriguing thought that perhaps Western 
theoretical triumphs have their source not with the 
pre-Socratics, nor with Plato or Aristotle, but with the 
Taoists, Confucians, and Sung Neo-Confucians of traditional 
China. It is at once a humbling and gratifying thought 
which tends to indicate the unity of world knowldge.
While we are at this point in the currents of world 
knowledge, I cannot hesitate tc make yet a further 
speculation concerning the contemporary world. It is an 
enticing thought that perhaps, in the guise of Marxism, the 
Western modified traditional Chinese framework has again 
returned to China. Maoism, as it derives from the work of
3U3
Harx and Engles# would seem to enter at this point on the 
chain developed above. It is revealing to a note a comment 
made to Peyrefitte (1977). He guotes one Chinese communist 
theorist as saying# "Besearch may in time show that in fact 
aarx borrowed from China. He took it straight from Hegel, 
and Hegel— along with Fichte and Schelling— seems to have 
derived it from Asiatic thought." (p. 56)
The feeling that this discussion leaves with me is 
similar to that which I have cften had when viewing a huge 
machine. Hany times# I can see the relation between 
different moving parts, of piston to rod, but the final 
purpose of the machine remains a mystery. A comforting 
assumption is that world knowledge# through these 
cross-currents, is evolving# generating its dynamism from 
the continued cross-fertilization between China and the 
West.
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